Martinez vs Taylor

opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or

directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including

protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to

protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations

of the right of privacy of the person.

A party, witness, consumer, employee, or person whose personally identifying information is

sought may bring the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1987.1, subd. (b).)

No meet and confer effort is required to bring a motion to quash. (Code Civ. Proc., §1987.1.)

Sanctions against the losing party are discretionary, pursuant to Section 1987.2, if the court finds

the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification, or if one or more

of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc., §1987.2.) When a trial

court exercises its discretion to issue discovery sanctions, the court must delineate the specific

acts upon which the sanctions are awarded. (First City Properties, Inc. v. MacAdam (1996) 49

Cal.App.4th 507, 515.)

Analysis

Defendant Burroughs’ subpoenas to West Point Medical Center and Yalina Palomino,

MSW, LCSW seeks all medical and billing records, broadly defined, regarding Plaintiff’s mental

health from January 1, 2018 to the present. Defendant’s subpoena to Jin M. Kim, M.D., seeks

similar records as well as medical and radiology records relating to Plaintiff’s torn meniscus from

March 1, 2023 through June 30, 2023. Plaintiff moves to quash on grounds (a) the subpoenas

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional privacy rights; and (b) the requests for billing records are not

reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

Discovery is relevant if admissible or likely to lead to admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc.,

§2017.010.) “In the context of discovery, evidence is ‘relevant’ if it might reasonably assist a

party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.” (Glenfed Dev. Corp. v.

Superior Court (National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA) (1997) 53

Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Norton v. Superior Court (Ein) (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1760.)

Individuals have a constitutional right of privacy that protects their information. (Williams v.

Superior Court (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) A privacy interest is invaded if

there is “a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in

the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Ibid.; Hill v. National

Collegiate Athletic Assn (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-37.)

When discovery seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, the standard of

review will depend on the seriousness of the invasion, i.e., a compelling interest applies if the

privacy invasion concerns an interest fundamental to personal autonomy but otherwise a

balancing test based on the strength of the privacy interest, the seriousness of the invasion, and

the availability of alternatives and protective measures. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552;

Lewis v. Superior Court (Medical Board of California) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 572.)

Where a plaintiff alleges a defendant caused mental and emotional ailments, the existence and

extent of such mental injuries is “indubitably in dispute.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (Peralta

Community College District) (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840.) “In addition, by asserting a causal link

between her mental distress and defendants' conduct, plaintiff implicitly claims it was not caused

by a preexisting mental condition, thereby raising the question of alternative sources for the

distress.” (Ibid.) Where a plaintiff alleges a defendant caused mental and emotional ailments, the

existence and extent of such mental injuries is “indubitably in dispute.” (Ibid.)

“[A] patient has a privacy interest in a doctor's medical records pertaining to the patient's physical

or mental condition.” (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853, disapproved on

other grounds in Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th 531.) The patient-physician privilege allows a patient

to refuse to disclose a confidential communication between patient and physician, but there is no

privilege where the patient has filed an action for personal injuries as to information which relates

to the claimed injuries. (Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1313, citing Evid.

Code, §§994, 996.)

In opposition, Defendant Burroughs correctly notes that the complaint repeatedly alleges Plaintiff

suffered emotional and physical injuries as a result of Defendants’ misconduct, including high

blood pressure (¶23); mental and physical pain, anguish, loss of sleep, severe stress, and

anxiety (¶50); loss of appetite and depression-like symptoms (¶70); and decline in health,

embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of self-esteem (¶106).

Defendant also provides excerpts from Plaintiff’s testimony in a workers’ compensation appeals

board matter wherein Plaintiff testified the stress from working at Burroughs created problems

with his neck, back, leg, hip, and teeth. (Davis Decl., Exh. B, 34:16-23, 36:24-38:3.) Plaintiff first

experienced neck problems five years prior to his October 2023 deposition due to stress. (Id.,

38:4-7.) He had also experienced neck and arm numbing during the same period, also stress

related. (Id., 41:8-14.)

Plaintiff further testified in the workers’ compensation matter that he that he had a prior motor

vehicle accident involving his neck and back in 2021. (Davis Decl., Exh. C, 113:22-114:14.)

Plaintiff further testified he made a full recovery from the accident, but seemed to acknowledge

being seem for issues from the accident as late as April 27, 2022. (Id., 130:24-131:9, 133:22-

135:11.) Defendant contends Plaintiff made a workers’ compensation claim on May 4, 2022,

complaining of neck issues caused by work stress, but the evidence behind this is ambiguous.

Plaintiff further testified he weighs 260 pounds (Davis Decl., Exh. C, 111:23-24) and was

diagnosed with hypertension in 2023 but does not take medication for it (Davis Decl., Exh. B,

70:2-13). Plaintiff was diagnosed with sleep apnea within the last five years before his 2023

deposition. (Id., 71:17-23.) Plaintiff had insomnia from 2005 through 2008. (Davis Decl., Exh. C,

155:4-156:18.) Plaintiff testified he started taking medication for diabetes two weeks before the

deposition, although his physician had prescribed it for him a year and a half or two years before

that. (Davis Decl., Exh. B, 69:6-24.)

Defendant Burroughs asserts the subject subpoena is justified because Plaintiff has

claimed both mental and physical injuries in his complaint. In the reply, Plaintiff cites to two

responses to form interrogatories (which are not provided to the Court or authenticated) in which

he somewhat limits or perhaps even disavows claims of physical injury while maintaining his

claims of emotional injury. Plaintiff further argues Defendant Burroughs is trying to use testimony

from the workers’ compensation case to get access to material that is not relevant to this case.

Plaintiff certainly has a privacy interest in the material sought, but it is overcome because

Plaintiff expressly alleges mental and physical injuries resulting from Defendants’ misconduct.

Plaintiff is entitled to explore alternate sources of stress, of which Plaintiff testified to several in

the workers’ compensation appeal. Going back to 2018 is reasonable given Plaintiff’s testimony

that he suffered physical ailments over much of his body as a result of his stress going back that

far. The request for billing records, while perhaps more questionable, is also reasonably

calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Accordingly, the Court denies all three motions to

quash.

Plaintiff’s papers suggest he may either has agreed or is willing to reduce the scope of

his claims in some respects. This does not alter the analysis on the motions themselves,

because Plaintiff’s complaint still alleges mental and physical injury. However, the parties have

the option of meeting and conferring on a stipulation to reduce the scope of the litigation or

damages claimed.

RULING

For all the reasons stated above, the motions are DENIED.