State v. Amazon

Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, Plaintiff is proceeding

herein solely under the PAGA on behalf of approximately 10,000 similarly situated current and

former aggrieved employees employed by Amazon (collectively Employees) throughout the

State of California between September 6, 2023, and the conclusion of this action (Statutory

Period). (Compl. ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff further alleges that she this action for violations of occupational health-and-safety

provisions of the California Labor Code. Amazon subjected Employees to these violations, some

of which caused injury while some of which did not necessarily cause injury. Like all PAGA

actions, this action does not seek compensation for any injury (Kim v. Reins International

California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 89); the PAGA provides for civil penalties, for violations of

the California Labor Code. (See Compl. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff also alleges that she worked for Amazon from 2022 until 2024 in various positions at

various locations in California. While Plaintiff worked at Amazon, she and the Employees were

not properly trained for their work at Amazon, particularly when Amazon assigned Employees to

a new job assignment. Amazon also failed to provide additional safety training as required by law

whenever an employee was placed in a new job assignment. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-18.)

Plaintiff further alleges that she expressed her concerns to supervisors about safety issues, but

there was no response, and she was injured on more than one occasion. First, she was struck

by a pole near her eye and her supervisor laughed and instructed her to stay quiet, but she

made a formal complaint. Then in 2024, she injured her right hand during her shift and Amazon

provided ice and Tylenol, and sent her back to work. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-21.)

Plaintiff also alleges that there was no adequate investigation regarding the cause of Employees’

injuries. Nor was there an adequate analysis by Amazon regarding the availability of

preventative measures that could have mitigated the risks leading to Employees’ injuries.

(Compl. ¶ 22.)

Before the Court is Amazon’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary

adjudication as to Plaintiff’s causes of action. Plaintiff opposes and Amazon replies. The issues

have been fully briefed.

Amazon’s Request for Judicial Notice:

Amazon request the Court to take judicial notice of the following items in support of its

MSJ/MSA:

(1) Senate Judiciary Committee, April 29, 2003 Hearing on Senate Bill No. 796 (2003-

2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 22, 2003. (RJN, Exh. 1.)

(2) Excerpts from the Governor’s File for Senate Bill No. 796 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.).

(RJN, Exh. 2.)

(3) Senate Rules Committee, Office of Senate Floor Analyses July 28, 2004, Senate Bill

No. 1809 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 27, 2004. (RJN, Exh. 3.)

(4) Senate Floor Analysis, Senate Bill No. 1809 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended

July 27, 2004. (RJN, Exh. 4.)

(5) Assembly Committee on Judiciary, June 24, 2004 Hearing on Senate Bill No. 1809

(2003-2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended May 26, 2004. (RJN, Exh. 5.)

(6) Senate Rules Committee, Office of Senate Floor Analyses July 29, 2004, Senate Bill

No. 1809 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 27, 2004. (RJN, Exh. 6.)

(7) Assembly Committee on Appropriations, July 28, 2004 Hearing on Senate Bill No.

1809 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 27, 2004. (RJN, Exh. 7.)

(8) Assembly Committee on Appropriations Analysis, Senate Bill No. 1809 (2003-2004

Reg. Sess.), as amended July 27, 2004. (RJN, Exh. 8.)

(9) Senate Bill No. 1809 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2004, ch. 221, approved Aug.

11, 2004. (RJN, Exh. 9.)

(10) Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA), Policy and Procedures

Manual, Section P&P C-45A (rev. Apr. 1, 2003), available at

https://www.dir.ca.gov/DOSHPol/P&PC-45A.pdf. (RJN, Exh. 10.)

(11) Order Denying Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary Injunction in Brent v.

AmazonFresh LLC, San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-20-584828, dated

July 27, 2020. (RJN, Exh. 11.)

(12) Order Sustaining Defendants’ Demurrers in Brent v. AmazonFresh LLC, San

Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-20-584828, dated September 15, 2020.

(RJN, Exh. 12.)

