MIGUEL ANTONIO HERNANDEZ RAMIREZ, et al. v. J.F. SHEA CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.

B. CIVSB2404283 (Hernandez Action) On January 30, 2024, Plaintiffs Claudia Medina & Briana Cecilia Hernandez, individually and as successors-in-interest to Decedent Hernandez, filed their Complaint against Defendants Shea (dismissed 05/02/2024), Rodriguez, Stater Bros, Millen, Ramirez, Valencia, Valencia Estate, and Severo. The Complaint pleads alleges the following causes of action: (1) motor vehicle negligence (survival and wrongful death) against all, and (2) negligent entrustment (survival and wrongful death) against Shea and Stater Bros. All Defendants have filed Answers.

The Valencia SAC and Hernandez Complaint allege that on June 24, 2023, Decedent Valencia was driving on the Southbound I-215 with Severo and Decedent Hernandez as passengers. Defendant Rodriguez rear-ended Valencia’s Jeep. Due to that impact, Decedent Valencia’s car moved across the interstate where Defendant Millen failed to take evasive measures and collided with him. Decedent Valencia’s Jeep caught fire and Decedents Valencia and Hernandez died. Defendant Rodriguez was driving a vehicle owned and entrusted by Shea, and he was employed by Shea. Defendant Millen was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Stater Bros, and he was employed by Stater Bros. (Valencia’s SAC at ¶¶ 12, 14; Hernandez’s Complaint at ¶¶ 15- 20.) These two lawsuits were consolidated on November 20, 2024.

C. Shea-Rodriguez Cross-Complaints On June 10, 2024, Defendants Shea and Rodriguez filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross- Defendants Severo and Valencia Estate for equitable indemnity in the Hernandez Action. Also, on July 24, 2024, Defendants Shea and Rodriguez filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant Severo for equitable indemnity in the Valencia Action.

D. Severo Cross-Complaints On June 3, 2024, Defendant/Cross-Defendant Severo filed his Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Shea, Rodriguez, Stater Bros., and Millen for apportionment, declaratory relief, and indemnity in the Hernandez Action. Also, on November 19, 2024, Defendant/Cross-Defendant Severo filed his Cross- Complaint against Cross-Defendants Shea, Rodriguez, Stater Bros., and Millen for indemnity, apportionment, and declaratory relief in the Valencia Action.

E. Stater Bros-Millen Cross-Complaint On June 5, 2024, Defendants Stater Bros and Millen filed their Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Valencia Estate, Hernandez Estate, Shea, Rodriguez, and Severo in the Hernandez Action. On April 1, 2025, after a demurrer, Stater Bros and Milled filed the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC), which pleads cross-claims for equitable indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief, apportionment, comparative fault, negligence (property damage), and NIED.

F. Valencia Estate Cross-Complaint On July 26, 2024, Cross-Defendant Valencia Estate filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross- Defendants Shea (dismissed 09/18/2025), Rodriguez, Stater Bros (dismissed 5/14/2026), Millen (dismissed 5/14/2026), and Severo for indemnity, declaratory relief, and contribution in the Hernandez Action. On May 14, 2026, Valencia Estate filed a Request for Dismissal, with prejudice, as to Stater Bros and Millen.

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G. Motion for Summary Judgment Now before the Court is Stater Bros and Millen’s (“Moving Parties”) Motion for Summary Judgment against the Cross-Complaint filed by the Valencia Estate and the Cross-Complaint filed by Severo. However, because the Valencia Estate has dismissed Stater Bros and Millen from their Cross-Complaint, the Motion is moot in regard to that Cross-Complaint. As such, this court will only address the Cross-Complaint filed by Severo. To date, Severo has failed to file an opposition to the motion.

DISCUSSION I. Statement of Law A summary judgment motion is a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings to determine if a trial on the facts is necessary. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) Only the pleadings establish the grounds for granting or denying summary judgment. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1343.) Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute as to any essential element of a cause of action. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c.) A party may move for summary adjudication of causes of action, affirmative defenses, damages, or issues of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A summary adjudication motion is subject to the same rules and procedures as a summary judgment motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2); Lomes v. Hartford Financial Service Group, Inc. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 127, 131.)

When the defendant is the moving party, the analysis requires (1) identifying the issues framed by the pleadings, (2) determining whether the moving party’s showing has established facts that negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in the movant’s favor, and (3) determining whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1662.) A defendant must establish no material facts are in dispute by showing “one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

Once that burden is met, the plaintiff must produce admissible evidence showing a triable issue of material facts exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849-51.) The opposing party’s failure to file counter-declarations does not relieve the moving party of the burden to establish every element of the causes of action necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) “In ruling on a motion, the court must ‘consider all of the evidence’ and ‘all’ of the ‘inferences’ reasonably drawn therefrom and must view such evidence and such inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’ (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843, citations omitted.)

II. Request for Judicial Notice Moving Parties request the Court take judicial notice of the following: • Exhibit A – MSJ Ruling (as to the SAC filed in the Valencia Action), filed on October 9, 2025 in this Action; • Exhibit B – Order granting Moving Parties’ MSJ (as to the SAC filed in the Valencia Action), filed on October 15, 2025 in this Action;

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• Exhibit C – Notice of Non-Opposition to Moving Parties’ MSJ (as to the SAC filed in the Valencia Action), filed on September 29, 2025 in this Action; • Exhibit D – Cross-Complaint for Indemnity, Declaratory Relief, and Contribution, filed by Valencia Estate on July 26, 2024 in the Hernandez Action; • Exhibit E – Cross-Complaint for Apportionment, Declaratory Relief, and Indemnity, filed by Severo on June 3, 2024 in the Hernandez Action; • Exhibit F – Cross-Complaint for Apportionment, Declaratory Relief, and Indemnity, filed by Severo on November 19, 2024 in the Valencia Action;

The Court grants the request for judicial notice in total.

