CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, et al.

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion for Stay of Proceedings During Pendency of Arbitration Appeal in Department 54

proceedings in the trial court during the pendency of the appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294(a).) Where an automatic stay does not apply, the court may still exercise its discretion to stay the case under its inherent authority. (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1994) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) A discretionary stay is used to “maintain the status quo pending the appeal.” (Reed v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 448, 454.)

Defendants contend this action should be stayed pending resolution of the appeal for three reasons. First, Defendants argue the case must be automatically stayed because the parties’ arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA. (Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski (2023) 599 U.S. 736, 740-741.) Second, Defendants contend Coinbase preempts section 1294(a). Third, Defendants assert that even if the amendment were not preempted, Defendants are still entitled to a discretionary stay pending the appeal because: (1) the appeal involves significant questions of law, and (2) the fruits of a reversal would be irrevocably lost if the status quo is not maintained. (See Daly v. San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1039; see also Code Civ. Proc. § 918(a) [“the trial court may stay the enforcement of any judgment or order” subject to limited exceptions not relevant here].)

Defendants contend that if the stay is denied and they succeed on appeal, they will have wrongfully deprived them of the benefits of arbitration, including efficiency and lowered costs. Moreover, if the case proceeds to trial (which is likely given the February 17, 2026 trial date) and the order is reversed, then judicial resources will have been wasted and this “Court would have effectively prevented arbitration even if an appellate court deems that Defendants are entitled to enforce the parties’ Arbitration Agreement.” (Motion at 12:22-23.)

In addition, Defendants assert that: “To date, Plaintiffs have already served no less than 757 requests for production of documents, 634 special interrogatories, form interrogatories, 21 requests for admission, and 28 deposition notices with accompanying document production requests. (Romano Decl. at ¶12.) Defendants have partially responded to Plaintiffs’ voluminous written discovery, including producing witnesses for deposition, but have not served any reciprocal discovery on Plaintiffs as doing so could be construed as a waiver of Defendants’ attempt to compel arbitration in this matter. (Id.)

Moreover, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for trial preference and scheduled the trial in this matter to commence on February 17, 2026 (less than 120 days from today). (Romano Decl. at ¶13.) Defendants will be unduly prejudiced if they must engage in voluminous discovery efforts and prepare for a trial within four months while the critical issue of whether this matter should be in arbitration is decided. (Id.)” (Motion at 5:1-12.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion for Stay of Proceedings During Pendency of Arbitration Appeal in Department 54

Finally, Defendants contend the decision to grant Mr. Charles trial preference is independent of Defendants’ right to stay this action during the pendency of the arbitration appeal.

Plaintiffs oppose a stay and argue a stay is not warranted because Defendants have not addressed the legal standards for a stay pending appeal and, even if they had, the factors weigh against a stay. Plaintiffs cite to “Emeryville v. Superior Court,” which is more properly cited as People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Com. v. Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, as support for the proposition that in exercising its jurisdiction, “courts apply the traditional equitable factors for stays pending appeal: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) the prospect of irreparable harm absent a stay; (3) the balance of the hardships to the respective parties; and (4) the public interest.” (Opposition at 6:12-15.)

Emeryville does not indicate that the foregoing is the legal standard applicable to a discretionary stay. Indeed, nowhere in Emeryville are those four purported factors enumerated or discussed. Rather, Emeryville stands for the proposition that in the context of a writ of supersedeas, a discretionary stay is appropriate where “difficult questions of law are involved and the fruits of a reversal would be irrevocably lost unless the status quo is maintained[.]” (People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Com. v.

Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 537.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ cited standard for the issuance of a discretionary stay is unsupported and, in turn, their discussion of Defendants’ purported failure to satisfy the four factors is irrelevant.

Courts routinely stay matters where circumstances warrant. (Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 885; Frieberg v City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 [“Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.”].) The decision to grant a stay is based on the following factors: “‘(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation.’” (Avant!

Corp., supra, at p. 885.)

The Court finds a discretionary stay pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority is warranted to “maintain the status quo pending appeal.” (Reed, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at 454.) In Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 190, the California Supreme Court observed that the purpose of appealing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is to avoid the need for trial court proceedings. Thus, “the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion for Stay of Proceedings During Pendency of Arbitration Appeal in Department 54

proceeding itself is entirely inconsistent with a possible outcome on appeal.” (Ibid.) That purpose still holds true notwithstanding the lack of an automatic stay. If Defendants are successful on appeal, then any proceedings in the trial court that occurred while the appeal was pending would be for naught, and the judicial resources expended would have been wasted. Further, Defendants are correct that if they are successful on appeal, then the benefits of the bargained for agreement to arbitrate would be diminished or even lost.

Although Plaintiffs argue that the balance of the hardships tips in their favor because Mr. Charles has been granted trial preference, Plaintiffs have also not presented any legal authority that the receiving trial preference is a basis to deny a motion to stay. Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529 did not involve a motion to stay when trial preference had been granted. Rather, Fox held that where a party met the requisite standard for calendar preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a), preference had to b granted and no weighing of the interests was involved. (Fox, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at 535.)

Kline v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 512 also does not involve circumstances that are factually or procedurally similar. In Kline, the petitioner had been granted trial preference, and after the parties were unable to settle at the mandatory settlement conference, the trial court ordered the case submitted to compulsory arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedures section 1141.11, and vacated the trial date. (Kline, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at 514.) The basis for the Court’s decision was an amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 36, effective as of January 1, 1991, which eliminated the automatic preference to litigants over the age of 70. (Ibid.)

Petitioner contended the amendment could not be applied retroactively and the Court agreed the application of the amendment was prospective. (Id. at 516-517.) These are plainly not the circumstances presented here.

Further, the Court assumes that given this matter has received trial preference, the Court of Appeal will attempt to hear the pending appeal expeditiously and, if the matter is affirmed, it will be placed back on calendar and receive trial preference.

Accordingly, the Court will stay this entire action pending the resolution of the appeal. Because a stay is warranted under the Court’s inherent authority, the Court need not reach Defendants’ arguments regarding the FAA’s procedural provisions or whether the FAA preempts section 1294(a).

Plaintiffs’ request that limited discovery be permitted pending the appeal is DENIED.

Defendants’ motion to stay this entire action pending the resolution of Defendants’ appeal is GRANTED. The trial date and mandatory settlement conference date are

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion for Stay of Proceedings During Pendency of Arbitration Appeal in Department 54

hereby vacated.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure 367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.