(13) Labor and Workforce Development Agency, Department of Industrial Relations,

Express Terms of the Proposed Regulatory Text: Regulations Implementing the

Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Feb. 6, 2026), available at:

https://www.labor.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/338/2026/02/2026-2-6-Express-

Terms-of-Prop-Rulemaking LWDA PAGA-Z2026-0121-03.pdf. (RJN, Exh. 13.)

The Court Grants Amazon’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1-10 and 13 pursuant to

Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b) and (c); Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v.

Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 31-32; Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87

Cal.App.4th 513, 518; and Becerra v. McClatchy Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 913, 929.

The Court Denies Amazon’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 11-12. Decisions from other

superior courts are not citable authority and are not binding precedent on this court. (Santa Ana

Hospital Med. Center v. Belshi (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.)

Relevant Facts:

Amazon’s Sort Center known as LGB5 (Amazon LGB5) is located at 555 E. Orange

Show Rd., in San Bernardino, California. (UF Nos. 1 & 14 - undisputed.) Amazon’s Cross-Dock

Facility known as SBD3 (Amazon SBD3) is located at 5990 Cajon Blvd., in San Bernardino,

California. (UF Nos. 2 & 15 - undisputed.)

Plaintiff Coronado worked as a package sorter at Amazon LGB5 from around August to October

2023. (UF Nos. 3 & 16 - undisputed.) Plaintiff worked as a pallet builder for a total of six shifts at

Amazon SBD3, ending around January 2024. (UF Nos. 4 & 17 - undisputed.)

Cal/OSHA sent a Document Request to Amazon SBD3 dated May 24, 2023. (UF Nos. 5 & 18 -

undisputed.) On June 7, 2023, Amazon SBD3 responded to Cal/OSHA’s Document Request,

providing a copy of Amazon SBD3’s Injury and Illness Prevention Program (IIPP), and other

information. (UF Nos. 6 & 19 - undisputed.) Following Amazon’s June 7, 2023 response,

Cal/OSHA did not issue a citation to Amazon. (UF Nos. 7 & 20 - undisputed.)

Cal/OSHA sent Amazon LGB5 a Cal/OSHA Inspection Document Request dated February 23,

2024. (UF Nos. 8 & 21 - disputed.) On March 13, 2024, Amazon LGB5 responded to

Cal/OSHA’s Inspection Document Request, providing a copy of Amazon LGB5’s IIPP, and other

information. (UF Nos. 9 & 22 - undisputed.) Following Amazon’s March 13, 2024 response,

Cal/OSHA did not issue a citation to Amazon. (UF Nos. 10 & 23 - undisputed.)

On April 3, 2025, Amazon SBD3 received a letter from Cal/OSHA dated March 20, 2024,

concerning Complaint No. 2142821. (UF Nos. 11 & 24 - undisputed.) On April 16, 2025, Amazon

SBD3 responded to Cal/OSHA’s letter regarding Complaint No. 2142821, providing a copy of

SBD3’s IIPP, and other information. (UF Nos. 12 & 25 - undisputed.) Following Amazon’s April

16, 2025 response, Cal/OSHA did not issue a citation to Amazon. (UF Nos. 13 & 26 -

undisputed.)

Analysis:

Amazon’s MSJ/MSA is made on the grounds that (1) the first cause of action fails as a matter of

law on the ground that Plaintiff’s claims are nonjusticiable because they are barred by the

doctrines of judicial abstention and primary jurisdiction, such that the Court should defer to the

specialized expertise, judgment, and prior involvement of Cal/OSHA on the issue of the

adequacy of Amazon’s IIPPs; and (2) the second cause of action fails as a matter of law on the

ground that Plaintiff’s claims are nonjusticiable because they are barred by the doctrines of

judicial abstention and primary jurisdiction, such that the Court should defer to the specialized

expertise, judgment, and prior involvement of Cal/OSHA on the issue of Amazon’s compliance

with its obligation to provide a safe and healthful workplace.

It is noted that in this case there is not an issue of disputed facts, there is an issue of application

of law to the facts.

