Freddy Lopez, et al. v. Belfor USA Group, Inc., et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 12 Honorable Nahal Iravani-Sani, Presiding Courtroom Clerk, Ryan Nguyen 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: (408) 882-2230

DATE: 08/07/2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. and 9:01 A.M.

LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING LINE 1 23CV422700 Amarjeet Rai Motion for summary judgment/adjudication v. City of San Jose Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 1

LINE 2 24CV443682 Freddy Lopez DEMURRER (x 2) & MOTION TO STRIKE (x 2) v. LINE 3 Belfor USA Group LINE 4 Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Lines 2-5 LINE 5 LINE 6 25CV456689 Richard Chamberlain MOTION TO COMPEL v. LINE 7 Santa Clara Public Defender’s Office, et al. Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Lines 6/7 LINE 8 25CV460170 Angela Washington MOTION TO COMPEL v. FCA US, LLC, et al. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel filed January 13, 2026. Notice is proper. The Court has received no opposition from Defendant. “[T]he failure to file an opposition creates an inference that the motion or demurrer is meritorious.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Good Cause Appearing, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is GRANTED. Motion re Sanctions pursuant to CCP 871.26(j)(1) in the amount of $2,500.00 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff to prepare the final proposed order, accompanied by the necessary Form EFS-020, within 7 days of the date of the hearing.

LINE 9 & 25CV483393 Syed Zafar Hamdani PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION v. MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE LINE 10 Three Arch LLC et al. Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 9 & 10

Calendar Line 2-5 Case Name: Freddy Lopez, et al. v. Belfor USA Group, Inc., et al. Case No.: 24CV443682

Plaintiffs Freddy Lopez, Greta Hernandez, Heidy Lopez, and Marlon Noguera (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants Belfor USA Group, Inc. (“Belfor USA”), Belfor Environmental, Inc. (“Belfor Environmental”), Trademark Staffing, Inc. (“Trademark Staffing,” or “Trademark”), and Does 1 through 100 inclusive. Presently before the court is Defendant Belfor USA and Belfor Environmental, Inc. (collectively, “Belfor Defendants”)’s joint demurrer (“Belfor Demurrer”) to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and joint motion to strike (“Belfor Motion to Strike”). Also before the court is Defendant Trademark’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC and motion to strike.

Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED. Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through nineteenth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED. Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND, and Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through nineteenth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Belfor Defendants’ and Trademark’s motions to strike the FAC are DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Belfor Defendants and Trademark jointly employed Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 5.) Plaintiffs allege that they were directly employed by Trademark but were assigned to work for the Belfor Defendants’ renovation department. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs were also supervised, directed, and managed by the Belfor Defendants’ employees. (Ibid.)

Belfor Defendants managed and operated the worksites Plaintiffs were sent to, scheduled and tracked Plaintiffs’ hours worked, and terminated Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.) Trademark fulfilled payroll and onboarding functions. (FAC, ¶ 7.)

Plaintiffs were employed to work as restoration laborers and/or technicians throughout the Bay Area and surrounding regions. (FAC, ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs worked within Belfor Defendants’ restoration department and were primarily responsible for visiting different client worksites to perform demolition, renovation, and restoration work. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs also extracted water from buildings that flooded, which primarily occurred during periods of heavy rain. (Ibid.)

On or around November 7, 2023, Plaintiffs were informed that Belfor Defendants intended to change the staffing agency they were working with to “Quality Staffing” instead of Trademark. (FAC, ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs were informed that they needed to apply to Quality Staffing to continue working with Belfor Defendants, but that they were unlikely to pass the

background check employed by Quality Staffing. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17.) Plaintiffs nonetheless applied to Quality Staffing but did not pass the background check. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs ceased working with the Belfor Defendants around November 2023. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs are informed and believe only the restoration department changed staffing agencies but not the construction department. (FAC, ¶ 19.)

Plaintiffs allege that they were frequently contacted while off-duty to work last-minute shifts when clients of Belfor Defendants had an emergency that needed their attention. (FAC, ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege they were not adequately compensated for these on-call hours and were deprived of proper overtime and double-time hourly rates. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs further allege that they were never afforded rest periods or meal periods. (FAC, ¶¶ 24, 25.) Plaintiffs did not personally clock in or out for meal periods and believe that employees of the Belfor Defendants recorded their meal periods times, which were either partially or wholly inaccurate. (Id. at ¶ 26.)

Plaintiffs also allege that their paystubs did not accurately reflect the total number of hours they worked per pay period, and had to contact Trademark to correct these issues, else they would have been deprived of their lawful wages. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

Plaintiffs further allege that their employment duties required them to undertake renovation, demolition, and construction projects within the worksites of Belfor Defendants’ clients. (FAC, ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs allege that “[w]hile undertaking this work, Defendants would frequently inform Plaintiffs that the work sites they were visiting had tested negative for toxic materials, including asbestos and lead. Relying upon these representations, Plaintiffs would perform their work without Personal Protective Equipment[.]” (Id. at ¶ 29.)

