BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

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TENTATIVE RULING

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendant Kreative Kids KKLC, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) demurrer to Plaintiff Van Bui’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint is ruled upon as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to attempt to contact opposing counsel and advise them of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact them prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person or remotely.

Background

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges seven employment-related causes of action against her former employer, Defendant, including claims related to alleged discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate.

Defendant now demurs to the complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

On demurrer, allegations of the challenged pleading are liberally construed, with a view

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the challenged pleading lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “‘“[P]laintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . .”, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations . . . .’” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.)

Discussion

Defendant demurs to each of Plaintiff’s causes of actions contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint, on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiff’s First cause of action for whistleblower retaliation fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5 as follows: • The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute “adverse employment actions” or “constructive discharge.” • The Complaint does not allege that Defendant had actual knowledge or belief that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity.

2. Plaintiff’s Second cause of cation for retaliation fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Government Code 12940(h) as follows:

• The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute “adverse employment actions” or “constructive discharge.” • The Complaint does not allege that Defendant had actual knowledge or belief that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

3. Plaintiff’s Third cause of cation for disability discrimination fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Government Code 12940(h) as follows:

• The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute “adverse employment actions” or “constructive discharge.” • The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant had a medical, mental, or physical condition as defined by California law.

4. Plaintiff’s Fourth cause of cation for failure to provide reasonable accommodations fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Government Code 12940(h) as follows:

• The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant had a medical, mental, or physical condition as defined by California law. • The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical, mental, or physical condition as defined by California law. • The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations.

5. Plaintiff’s Fifth cause of cation for failure to engage in interactive process fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Government Code 12940(n) as follows:

• The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant had a medical, mental, or physical condition as defined by California law. • The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical, mental, or physical condition as defined by California law. • The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Plaintiff requested Defendant make reasonable accommodations.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

• The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant did not participate in a timely good-faith interactive process.

6. Plaintiff’s Sixth cause of cation for failure to prevent retaliation and discrimination fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Government Code 12940(k) as follows:

• The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute “adverse employment actions” or “constructive discharge” as required to show retaliation. • The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendant had a medical, mental, or physical condition as defined by California law, and as required for a showing of discrimination.

7. Plaintiff’s Seventh cause of cation for wrongful constructive discharge in violation of public policy fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action under common law as follows:

• The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute “constructive discharge.”

(Notice, 2:5 – 4:5.)

Adverse Employment Action

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh causes of action each require Plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to allege that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to an “adverse employment action” and that Plaintiff fails to do so.

An “adverse employment action” is an action taken by an employer that causes a “substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.” (Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co. (2011) 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1063.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

Defendant asserts that the specific material facts that Plaintiff alleges constituted adverse employment action include:

• That Defendant required Bui, the center’s director, to work at times in classrooms to cover for teachers and to plan curriculum. Id., e.g., ¶ 173(a). • That on September 18, 2024, Bui’s device was logged out of Brightwheel, a preschool management and communication app. Id., e.g., ¶ 173(b). • That on September 29, 2024, Bui was not initially added to a new group in GroupMe, a team communication app, until another employee pointed out later that day that Bui was not in the group, at which point Bui was added.

Id., e.g., ¶ 173(c). • That Bui received a disciplinary write-up. Id., e.g., ¶ 173(e). • That between September 2024 and October 2024, on five separate days, Defendant sent text messages to Bui asking Bui to work an earlier or later shift than was her standard schedule, or despite the fact that Bui was in hospital. Id., e.g., ¶ 182(f). • That in January 2024 (eight months before Bui’s alleged protected activity), Bui was asked to come to work on the same day that Bui’s child had to get “stitch procedures.” Id., e.g., ¶ 182(g). • That on October 1, 2024, Defendant hired an assistant director, gave that new hire access to apps and door codes, and delegated some of Bui’s responsibilities to the new assistant director.

Id., e.g., ¶ 182(i). • That Defendant “defamed” Bui by telling one parent that the parent’s child’s behaviors were a result of Bui “baby[ing]” the child. Id., e.g., ¶ 182(h). • That other employees were “instructed” not to communicate with Bui. Id., e.g., ¶ 182(d). • That Defendant “continuously” monitored Bui through the building’s security cameras. Id., e.g., ¶ 182(j).

(Defendant’s Memorandum, 3:15 – 4:3.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

Defendant argues, “Even accepting each of [Plaintiff’s] factual allegations as true, they do not constitute an adverse employment action, as they did not, individually or taken together, change any ‘term’ or ‘condition’ of her job.” (Defendant’s Memorandum, 4:5-8.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the Complaint alleges that six days after Plaintiff’s reports to Community Care Licensing and Child Protective Services, and on the day the accused teacher resigned, Defendant began directing at Plaintiff a series of actions, which taken in context, amount to a continuing campaign of mistreatment after which Plaintiff resigned, and that this action looked at in its totality constitutes properly pled adverse employment action.

FEHA protects employees “with respect not only to so-called ‘ultimate employment actions’ such as termination or demotion, but also the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1053-54.) “[T]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment must be interpreted liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the realities of the workplace.” (Id. at 1054.) The inquiry “should take into account the unique circumstances of the affected employee as well as the workplace context of the claim.” (Id. at 1052.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of job reassignment and removal of Plaintiff’s access to certain work systems, the context of the other alleged facts and the close temporal proximity to Plaintiff’s reports against Defendant, are sufficient to support her allegation of action(s) that adversely and materially affected her performance or opportunity for advancement. The Court finds that, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, as plead, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to support a showing of adverse action.

Defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff has plead insufficient facts to show adverse employment action is OVERRULED.

Constructive Discharge

Plaintiff alleges that she was constructively discharged.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

“Constructive discharge occurs only when the employer coerces the employee’s resignation, either by creating working conditions that are intolerable under an objective standard, or by failing to remedy objectively intolerable working conditions that are actually known to the employer.” (Mullins v. Rockwell Int’l Corp. (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 731, 737.)

Plaintiff’s allegations as to the acts, statements, and occurrences that constituted “adverse employment actions” are the same allegations Plaintiff argues combined to create “working conditions so intolerable that she was forced to resign[.]” (Complaint ¶ 196.)

As discussed by the Court above, the factual allegations, taken as true for the purpose of demurrer, when looked at in their totality, are sufficiently to support an allegation of constructive discharge at the pleading stage.

Defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff has plead insufficient facts to show constructive discharge is OVERRULED.

Defendant’s Knowledge or Belief

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s retaliation-related claims fail because the complaint does not include an allegation that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of Plaintiff’s reports to CCLD, CPS, or police. Defendant argues that while the complaint alleges that Defendant said to Plaintiff that she “told on” other teachers, that allegation, as written, seems to refer to feedback Plaintiff provided internally to Defendant, and not to the reports she made to CCLD, CPS, or police.

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the demurrer should be overruled on this ground for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff’s report to “a person with authority over the employee” suffices under Labor Code section 1102.5(b); and (2) the complaint sufficiently alleges facts to support an inference that Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff’s external reports.

Labor Code section 1102.5(b) provides that an employer “shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance ”

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations as to Defendant’s knowledge of her internal reports is sufficient to support Plaintiff cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5. As a result, the Court need not reach the issue of Plaintiff’s allegations as to Defendant’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s external complaints.

Defendant’s demurrer on the ground that Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendant had sufficient knowledge or belief to support her cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 is OVERRULED.

Disability

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action each require Plaintiff to adequately plead that she had a “condition” that meets the definition of “medical condition,” “mental disability,” or “physical disability,” and that she fails to allege sufficient facts to support these claims.

Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff’s complaint offers a conclusion of fact that she had a “stress-induced physical and mental health condition that limited the major life activities of working and self-care.” (Complaint, e.g., ¶ 194.) However, Defendant argues that this is not sufficient to show Plaintiff has a disability.

Defendant argues that the material facts alleged in support of Plaintiff’s purported disability include that Plaintiff went to the hospital four times in seven weeks, including three hospitalizations, collapsing at home, and chest pain requiring emergency treatment, however, Defendant argues that this is facially insufficient to plead that Plaintiff had a “medical condition,” “medical disability,” or “physical disability.”

“[T]he Legislature has determined that the definitions of ‘physical disability’ and ‘mental disability’ under the law of this state require a ‘limitation’ upon a major life activity, but do not require a ‘substantial limitation.’” (Gov. Code, § 12926.1(c).) Working is a major life activity, and a condition “limits” one if it makes its achievement “difficult.” (Id., § 12926, (j)(1), (m)(1).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficiently plead to support that she had a disability.

Defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to show that she had a disability is OVERRULED.

Request for Accommodation

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that she requested accommodation, or that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process.

Plaintiff argues, “Leave is a reasonable accommodation, and Plaintiff requested it. (Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1341.) Plaintiff told Defendant on September 12, ‘I’m in the emergency I cannot come tomorrow’ (¶ 222(a)); on September 13, ‘Currently I am still in the hospital’ (¶ 222(b)); and on October 21 at 4:01 a.m., ‘Morning Liz I’m in the hospital. Can’t any come in today’ (¶ 222(d)). Those are requests for leave.” (Opposition, 13:6-10.)

Plaintiff further argues that Plaintiff alleges other requests for accommodation, including that Plaintiff asked for restoration of BrightWheel access (Compl. ¶¶ 101, 222(g)) and asked in writing that Defendant cease the conduct that had “sent me to the hospital after hours of continuing harassment” (Compl. ¶¶ 142, 222(e).)

Defendant does not present a detailed argument of why Plaintiff’s allegations fail to support a request for accommodation, nor does Defendant address Plaintiff’s arguments as to her reasonable accommodation claims on reply.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support her claim that she made a request for accommodation, and Defendant’s demurrer on that ground is OVERRULED.

Failure to Engage / Reasonable Accommodation

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege facts to support that Defendant failed to engage in an interactive process or to provide requested reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003277: BUI, AN INDIVIDUAL, vs KREATIVE KIDS KKLC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 08/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8C

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s alleged reasonable accommodations that could have been provided include time-off and/or a reduced schedule in connection with her four hospitalizations, and finding a way to reduce or delegate her workload at work. (Complaint ¶ 195.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff alleges that these reasonable accommodations were made, defeating her own claim because Plaintiff was allowed to take time off when she was in the hospital (Complaint, ¶ 196) and that she fails to allege that she requested or was denied further time off. Defendant further argues that as to reducing Plaintiff’s workload, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant hired someone specifically to assist with her duties. (Complaint, ¶¶ 117-120.) (Defendant’s Memorandum, 8:16 – 9:4.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was allowed her requested time off, and that Defendant’s hiring of a new assistant was to replace Plaintiff, not to actually assist her.

On demurrer, as discussed above, the Court determines if the pleadings, taken as true, are sufficient to support the stated causes of action.

Here, the Court finds Plaintiffs allegations that she was not provided the accommodations requested are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to support her causes of action relating to Defendant’s purported failure to engage in the interactive process and accommodate her.

Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Disposition

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety.

Defendant shall file and serve its response no later than August 24, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.