1. Primary Jurisdiction Argument:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is related to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies in that both involve the question whether an administrative agency should first hear (or

rehear) a dispute prior to it being presented to a court. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 390 (Farmers Ins. Exchange).) The doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies is applied where an administrative agency must be the first body to

consider a matter; the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim can originally be

addressed in a court, but would be better addressed first by an administrative body. (Ibid.) The

latter doctrine does not preclude judicial consideration of the case, but rather suspends judicial

action pending the administrative agency's views. (Ibid.; Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

(1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 287, 295-296.) The doctrine of primary jurisdiction doctrine advances

two related policies: it enhances court decision making and efficiency by allowing courts to take

advantage of administrative expertise, and it helps assure uniform application of regulatory laws.

(Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 391.)

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PAGA is not an element of any of Plaintiff’s

claims; rather, it is an affirmative defense which Amazon bears the burden of proof. (Gunther v.

Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 351.) Unlike Amazon’s prior demurrer, the

present motion does not assert the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (See

Mtn, at p. 10 fn. 6 [“administrative exhaustion is not the subject of this motion”].) Because

Amazon frames its challenge in the context of administrative review, however, it is nonetheless

helpful to review PAGA’s statutory scheme.

PAGA includes three provisions setting forth different exhaustion procedures, depending on the

type of Labor Code violation alleged:

(1) Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a);

(2) Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (b); and

(3) Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c).

A. Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a): Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a)’s

exhaustion procedure applies to Labor Code provisions specifically listed in Section 2699.5. It is

undisputed that this action does not involve a specified statutory provision and is therefore not

governed by the exhaustion procedure set forth at Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a).

B. Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (b): Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (b)’s

exhaustion procedure applies to health-and-safety laws contained in Division 5 of the Labor

Code (Lab. Code, §§ 6300-9104). This action alleges violations of Division 5; thus, this action is

governed initially by the exhaustion procedure set forth at Labor Code section 2699.3,

subdivision (b), which under certain circumstances present here also incorporates the

exhaustion procedure set forth in the next subdivision of the statute.

C. Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c): Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c)’s

exhaustion procedure applies in two scenarios: (i.) If Cal/OSHA does not investigate a Labor

Code section 2699.3, subdivision (b) violation within “three working days after receipt of a

complaint charging a serious violation,” or within “14 calendar days after receipt of a complaint

charging a nonserious violation” as required by Section 6309(a), and (ii.) All other Labor Code

violations not listed in Section 2699.5 and not contained within Division 5 of the Labor Code.

As relevant to this case, the essence of Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c) is the 33-day

period in which the employer may file a “cure” claim with the government. Plaintiff recognizes

that Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c) was amended effective October 1, 2024, to alter

the time period from a 33-day period to a 60-day period. (Lab. Code, §§ 2699.3. subd. (c)(1)(d) &

2699.3, subd. (g).) Because both of Plaintiff’s PAGA notices predated the amendment, however,

the Court should look to the language of the statute then-in effect in calculating the procedural

requirements and deadlines applicable to Plaintiff’s PAGA notices. (Beeman v. Burling (1990)

216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1607 [discussing prospective application of rules regarding “modes of

procedure to be followed in future proceedings”].)

The statute in effect at the time of Plaintiff’s PAGA notices provided, “The employer may cure the

alleged violation within 33 calendar days of the postmark date of the [PAGA] notice sent by the

aggrieved employee or representative. The employer shall give written notice within that period

of time by certified mail to the aggrieved employee or representative and by online filing with the

agency.... If the alleged violation is not cured within the 33-day period, the employee may

commence a civil action pursuant to Section 2699.” (Lab. Code, § 2699.3, subd. (c)(2)(A).)

Plaintiff relies on the District Court’s reasoning in Sprewell v. Federal Express Corporation (C.D.

Cal., May 19, 2021) 2021 WL 4706703 (Sprewell). The District Court in Sprewell recognized that

where, as here, Cal/OSHA fails to investigate within a maximum of 14 days, Labor Code section

2699.3, subdivision (b), drops out of the picture and the matter is governed exclusively by Labor

Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c)’s exhaustion procedure.

Here, Plaintiff served the first PAGA notice on Amazon and Cal/OSHA on September 6, 2024,

and there was no inspection or investigation within the time provided by law (i.e., 3-to-14 days).

