Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production
In the abstract, the Court would agree. But Plaintiff himself filed the complaint and exhibits, and he did so in the public record rather than seeking to do so under seal. Nothing in the record— including the declaration in support of this motion—states that Plaintiff publicly filed the documents by mistake.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff filed this case in propria persona and may not have realized the effect of publicly filing the exhibits. But a party who proceeds in pro per is held to the same rules as an attorney, and he or she is entitled to no greater consideration than represented litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) Accordingly, the motion is denied.
9 Roe 1 O.B. vs. Anaheim Union High School District
2024-01439626
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production
Plaintiffs John Roe 1 O.B. et al. move for an order compelling the Orange County District Attorney (“OCDA”) to comply with a deposition subpoena for production of business records served on March 9, 2026. The Court is inclined to GRANT the motion as set forth below.
GROUNDS FOR RULING
On March 9, 2026, Plaintiffs served a document subpoena on OCDA, with a return date of April 7. (Gures Decl. (included in ROA 117) Ex. 1.) In effect, the subpoena seeks all documents in OCDA’s possession, custody, or control relating to David Bruce, who allegedly sexually abused Plaintiffs during Bruce’s career as a teacher for the Anaheim Unified School District.
On March 26, 2026, OCDA served objections by letter. (Gures Decl. Ex. 2.) It argued Plaintiffs had previously served a nearly identical subpoena, that OCDA had objected to the prior subpoena, and the time to move to compel compliance with the prior subpoena had long since passed. It further argued the failure to move to compel couldn’t be cured by serving a second, identical subpoena.
On May 20, 2026, Plaintiffs sent a meet-and-confer letter to OCDA. (Gures Decl. Ex. 3.) No response from OCDA is in the record.
CCP § 1987.1 allows a party who serves a subpoena for production of documents to move for an order compelling the witness to comply. A party moving to compel production of documents sought in a deposition notice must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production.” (
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Plaintiffs have established good cause for production. In the current lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to hold AUSD liable for its alleged negligent supervision of Bruce. OCDA’s records regarding the investigation of Bruce and his subsequent prosecution likely contain information bearing not only on Bruce’s acts, but also on issues of whether AUSD was on notice of allegations against him, the extent of its supervision of Bruce, institutional responses to allegations against him, etc. The records may also contain witness information that can assist Plaintiffs in developing their case. (Gures Decl. ¶ 3.)
OCDA has not filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion. Therefore, it has failed to justify the objection raised in its March 26 letter. (Notably, the sole objection raised was to the duplicative nature of the subpoena. OCDA did not raise objections such as the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, etc. Any objections not raised in the letter are waived.)
Plaintiffs’ motion is accordingly granted. As to the nature of the production, Plaintiffs will accept “redactions of nonparty minor identifying information, including names, dates of birth, contact information, and medical or mental health information, so long as the factual substance of the allegations, investigative findings, witness statements, dates, locations, and Bruce’s conduct remained intact.” (Mot. at p. 11.) By no later than August 24, 2026, OCDA is to produce all documents responsive to the subpoena, redacted as proposed by Plaintiffs.
10 Vazquez vs. GNIMGT, Inc.
2025-01535748
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
Defendant GNIMGT, Inc. moves to compel arbitration of the individual portion of Plaintiff Erick Vasquez’s PAGA claim and stay the representative portion pending completion of arbitration. The motion is DENIED.
GROUNDS FOR RULING
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the arbitration agreement at issue during the onboarding process, nor that it covers all claims at issue here. (See generally Vasquez Decl.) Following the Court’s prior minute order, Defendant submitted a declaration establishing that Artemis Hospitality, defined as “the Company” in the agreement, is a fictitious business name used by Defendant. (See 3rd Gutierrez Decl.) The Court therefore finds that Defendant has proven an agreement to arbitrate exists, that Ex. A to the declaration of Matthew Alfonso Martinez is the agreement, that it is governed by the FAA, and that it covers all claims in this case.
II. Unconscionability
Plaintiff’s sole argument against enforcing the arbitration agreement is unconscionability. “‘The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.’ [Citation.] But they need not be present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare