Vanessa Singh v. State of California, Department of General Services

5. As recited on the record, the release was “[a] release of any and all claims to the present date,” and provided that the underlying claims, two prior lawsuits and anything to do with the demotion, will not be used in the future as a protected activity or a basis to pursue retaliation. (Id., p. 39). The Court confirmed with counsel that Singh was “waiving any and all rights to pursue” her claims going forward. (Id., p. 38-45). The Court further stated, and DGS’s counsel confirmed, that upon tender of the settlement funds DGS would be “absolved from all liability” and the release takes full force and effect. (Id.)

6. The settlement did not require DGS to remove the NOAA or the related State Personnel Board decision from Singh’s OPF. Counsel for DGS, Mr. Curran stated: “And what is not part of this deal, everyone should be clear that this settlement agreement does not contemplate, it doesn’t require DGS to remove either the notice of adverse action that led to the two-step demotion or the State Personnel Board’s decision on that or the administrative law judge’s proposed decision on that.” (Curran Decl, Exh. 1 Trial Transcript p. 41:2-8.) To which, Plaintiff’s Counsel, Ms. Schaffer responded, “Correct.” (Id., at p. 41:9).

7. Additionally, Singh knew, at the time she settled, that the NOAA remained in her OPF. When placed under oath and asked whether she understood the terms of the settlement, Singh stated: “I understand the adverse action will not be removed.” (Curran Decl, Exh. 1 Trial Transcript p.42:1-19). There was some discussion of whether Singh would be paid in a lump sum or whether the funds would go into a structured settlement. Then, the Court confirmed that Singh understood the terms of the settlement agreement and entered into it knowingly and voluntarily. (Id. p. 44:16-19). The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

8. On January 5, 2026, following Singh’s refusal to sign a written settlement agreement conforming to the terms placed on the record, DGS moved to enforce the settlement and compel entry of judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

9. On February 3, 2026, Singh filed a new complaint against DGS in Case No. 26CV002821 (the “2026 Lawsuit”). That complaint asserts two causes of action: (1) Anticipatory Retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12940(h); and (2) Failure to Prevent Anticipatory Retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12940(k). Both causes of action in the 2026 Lawsuit

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 07/24/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion to Enforce Judgment and Compel Payment in Department 8A

arise from DGS’s alleged reinsertion of, and refusal to remove, the NOAA and the State Personnel Board decision from Singh’s OPF. The complaint’s prayer seeks equitable relief directing “removal of adverse action material from Plaintiff’s Official Personnel File.” (2026 Lawsuit, p. 14) 10. On February 5, 2026, the Court granted DGS’s motion to enforce the settlement. The Court rejected Singh’s contention that the parties’ agreement contained a “carve out” permitting her to pursue claims related to negative documents in her OPF, finding: “Given the broad language the parties placed on the record, Plaintiff agreed to waive any and all claims relating to her employment, including any claims related to her personnel file.” (February 5, 2026 Minute Order).

11. On February 11, 2026, the Court signed and entered the Judgment enforcing the settlement under section 664.6. The Judgment obligates DGS “[t]o pay Plaintiff One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars and No Cents ($175,000.00)” and “[t]o make reasonable efforts to secure the warrant for the payment . . . as soon as practicable,” and provides that, upon receipt by Singh’s counsel of the payment, the action shall be dismissed with prejudice as to all parties and all causes of action. (February 11, 2026 Judgment).

12. The claims Singh asserts in the 2026 Lawsuit are claims relating to her employment and her personnel file. They fall within the scope of the general release of all claims to which Singh agreed on September 22, 2025 and which the February 11, 2026 Judgment enforces.

Enforcement of The Settlement

Where parties to pending litigation stipulate orally before the court for settlement of the case, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement and may retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement until performance in full. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6(a).) A settlement recited on the record is valid and binding where all material terms are stated before the court and the parties agree to be bound. (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 790-791.)

In enforcing a settlement under section 664.6, the court gives effect to the terms the parties themselves agreed upon; it may not create material terms or “impose on the parties more restrictive or less restrictive or different terms than those contained in their

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 07/24/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion to Enforce Judgment and Compel Payment in Department 8A

settlement agreement.” (Id. at p. 790) A court may not unilaterally modify a term of a section 664.6 settlement or the judgment entered on it. (Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1370.)