(Compl., Exh. 2; Compl. ¶ 6.) Accordingly, Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (c) applies.

Amazon does not dispute that Plaintiff’s second notice appropriately waited the applicable 33-

day period before commencing this action. Plaintiff served the second PAGA notice on Amazon

and the LWDA more than 14 days later on September 24, 2024 (i.e., 18 days later). (Compl.

Exh. 2.)

And with respect to those violations that were curable, Plaintiff specifically alleged that

“Defendant failed to invoke its option to cure the violations within the time provided under PAGA”

(i.e., 33 days). (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff filed this action more than 33 days later on October 29,

2024 (i.e., 35 days later).

This is what happened in Sprewell. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that Cal/OSHA “failed to

comply with section 6309’s timeline for investigating complaints.... Cal/OSHA missed the 3- or

14-day deadline set forth in Labor Code section 6309, subdivision (a). Because the Division

[Cal/OSHA] failed to meet the 3- and 14-day deadlines in section 6309, the provisions of

subdivision (c) apply to Defendant’s alleged violations.” (Sprewell, supra, 2021 WL 4706703 at

*5 [citations omitted, citing Lab. Code, § 2699.3, subd. (b)(2)(B)].) In Sprewell, the court

discussed that “Plaintiff further alleges that more than 33 calendar days after Plaintiff’s second

notice, Amazon failed to cure the violations or provide any notice of cure within the requisite time

period.” (Id.) “Although no civil action can be filed under Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision

(c)(3) if the employer asserts that the violation has been cured and the employee fails to contest

that assertion within the specified time period, the statute unambiguously provides that ‘[i]f the

alleged violation is not cured within the 33-day period, the employee may commence a civil

action pursuant to Section 2699.’” (Id.) The Sprewell court found “Plaintiff’s complaint alleges

that this condition for commencing a civil action has been satisfied.” (Id.) Thus, the federal

district court in Sprewell denied the defendant’s challenge to administrative exhaustion.

Likewise, Amazon concedes administrative exhaustion for purposes of its motion.

The PAGA provides that “[n]o action may be brought under this section by an aggrieved

employee if the agency or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or

employees, on the same facts and theories, cites a person within the time frames set forth in

Section 2699.3 for a violation of the same section or sections of the Labor Code under which the

aggrieved employee is attempting to recover a civil penalty on behalf of the employee or others

or initiates a proceeding pursuant to Section 98.3.” (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l).) Preclusion of

the sort Amazon advocates was contemplated by the Legislature only if the agency either issued

a citation or filed an action in court based on the “same facts and theories” asserted in the PAGA

claim. There is no evidence or facts presented that show that either of these things occurred.

Therefore, the Court denies Amazon’s MSJ/MSA based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,

as Amazon has failed to meet its initial burden of showing this doctrine applies to this action.

2. Judicial Abstention Argument:

“Judicial abstention is appropriate when granting the requested relief would require a trial court

to assume the functions of an administrative agency, or to interfere with the functions of an

administrative agency.” (Alvarado v. Selma Convalescent Hospital (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1292,

1298 (Alvarado).) “As a general matter, a trial court may abstain from adjudicating a suit that

seeks equitable remedies if [1] ‘granting the requested relief would require a trial court to

assume the functions of an administrative agency, or [2] to interfere with the functions of an

administration agency,’” or [3] “where ‘granting injunctive relief would be unnecessarily

burdensome for the trial court to monitor and enforce given the availability of more effective

means of redress.’” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181Cal.App.4th 471,

496; see also, e.g., Alvarado, supra, 153Cal.App.4th at p. 1296.)

The cases cited by Amazon do not involve a statutory scheme like the PAGA, which deputizes

private plaintiffs to file actions for violations previously prosecuted exclusively by a government

agency. For example, in Samura v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th

1284 (Samura), cited by Amazon, the Court addressed violations of the Knox-Keene Act,

prosecution of which was “entrusted exclusively to the Department of Corporations, preempting

even the common law powers of the Attorney General.” (Samura, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p.

