CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al.

a. Agreement to Arbitrate. . . by signing below, and in consideration of the parties’ mutual agreement to arbitrate, the parties agree that if informal resolution is not possible, any and all claims or disputes arising from or related to this Agreement or to your rights, obligations, care, or services at WellQuest of Elk Grove shall be resolved by submission to neutral, binding arbitration in

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 10/14/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 54

accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act. This agreement to arbitrate applies regardless of whether the claim is made against us, you, or any other individual or entity, and it includes, without limitation, personal injury and wrongful death claims. If the Federal Arbitration Act does not permit arbitration in accordance with this Section 11.G.9., then the matter shall be arbitrated in accordance with State law.

b. Claims Not Subject to Arbitration. Any claim or dispute involving unlawful detainer proceedings (eviction), any claims that can be brought in small claims court, and any issues that cannot be arbitrated as a matter of law, shall not be subject to arbitration. In addition, to the extent required by law, claims involving your rights and obligations as a tenant, if any, shall not be subject to arbitration, consistent with Civil Code Section 1953(a)(4).

c. Claims Subject to Arbitration. Unless excluded under Section 11.G.9.b. of this Agreement, all claims relating to this Agreement or to your rights or obligations at WellQuest of Elk Grove, including but not limited to claims involving the provision of care or services, shall be subject to arbitration. The parties agree that an arbitrator will decide any question about whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated under this Section 11.G.9.

[¶]

e. Withdrawal. You may withdraw your agreement to arbitrate within thirty (30) days after signing this Section 11.G.9. by giving written notice of your withdrawal to us. If you decide to withdraw your agreement to arbitrate, you understand and agree that any claim that accrued prior to your withdrawal of the agreement to arbitrate, including any claim for consequent injuries or damages, shall be subject to and governed by the agreement to arbitrate that was in place at the time the claim arose.

[¶]

g. Arbitration Administration, Procedures, and Costs. The arbitration shall be administered by the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”) and shall be conducted in Placer County, California by a single neutral arbitrator selected by JAMS, unless otherwise mutually agreed. In reaching a decision, the arbitrator shall prepare a written decision that includes findings of fact, the reasons underlying the decision, and conclusions of law. If JAMS is unable to administer the arbitration in accordance with the terms of this Section 11.G.9., the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 10/14/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 54

parties shall select another arbitration administrator that is able to do so. If no such arbitration administrator is available, the parties shall select an arbitrator in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act. Each party shall bear all costs and fees that it incurs in connection with the arbitration, unless otherwise provided by law.

h. Nondisclosure. Neither party shall disclose the existence, content, or results of the arbitration without the prior written consent of the other party, unless disclosure is required by court order.

[¶]

j. Acknowledgment; Signatures. By signing below, the parties warrant that they understand the significance of this Section 11.G.9. and voluntarily agree to be bound by it. You further acknowledge that agreeing to arbitration is not a condition of admission to WellQuest of Elk Grove.

[signed by Ms. Wright] Resident’s Signature

(Declaration of Lindsey Romano (“Romano Decl.”), Ex. A pp. 18-20 (bold in original.)

II. Legal Standard

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at 1518.) “A party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.” (Id.) “Once that burden is satisfied, the party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition.” (Id.)

The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature. (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543–544; CRC Rule 3.1330.) As an alternative to attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement to the petition, the moving party must state “verbatim” the “provisions” of the arbitration agreement. (CRC Rule 3.1330.)

An arbitration agreement may be revoked on “such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Civ. Code § 1281.) Further, the Court may refuse to enforce any contract or any provision of a contract determined to be unconscionable. (Civ. Code § 1670.5.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 10/14/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 54

III. Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement

Defendants have demonstrated the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Plaintiff does not dispute that Ms. Wright signed the arbitration provision as Decedent’s power of attorney.

IV. Delegation

Defendants suggest that the parties agreed that the arbitrator would decide the issue arbitrability based on the language in Section C of the Arbitration Provision which states, “[t]he parties agree that an arbitrator will decide any question about whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated under this Section 11.G.9.” According to Defendants, this clause is both clear and unmistakable, and therefore, the Court must refer all issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator, including enforceability and unconscionability.

The Court disagrees.

The United States Supreme Court has held that courts cannot ignore a delegation clause that delegates the threshold question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 139 S.Ct. 524, 528 [“When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties’ decision as embodied in the contract.”].) Courts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide threshold issues of arbitrability. (Aanderud v.

Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 891.) “‘There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be effective. First, the language of the clause must be clear and unmistakable. [Citation.] Second, the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’ [Citation.] The ‘clear and unmistakable’ test reflects a ‘heightened standard of proof’ that reverses the typical presumption in favor of the arbitration of disputes. [Citation.]” (Id. at 892.)

Where the agreement is silent or ambiguous on the question of who decides threshold arbitrability questions, the court and not the arbitrator should decide arbitrability so as not to force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide. (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 945.)

In the case at bar, the delegation language is set forth in the “Claims Subject to Arbitration” section, and is limited to “whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated.” The clause does not clearly and unmistakably delegate to the arbitrator the threshold issues of arbitrability, including issues of unconscionability or enforceability of the Arbitration Provision[4].

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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The Arbitration Provision’s language is unlike that in the case of Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231 on which Defendants in rely. In Tiri, the arbitration agreement stated in part, “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” (Id., at 237.)

V. Unconscionability

Unconscionability has procedural and substantive elements, and although both must be present in order for the Court to invalidate a contract, they need not be present in the same degree. (Kinney v. United Healthcare Svc, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4 1322, 1329.) Procedural unconscionability exists where there is “an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice...surprise involves the extent to which the terms of the bargain are hidden in a ‘prolix printed form’ drafted by a party in a superior bargaining position.” (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) “Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create “overly harsh” or “one-sided” results.” (Ibid.)

a. Procedural Unconscionability

The procedural aspect of unconscionability “concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. [citations omitted] It focuses on factors of oppression and surprise. [citations omitted] The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’ [citations omitted]” (Morris v Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th at 1305, 1319; Gatton v. T-Mobil USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 595.)

Relying on Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93 and Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1280, Plaintiffs insist that the Arbitration Provision “has all the hallmarks of a contract of adhesion.” (Opposition, 13:3-4.) They note that the Arbitration Provision is part of a “massive packet of admissions documents – in this case spanning some 70 pages” – and is “in no way separated out from the rest of the admission packet and instead, for reasons unknown, is found on page 18 of the 70-page packet starting at the bottom of a page.” (Opposition, 13:4-8.) Plaintiffs add that the Arbitration Provision does not provide which rules will govern the arbitration, and that it “contains no language stating that it is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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optional or explaining that if it is not signed the resident still will be admitted.” (Opposition, 14:12-13.)

Plaintiffs further argue that from the face of the document, “it is apparent that Ms. Wright was not able to negotiate any aspect of the arbitration agreement – there are no interlineations nor alterations by Ms. Wright throughout the arbitration agreement or, for that matter, the entire admission paperwork.” (Opposition, 14:16-20.)[5]

Plaintiffs lastly claim that procedural unconscionability exists because Ms. Cuevas, the Executive Director of WellQuest of Elk Grove who conducted the intake process with Decedent and Ms. Wright, “had no idea about material aspects of the difference between a jury trial and arbitration and, as her custom and practice, conveyed out and out falsehoods about why arbitration purportedly was preferable to a jury trial.” (Opposition, 14:21-24.)

Plaintiff’s reliance on Haydon, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 1280, as well as Dougherty, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 93 is misplaced.

In Haydon, the First District Court of Appeal concluded that a residential care facility’s arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because the resident, who was elderly and had dementia, was under enormous pressure to sign because her condition was declining, she had limited financial resources, and the facility was offering a discount contingent on signing quickly. (Haydon, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at 1284-1285.) Further, there was an element of surprise because the provision was buried in a long-dense agreement and the facility did not alert the resident to arbitration rules. (Id. at 1288.)

In Dougherty, the elder’s daughter signed an arbitration agreement as the elder’s power of attorney. She was presented with an arbitration agreement that was “buried within the [admission] packet at pages 43 through 45.” (Id. at 104.) Further, although the defendant’s marketing director claimed that the arbitration provision was not mandatory, the elder’s daughter declared that she was directed to sign the documents and thus perceived that she could not negotiate or refuse to sign the documents. Moreover, two other facilities had already found the elder to be unsuitable. The daughter communicated her family’s predicament and her accompanying lack of bargaining power the facility’s representative, telling the representative that the facility was “the only feasible care option.” The Court of Appeal found these factors “evinced a high degree of procedural unconscionability.” (Ibid.)

Here, unlike Haydon, Ms. Wright, not Decedent, signed the Arbitration Provision. Further, the Arbitration Provision itself includes a right to withdraw provision, and Ms. Cuevas, avers in her

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declaration that she “explained that the arbitration agreement was completely optional” and “explained that the arbitration agreement was not mandatory for Ms. Charles’ admission to WellQuest of Elk Grove.” (Declaration of Elena Cuevas (“Cuevas Decl.”), ¶¶ 9-10.) Ms. Cuevas also states that she asked Decedent and Ms. Charles if they had any questions after she explained the provisions of the arbitration provision, and they affirmed that they did not. (Id., at ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs do not offer any evidence to dispute Ms.