III.

Analysis

Here, Moving Parties seek summary judgment on the two Cross-Complaints filed by Severo in both the Valencia Action (filed 11/19/2024) and the Hernandez Action (filed 06/03/2024) (collectively, “Severo Cross-Complaints”). Both Severo Cross-Complaints allege causes of action sounding in (1) Indemnification, (2) Apportionment of Fault, and (3) Declaratory Relief. (Moving Parties’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UF”) # 2-3.)

“The right to indemnity flows from payment of a joint legal obligation on another’s behalf. [Citations.] The elements of a cause of action for indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is contractually or equitably responsible.” (Expressions at Rancho Niguel Ass’n v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.) In an indemnity action, the trier of fact must determine whether the indemnitee was held legally responsible for damages to a third party, whether the indemnitor’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm, and if so, the indemnitee’s and indemnitor’s percentages of responsibility. (CACI No. 3800.)

There are only two basic types of indemnity: express indemnity and equitable indemnity. (Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1151, 1157 (Prince).) Express indemnity refers to an obligation that arises “ ‘by virtue of express contractual language establishing a duty in one party to save another harmless upon the occurrence of specified circumstances.’ ” (Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1029.) Express indemnity generally is not subject to equitable considerations or a joint legal obligation to the injured party; rather, it is enforced in accordance with the terms of the contracting parties' agreement. (Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951, 961.)

On the other hand, unlike express indemnity, traditional equitable indemnity requires no contractual relationship between an indemnitor and an indemnitee. Such indemnity “is premised on a joint legal obligation to another for damages,” but it “does not invariably follow fault.” (Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 114.) Although traditional equitable indemnity once operated to shift the entire loss upon the one bound to indemnify, the doctrine is now subject to allocation of fault principles and comparative equitable apportionment of loss. (Prince, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1158.)

Equitable indemnity may include claims for implied contractual indemnity, apportionment of fault, and contribution. (Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 622, 628; Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1029 (“[I]mplied contractual indemnity is a form of equitable indemnity.”);

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City of Huntington Beach v. City of Westminster (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 220, 224 (“Comparative equitable indemnity includes the entire range of possible apportionments-from no indemnity to total indemnity.”).

Here, because the Severo Cross-Complaints do not allege the existence of a contract giving rise to a claim for express indemnity, it is presumed that Severo’s indemnity claim is a claim for equitable indemnity. The basis for comparative equitable indemnity/apportionment of fault is “one person is unjustly enriched at the expense of another when the other discharges liability that it should be his responsibility to pay.” (Children’s Hospital v. Sedgwick (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4th 1780, 1786.) An action on comparative fault is presumed upon a joint legal obligation to another for damages. (Id. at p. 1787.)

In other words, the indemnitor and indemnitee must be jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. (Heritage Oaks Partners v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 339, 348; BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction (2004) 119 Cal. App. 4th 848, 852.) Thus, apportionment of fault/comparative equitable indemnity rests upon a jury equally apportioning or allocating a plaintiff’s loss among parties who share in the responsibility for the loss. Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 314; CACI 406 and 3800.)

As for declaratory relief, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, a plaintiff must present: “(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.) In general, a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity properly takes the form of an action for declaratory relief. (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 285.) The duty to indemnify arises when the person to be indemnified becomes liable. (Civ. Code, § 2778, subd. (1); Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 787, 803.)

Here, Cross Defendants argue that summary judgment should be entered in their favor against Severo because on October 15, 2025, this Court previously entered an Order granting Moving Parties’ Motion for Summary Judgment against both sets of Plaintiffs in the Valencia Action and the Hernandez Action. (UF # 4.) Moving Parties argue that because there is a finding of no fault or liability in the underlying Subject Incident, they cannot therefore be held liable for indemnity, apportionment, or declaratory relief. (UF # 5.)

“ ‘[I]n the case law of equitable indemnity ... one point stands clear: there can be no indemnity without liability. In other words, unless the prospective indemnitor and indemnitee are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff there is no basis for indemnity. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[A] fundamental prerequisite to an action for partial or total equitable indemnity is an actual monetary loss through payment of a judgment or settlement.’ (Forensis Group, Inc. v. Frantz, Townsend & Foldenauer (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 14, 28, citing Major Clients Agency v.

Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1130.) In this case, because this Court has previously determined that Cross Defendants Stater Bros. Market and Millen have no liability to the underlying Plaintiffs in the Valencia Action and the Hernandez Action, there is no basis for indemnity or apportionment of fault. Therefore, the Court grants Cross Defendants’s Stater Bros. Market and Millen Motion for Summary Judgment.

RULING

The Court rules as follows: (1) grants Moving Parties’ requests for judicial notice as to Exhibits A-F;

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(2) Deems Stater Bros and Millen’s Motion for Summary Judgment as being moot as to the Valencia Estate Cross-Complaint; and (3) Grants Stater Bros and Millen’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Severo Cross-Complaints. Because this Court has previously determined that Moving Parties have no liability to the underlying Plaintiffs in the Valencia Action and the Hernandez Action, there is no basis for indemnity or apportionment of fault. (UFs # 2 - 5, and evidence cited in support: Samaniego Decl., COE, Exhs. A-C, E-F.)

Dated: August 7, 2026

____________________________ Judge Nicole Quintana Winter

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