1299.) The same cannot be said here; the PAGA expressly recognizes that Division 5 of the

Labor Code may be enforced by Cal/OSHA via agency citations or by employees via the PAGA.

Amazon argues that the Court should not interfere with the domain of Cal/OSHA because the

Court is not an expert in health-and-safety law. (Mtn. at p. 21.) Amazon’s argument is not

persuasive. (See People v. Savala (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 41, 56 [it is the authority of the judicial

branch “to say what the law is”].) It is for the courts, including this Court, to define and apply the

law, as it regularly does in disputes involving employees and their employers in a wide variety of

contexts.

Despite Amazon’s opinion that this Court is “ill-equipped to substitute their judgment” for

Cal/OSHA’s judgment (Mtn. at p. 20), when Cal/OSHA does not take action, the PAGA expressly

contemplates that the courts will step in. “[W]here the LWDA [which includes Cal/OSHA] has

discretion to assess a civil penalty, the courts are to exercise the same discretion, subject to the

same limitations and conditions as the LWDA [including Cal/OSHA].” (LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery

Co. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)

PAGA plaintiffs are “proxies for the state, bringing what would otherwise be an administrative

regulatory enforcement action on its behalf.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff here followed the steps

required to file PAGA claims for matters within Cal/OSHA’s purview and Cal/OSHA did not take

timely action or investigation of the those claims, Plaintiff is deputized by operation of law to

prosecute this action standing in for Cal/OSHA. Amazon’s suggestion. To send the matter back

to Cal/OSHA when it already did not take action in response to two PAGA claims - makes no

sense given PAGA’s overarching purpose to deputize employees to prosecute employers when

the agency fails to do so. Amazon posits that “the PAGA statute permits a PAGA action for

alleged Division 5 violations to proceed under exceedingly narrow circumstances” (Mtn. at p. 15),

yet Amazon’s logic leaves no realistic room for such prosecution. Amazon’s motion largely

ignores both the text and intent of the PAGA, which permits suits such as this to enforce the

Labor Code when the LWDA (including Cal/OSHA) for whatever reason failed to investigate or

act upon Plaintiff’s PAGA claims.

Because Amazon’s legal and factual arguments do not address Plaintiff’s discrete claims or

issues asserted therein, Amazon fails to satisfy its initial burden on this motion.

Amazon casts a broad net, stating this action is an attempt to “re-litigate issues that the state

itself ... has already investigated and resolved.” (Mtn. at p. 18.) This is the crux of Amazon’s

argument on summary judgment. But the evidence fails to show that Cal/OSHA investigated any

of the claims and issues raised in Plaintiff’s PAGA claims. There can be no re-litigation of any

issue or claim if it was never litigated in the first place.

Amazon’s material facts assert that Plaintiff worked for Amazon (UF Nos. 1- 4), Cal/OSHA sent

document requests to Amazon in 2023 and 2024 (UF Nos. 5& 8) in connection with Cal/OSHA

Inspection Numbers 1672258 & 1733224 (Gunnin Decl. ¶¶ 6-7), Amazon provided a copy of its

written IIPP and information to Cal/OSHA in response to these requests (UF Nos. 6 & 9), and

Cal/OSHA did not issue a citation to Amazon (UF Nos. 7, 10, & 13). Amazon’s evidentiary

production fails to connect Cal/OSHA Inspection Numbers 1672258 & 1733224 to any of

Plaintiff’s claims or any of the issues in this case. Plaintiff is not attempting to prosecute

Cal/OSHA Inspection Numbers 1672258 & 1733224, both of which apparently predated

Plaintiff’s PAGA claims.