Plaintiffs allege that upon commencing work at their designated job site, they would frequently discover that current or prior worksites had tested positive for contaminants such as asbestos. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Although Plaintiffs allege that Defendants would pull them from worksites where the contaminants were discovered and send a team that was trained and equipped to handle such toxic substances to complete the work, “the work they performed within these contaminated worksites was certain to release asbestos fibers into the air, onto their clothing, and was breathed in by Plaintiffs, almost exclusively without their knowledge.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to adequately test and inspect worksite for toxic chemicals, and on occasion neglected to wait for the test results prior to sending Plaintiffs to commence their work. (FAC, ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs allege that there were additional instances where toxic chemicals were discovered at worksites, but Defendants failed to inform them of these discoveries. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiffs were never certified or trained to work with or identify asbestos-containing materials. (Id. at ¶ 33.)

Plaintiffs allege they were never given Personal Protective Equipment or separate clothing during their renovation or construction work. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs wore their own personal clothing throughout their shift and were responsible for their own laundry and cleanliness. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Plaintiffs had no way of knowing whether there were asbestos fibers on their clothing and would unknowingly take fibers to their homes, exposing their families to such toxic materials. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs allege that they voiced their concerns regarding their lack of certification for working with materials like lead or asbestos. (FAC, ¶ 36.) However, Belfor Defendants assured them that these substances would not be present within the worksites, even though Plaintiffs would later discover that these worksites had tested positive for such substances. (Ibid.) Despite voicing their concerns, Plaintiff alleges that Belfor Defendants told them that “their only options were to continue work within these unsafe conditions, or find work elsewhere.”

(FAC, ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs further alleges that they would “additionally voice concerns regarding the impacts that such exposure could have on their health, and Defendants failed to take any remedial actions to mitigate Plaintiffs’ risk of exposure.” (Id. at ¶ 39.)

Plaintiffs allege that asbestos is a toxic and inherently dangerous substance that is “practically impossible for laborers like Plaintiffs to discover...within their worksites.” (FAC, ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs further note that “[t]oday, most asbestos exposure occurs during the repair, renovation, removal, and maintenance of asbestos-containing materials that were installed decades ago.” (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs cite numerous California state regulations regarding employee safety for employers engaging in asbestos-related endeavors and note “employers whose employees interact with asbestos are required to be licensed to work with asbestos and are subject to stringent regulations pertaining to employee safety.” (Id. at ¶¶ 49-84.)

Plaintiffs allege that despite having the required licensing classifications and certifications, Belfor Defendants “continuously and wantonly acted without regard to the State regulations pertaining to asbestos, and exposed Plaintiffs to asbestos to such toxic materials with conscious disregard of their health.” (FAC, ¶ 85.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to adopt or follow a reasonable set of policies or procedures, neglected to provide Plaintiffs with safety equipment, failed to properly inspect worksites for hazardous substances, and failed to take reasonable actions to curtail the potential risks of harm to Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 86.)

Plaintiffs were also not provided with adequate training to identify or handle the disposal of asbestos materials. (FAC, ¶ 88.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants “failed to hold safety conferences for jobs in which Plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos.” (Id. at ¶ 88.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intentionally and fraudulently concealed the actual presence of, or possible existence of, asbestos containing materials within the workplaces Plaintiffs were sent to. (FAC, ¶ 90.) Plaintiffs also never received medical monitoring or examination despite their repeated exposure to asbestos and face significant emotional distress resulting from the exposure to them and their families. (Id. at ¶ 100.)

On July 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit against Trademark and the Belfor Defendants alleging fourteen causes of action for: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) liquidated damages; (3) unpaid time; (4) failure to provide meal periods; (5) failure to provide rest periods; (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements; (7) failure to pay all wages owed at termination; (8) failure to reimburse business expenses; (9) negligence; (10) medical monitoring; (11) breach of contract / independent duties; (12) unlawful business practices; (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (14) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On October 7, 2024, Defendant Belfor Environmental Inc. filed its Demurrer and Motion to Strike the Complaint. Therein, Belfor Environmental categorized Plaintiffs’ causes of action into two sets of claims: (1) the “Wage and Hour Claims,” or the first through eighth causes of action; and (2) the “Exposure Claims” or the ninth through fourteenth causes of action. On March 3, 2025, this court overruled Belfor Environmental’s demurrer to the “wage and hour claims,” and sustained Belfor Environmental’s demurrer to the “exposure claims” without leave to amend. On April 25, 2025, Belfor USA filed its Demurrer and Motion to Strike.