Cuevas’ declaration, or show that Ms. Wright was pressured into signing the Arbitration Provision or the admission agreement as in Haydon and Dougherty. Although Plaintiffs take issue with Ms. Cuevas’ misconceptions of the difference between a jury trial and arbitration, Plaintiffs do not point to any portion of Ms. Cuevas’ deposition testimony testifying that she communicated any of those purported misconceptions to Decedent or Ms. Wright. Plaintiffs also did not submit Ms. Wright’s declaration showing that Ms.

Cuevas made such representations to her.

In sum, at most, the only evidence of possible procedural unconscionability is that the Arbitration Provision was presented to Ms. Wright along with the admission agreement, and there is no reference as to which rules will govern arbitration. The Court finds a minimal level of procedural unconscionability, therefore, a high level of substantive unconscionability will be required for the Court to invalidate the Arbitration Provision.

b. Substantive Unconscionability

“A provision is substantively unconscionable if it ‘involves contract terms that are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience,’ or that impose harsh or oppressive terms.’” (Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1573.) “In assessing substantive unconscionability, the paramount concern is mutuality.” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 701, 713.) Arbitration agreements must have “a modicum of bilaterality.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 119.) An agreement lacks the required mutuality where the weaker party’s claims are subject to arbitration and there is no reasonable justification for the lack of mutuality. (Id. at 119-120.)

Plaintiffs insist that the provision requiring each party to “bear all costs and fees that it incurs in connection with the arbitration, unless otherwise provided by law” is substantively unconscionable because it requires Plaintiffs to share the costs of the arbitrator, and JAMS arbitrator fees are “extraordinarily expensive.” (Opposition, 16:15-16.) This provision is not substantively unconscionable because Plaintiffs is not obligated to pay those fees if the law does not allow for apportionment of fees.

The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs that the requirement that the arbitration take place in Placer County rather than Elk Grove is substantively unconscionable. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Murrey v. Superior Court (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1223 and Magno v. The College Network (2016) 1 Cal.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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App. 5th 277 is misplaced.

In Murrey, the location provision presented surprise because it vaguely stated: “Unless the parties agree otherwise, or the arbitrator directs otherwise, the parties shall use the DRO office nearest to the employee’s work location to arbitrate the Covered Claims. If the DRO’s office is unavailable, the DRO will arrange for the rental of an arbitration hearing room that is mutually convenient.” (Id., at 1247 [internal quotations omitted].) The court characterized the provision as “a complicated way of saying the location of your arbitration will be a surprise” because no specific location or distance from the employee’s workplace or home was stated in the forum provision. (Ibid.) Here, the Arbitration Provision does not present the same level of surprise because it states the arbitration will take place in Placer County.

In Magno, the plaintiffs were all California residents. The defendant’s California sales representatives visited the plaintiffs’ homes in San Diego to enroll plaintiffs in their school to become registered nurses in California. The arbitration agreement, however, required that the arbitration take place in Indiana. The court found the provision substantive unconscionability because “[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest plaintiffs reasonably could have expected at the time of contracting that they would be required to resolve any disputes in Indiana.” (Magno, supra,1 Cal.App.5th at 289.) In contrast here, Plaintiffs are not asked to fly to another state, or even take an airplane to the arbitration. Additionally, the arbitration agreement provides that the arbitration will take place in Placer County, “unless otherwise mutually agreed.”

The Court also disagrees with Plaintiffs that the confidentiality clause is substantively unconscionable. The confidentiality clauses at issue in Murrey, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 1223 and Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. etc. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 1041 are inapposite as they provided for an absolute bar to the disclosure of the arbitration proceedings. Here, on the other hand, the confidentiality provision provides that “[n]either party shall disclose the existence, content, or results of the arbitration without the prior written consent of the other party, unless disclosure is required by court order.”

Plaintiffs’ argument that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it would result in Mr. Charles losing his statutory right to a trial within 120 days is premature since the Presiding Judge has continued Mr. Charles’ motion for preference to October 24, 2025 to be heard after the instant motion.

Plaintiffs next contend that the exclusion of unlawful detainer and small claims actions from arbitration lack mutuality because these are claims that would be brought by Defendants. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs because these are types of actions that Defendants would likely take in the event the resident stopped paying for her residency. Thus, the arbitration agreement requires a plaintiff to arbitrate any claims that s/he has against the facility while allowing

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Defendants to bring claims they would be likely to have, unlawful detainer claims and small claims cases, outside of the arbitration context.

The Court, however, finds a low-level of substantive unconscionability. Given the minimal level of procedural unconscionability and a low-level of substantive unconscionability, the Court finds that Arbitration Provision is not unconscionable.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c)[6]

“While there is a strong public policy in favor of arbitration, there is an ‘equally compelling argument that the Legislature has also authorized trial courts to refuse enforcement of an arbitration agreement when, as here, there is a possibility of conflicting rulings.” (Fitzhugh v. Granada Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 469, 475.) Section 1281.2(c) “‘addresses the peculiar situation that arises when a controversy also affects claims by or against other parties not bound by the arbitration agreement.