A general release framed in terms of “any and all claims” is enforceable according to its literal terms, and “general releases can be so constructed as to be completely enforceable.” (Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1173.) Employment-related releases of any and all claims known or unknown regarding employment are enforced to bar later-filed employment claims, and a releasor who reads and voluntarily agrees to such a release “may not now rely on his unspoken intention not to waive these claims in order to escape the effect of the release.” (Skrbina v. Fleming Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1367; see Perez v. Uline, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 953, 958-959.)

Where a party has knowledge of a potential claim against the opposing party at the time of executing a general release but has not yet initiated litigation of that claim, that party “has the burden of expressly excepting the claim from the release,” and “[a]bsent this exception, and absent contrary extrinsic evidence, a court will enforce general language . . . releasing all claims including civil claims.” (Jefferson v. Department of Youth Authority (2002) 28 Cal.4th 299, 301.)

When a party’s failure to perform constitutes a material breach of a contract, the other party is discharged from its duty to perform. (Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277.) A material breach of the settlement agreement, therefore, would relieve DGS of its obligation to pay. (Machado, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.) Although whether a breach is material is ordinarily a question of fact, “if reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of materiality, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law.” (Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 278.)

The Settlement Terms are Clear and Unambiguous and Bar the 2026 Lawsuit

On the record, Singh released “any and all claims to the present date” and agreed she was “waiving any and all rights to pursue” her claims going forward. (Curran Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 1 (“Trial Transcript”) at p. 48:2-25.) The Court has already construed that language and found that Singh “agreed to waive any and all claims relating to her employment, including any claims related to her personnel file,” and that the agreement contained no

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 07/24/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion to Enforce Judgment and Compel Payment in Department 8A

“carve out” for personnel-file claims. The February 11, 2026, Judgment enforces that agreement. (Judgment, filed 2/11/26.)

The claims asserted in the 2026 Lawsuit fall squarely within the release. Both causes of action are premised on the presence of adverse-action material in Singh’s OPF and DGS’s refusal to remove it, and the complaint expressly seeks removal of that material. (2026 Lawsuit). These are claims “relating to her employment” and “related to her personnel file” – precisely the claims the release extinguished. An employment release of “any and all claims” bars exactly this species of later-asserted employment claim. (Skrbina, supra, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1367; see Perez, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 958-959.)

Singh’s contention that the 2026 Lawsuit rests on “post-settlement conduct” outside the release does not avoid this result. The gravamen of both causes of action is the presence of the NOAA and the State Personnel Board decision in Singh’s OPF — the very subject matter of the settlement. Singh knew when she settled that this material remained in her OPF; she stated under oath, “I understand the adverse action will not be removed.” (Trial Transcript, p.42:1-19.) Having knowledge of the factual predicate for her grievance at the time she released “any and all claims to the present date,” and having initiated no separate action to preserve it, Singh bore the burden to except any such claim expressly from the release. She did not. (Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299 at p. 301.)

Singh Is in Material Breach, Which Discharges DGS’s Payment Obligation

By filing the 2026 Lawsuit asserting claims she had released, Singh breached the settlement agreement. The breach is material as a matter of law. The consideration DGS bargained for a general release extinguishing all employment and personnel-filerelated claims and absolving DGS “from all liability.” Singh’s prosecution of released claims deprives DGS of the essential benefit of its bargain.

A material breach by Singh discharges DGS from its duty to perform, including its obligation to pay the settlement sum. (Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 277; Machado, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.) A plaintiff who breaches the release she granted cannot simultaneously compel the defendant’s payment under the settlement.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 07/24/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Motion to Enforce Judgment and Compel Payment in Department 8A

(See Pappas v. Chang (2022) 75 Cal. App. 5th 975, 987-988.) Accordingly, Singh’s motion, which seeks to compel DGS’s payment while she prosecutes the very claims she released, cannot be granted.

Disposition

Plaintiff Vanessa Singh’s Motion to Enforce Judgment and Compel Payment is DENIED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff materially breached the clear and unambiguous terms of the settlement agreement and the February 11, 2026 Judgment by filing Case No. 26CV002821 asserting claims released under the general release, and that Plaintiff’s material breach discharges Defendant’s obligation to pay the $175,000 settlement sum.

To the extent that Plaintiff dismisses the 2026 Lawsuit with prejudice, the Court may find that the breach has been cured, and payment should be tendered. Plaintiff’s requests for interest, attorney’s fees, and costs are DENIED.

The Court orders the parties to appear. The parties may appear by Zoom with the links below.

To join by Zoom link – https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16108301121 To join by phone dial (833) 568-8864 / ID: 16108301121

Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to notice all parties of this order.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order or further notice is necessary.