The fact that Amazon provided a copy of an IIPP to Cal/OSHA, as the motion asserts, does not

address any of Plaintiff’s theories of liability in this case. Plaintiff does not claim that Amazon

does not have an IIPP. Plaintiff does not claim that an IIPP document is somehow on its face

deficient. Rather, the claim is that Amazon failed to establish, implement, and maintain an

effective injury and illness prevention program. (Compl. ¶ 29.) The motion recognizes as much,

indicating “[t]he first cause of action seeks PAGA penalties for Amazon’s alleged failure to

maintain an effective IIPP....” (Mtn. at p. 9.) There is no evidence presented that anyone other

than Plaintiff has asserted a claim challenging the effectiveness of Amazon’s IIPP; nor is there

any evidence that Cal/OSHA has investigated or evaluated the effectiveness of Amazon’s IIPP

as it concerns Plaintiff or any of the specific issues she has raised in this action. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-

22.)

Amazon asserts that it communicated with Cal/OSHA between 2024 and 2025 concerning

Complaint No. 2142821. (UF Nos. 11-12.) As is the case with Amazon’s UF Nos. 5 through 10, it

is not apparent what this proposition has to do with Plaintiff’s clams. (Paulek v. Department of

Water Resources (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 35, 50.) Plaintiff is not attempting to prosecute

Complaint No. 2142821. Complaint No. 2142821 asserts that at some point prior to March 20,

2024, and prior to Plaintiff’s submission of her PAGA notices and claims, Cal/OSHA received a

complaint from another employee, not Plaintiff, that Amazon violated Title 8, Section 3203 of

California Code of Regulations (Amazon’s Exh. E) somehow by failing to assess hazards in the

workplace. Amazon responded that it does assess hazards in the workplace. (Amazon’s Exh. F.)

Plaintiff’s claims are related to not maintaining an effective IIPP and permitting unsafe work and

failing to provide a safe workplace, practices, and processes.

Amazon’s motion fails to address the claims actually asserted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that

Amazon employees were able to not wear masks during COVID protocols (Compl., Exh. 1, at p.

2.); employees were able to have their ears plugged while working on the floor (Compl., Exh. 1,

at p. 2); employees were able to use broken carts to load boxes (Compl., Exh. 1, at p. 2);

Amazon failed to respond to an employee’s reporting of safety issues (Compl. ¶ 19); an Amazon

supervisor caused a pole to strike an employee in the eyebrow (Compl., Exh. 1, at p. 2); in

response to notice of an injury, an Amazon supervisor laughed in the employee’s face and told

the employee to be quiet (Compl. ¶ 20); Amazon failed to take corrective action against the

supervisor (Compl. ¶ 20); when an employee injured one hand, Amazon instructed the employee

to get back to work using only the other hand without additional training about how the job could

safely be done one-handed (Compl. ¶ 21; Exh. 1 at p.2.); Amazon failed to adequately

investigate the cause of Employees’ injuries, including Plaintiff’s complaints (Compl. ¶ 22);

Amazon failed to conduct an adequate analysis regarding the availability of preventative

measures that could have mitigated the risks leading to Employees’ injuries (Compl. ¶ 22); and

Amazon failed to provide safety training when a new job assignment was given to employees

(Compl. ¶¶ 17-18). Amazon’s evidentiary presentation addresses none of these claims. This

deficiency is fatal to Amazon’s motion.

Amazon does not present any evidence or contend that Cal/OSHA investigated Plaintiff’s PAGA

claim or any of the issues asserted therein. Amazon’s facts do not address any of Plaintiff’s

factual theories of liability and, therefore, Amazon has failed to satisfy its burden as the party

moving for summary judgment or alternatively summary adjudication.

Therefore, the Court denies Amazon’s MSJ/MSA based upon the doctrine of judicial

abstention, as Amazon has failed to meet its burden of proof showing that this doctrine applies to

this action.

RULING

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court rules as follows:

(1) DENIES Defendant Amazon’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative,

summary adjudication as Defendant Amazon has failed to meet its burden of proof in

showing that the doctrines of judicial abstention and primary jurisdiction apply to the

facts of this action.

(2) GRANTS Amazon’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1-10 and 13 pursuant to

Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b) and (c); Kaufman & Broad Communities,

Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 31-32; Rodas v.

Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 518; and Becerra v. McClatchy Co. (2021) 69

Cal.App.5th 913, 929.

(3) DENIES Amazon’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 11-12 because the Court

does not take judicial notice of other superior court’s decisions.