The California provision giving the court discretion not to enforce the arbitration agreement under the circumstances-in order to avoid potential inconsistency in outcome as well as duplication of effort’ is consistent with the policy of encouraging arbitration.” (Abaya v. Spanish Ranch I, L.P. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497 [quoting Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 393].) The legislative history of Section 1281.2 is instructive. “In actions involving multiple parties with related claims, where some claimants agree to arbitrate their differences and others remain outside the agreement, arbitration is unworkable.

Where a party to an arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding, with such a third party, there may be a possibility of conflicting rulings on issues of law or fact.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1628 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) p.2.)

As an initial matter, to the extent Defendants argue that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts Section 1281.2(c), the Court disagrees. The California Supreme Court has held that even in agreements calling for the application of the FAA, Section1281.2 (c) is not preempted by the FAA because it does not conflict with the FAA’s applicable provisions and does not undermine or frustrate the FAA’s substantive policy favoring arbitration. (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394.) The California Supreme Court made clear that parties are not precluded from “expressly designat[ing] that any arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAA’s procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law.” (Id. [emphasis in original].)

Section 1281.2(c) has been applied to an arbitration agreement where the agreement stated that the dispute would be “decided by neutral arbitration as provided by California law” and also that “interpretation of this agreement shall be governed by the [FAA].” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 177.) “As noted in the Rosenthal-Cronus-DIRECT TV trilogy, the FAA’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 10/14/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 54

procedural provisions do not apply in the state court unless the parties expressly adopt them. The trilogy makes clear that the question is not whether the parties adopted the CAA’s procedural provisions: The state’s procedural statutes (§§ 1281.2, 1290.2) apply by default because Congress intended the comparable FAA sections (9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 10, 11) to apply in federal court. The question is whether the parties expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural provisions into their agreements.” (Id. [emphasis in original].)

The Arbitration Provision here does not expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural provisions. Rather, it simply states that “any and all claims or disputes arising from or related to this Agreement or to your rights, obligations, care, or services at WellQuest of Elk Grove shall be resolved by submission to neutral, binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act.” Accordingly, Section 1281.2(c) applies.

In the case at bar, Ms. Wright, Mr. Wright, and Mr. Charles (collectively, “Individual Plaintiffs”) assert wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action on their own behalf. They are not parties to the Arbitration Provision. As a result, the Individual Plaintiffs are third parties for purposes of Section 1281.2(c) and the danger for inconsistent rulings exists. The only potential claims that are subject to arbitration are the claims brought on behalf of the Decedent for elder abuse, negligence, fraud and tort per se.

The Decedent’s elder abuse and negligence claims are premised upon similar if not identical facts as the Individual Plaintiffs’ own claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Indeed, if the Decedent’s claims proceed to arbitration, an arbitrator could conclude that Defendants did not fail to provide adequate care and/or breach the standard of care, and thus could deny relief. However, a trial court could reach the opposite conclusion on the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims.

In a situation like this, the possibility of conflicting rulings clearly exists. (See, e.g, Fitzhugh, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at 475-476.) “Different triers of fact in different proceedings could come to different conclusions as to which party or parties were liable and also could arrive at different conclusions in apportioning the amount of damages. However, if the trier of fact is the same for all defendants, as would occur of all defendants are joined in the court action, then the possibility of conflicting rulings concerning fault and apportionment of damages would not occur.” (Bril v.

Heritage Care, LLC (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1321.) In the end, the Court may rely solely on the allegations of the complaint to find a possibility of conflicting rulings. (Abaya, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at 1499 [collecting cases].)

While the Court also has discretion to stay any non-arbitrable claims, it declines to do so in the instant case as such a result would not adequately address the danger of inconsistent rulings. Therefore, given the possibility of conflicting rulings, the Court exercises its discretion pursuant to Section 1281.2(c), and refuses to enforce the arbitration agreement, so that all claims may be adjudicated consistently. Indeed, to do so would be consistent with the legislative intent embodied in Section 1281.2(c) as stated above.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 10/14/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 54

As a result, the motion is DENIED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c).

Having denied the motion on this ground, the Court need not address the parties’ remaining arguments. This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

[1] Ms. Wright is Decedent’s niece. [2] Mr. Charles is Decedent’s brother. [3] Mr. Wright is Decedent’s nephew. [4] Even if the Arbitration Provision did clearly and unmistakably delegate to the arbitrator the

threshold issues of arbitrability, neither Ms. Wright, Mr. Charles, or Mr. Wright are parties to the Arbitration Agreement, and therefore, are not subject to arbitration. [5] Plaintiffs have not submitted a declaration from Ms. Wright. [6] Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014386: CHARLES, et al. vs WELLQUEST ELK GROVE, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 10/14/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 54

and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.