On May 5, 2025, Plaintiffs amended their complaint, thereby mooting Belfor USA’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs’ FAC alleges causes of action for: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) liquidated damages; (3) unpaid overtime; (4) failure to provide meal

periods; (5) failure to provide rest periods; (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements; (7) failure to pay all wages owed at termination; (8) failure to reimburse business expenses; (9) negligence/strict liability/negligence per se; (10) medical monitoring; (11) breach of contract/independent duties; (12) unlawful business practices; (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (14) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (15) civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”); (16) retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5; (17) retaliation under Labor Code section 6310; (18) fraudulent deceit; and (19) negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs’ FAC asserts all causes of action against all Defendants except for causes of action nine, 10, 11, 13, and 14 (negligence/strict liability/negligence per se; medical monitoring; breach of contract/independent duties; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligent infliction of emotional distress, respectively) against Belfor USA, Trademark, and Does 1 through 100.

Presently before the court is Belfor Defendants’ joint demurrer and motion to strike Plaintiffs’ FAC and Trademark’s demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiffs filed untimely oppositions to Belfor Defendants’ and Trademark’s demurrers.2 Belfor Defendants and Trademark each filed a reply. Plaintiffs do not oppose Belfor Defendants’ or Trademark’s motions to strike.

II. DEMURRERS

A.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. (Trs. Of Capital Wholesale Elec. Etc. Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 617, 621.) Consequently, “[a] demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 762, internal citations and quotations omitted; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. ... Thus, ... the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be.” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

In ruling on a demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Glennen v. Allergan, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) Nevertheless, while “[a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it does] not [admit] contentions, deductions or conclusions of law or fact.” (George v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.)

B. Belfor Defendants’ Demurrer

At the outset, the court notes that Belfor Defendants demur on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to seek leave to amend their complaint. (Belfor Demurrer, p. 10:3-14.) A demurrer is limited to the grounds for objection listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10. Failure to seek leave to amend a complaint is not one of the grounds listed in Code of Civil Procedure

2 The court will nevertheless consider Plaintiffs’ opposition to Belfor Defendants’ and Trademark’s demurrers. (See Jackson v. Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [courts have discretion to consider untimely filed papers so long as doing so does not affect the substantial rights of the opposing party].)

section 430.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) Accordingly, that portion of the demurrer is overruled.

Belfor Defendants further argue that causes of action one through eight of Plaintiffs’ FAC do not state a claim, causes of action nine through 14 are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine, and causes of action 16 through 19 are also barred by exclusivity doctrine and otherwise insufficiently pled.

i. Causes of Action One through Eight

Belfor Defendants demur to causes of action one through eight on the basis that the FAC fails to plead wage and hour violations. (Demurrer, 10:15-17.) At the outset, the court notes Plaintiffs’ argument in opposition that Belfor Defendants waived objections to causes of action one though eight by failing to raise the objections in an earlier demurrer. However, an objection that a pleading does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action cannot be waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.80, subd. (a).) Accordingly, the court finds that Belfor Defendants did not waive their objections to causes one through eight.

In addition, Plaintiffs argue in opposition that Belfor Defendants failed to meet and confer prior to filing a demurrer to cause of action one through eight. However, “[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) Therefore, the court will not overrule Belfor Defendants’ demurrer on that basis. However, neither the letter attached as an exhibit to the Declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel Allan A.

Villanueva (“Villanueva Decl.”) nor the Declaration of Belfor Defendants’ counsel Betty Luu (“Luu Decl.”) show that Belfor Defendants’ meet and confer attempts prior to filing the demurrer included objections to causes of action one through eight. (Villanueva Decl.; Luu Decl.) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires the demurring party to “identify all of the specific causes of action that it believes are subject to demurrer and identify with legal support the basis of the deficiencies.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(1). Belfor Defendants clearly did not communicate their intent to demur to causes of action one through eight in their meet and confer attempts. The court admonishes Belfor Defendants to comply with their meet and confer obligations.

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s first cause of action for failure to pay minimum wage because Plaintiffs “do not allege that they were called upon and actually worked two or more distinct shifts in a day.” (Demurrer, p. 11:3-4.) The FAC alleges that “Plaintiffs frequently worked split shifts when they would be called into work while off-duty, yet were never provided a split-shift premium.” (FAC, ¶ 109.) However, Plaintiffs also allege that Belfor Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs minimum wage: “Pursuant to § 4 of IWC Wage Order No. 16-2001, Plaintiffs were entitled to receive not less than the minimum wage for all hours worked.

At all times relevant during the liability period, Defendants willfully failed and refused, and continues to willfully fail and refuse, to pay Plaintiffs the amounts owed.” (FAC, ¶¶ 106, 107.) Plaintiffs have stated a claim for failure to pay minimum wage by alleging that Belfor Defendants filled out time sheets noting Plaintiffs’ hours worked, that those time sheets “did not always accurately reflect the number of hours Plaintiffs worked per pay period,” and that Trademark used the timesheets Belfor Defendants provided to calculate Plaintiffs’ wages. (FAC, ¶ 15.)

Thus, regardless of if Plaintiffs have also sufficiently stated a claim for failure to pay wages owed for split shifts, Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for

failure to pay minimum wage. “[A] demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 (Kong).) The court OVERRULES Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action.

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s second cause of action for liquidated damages because “[l]iquidated damages is not a standalone claim.” (Demurrer, p. 10:8-9.) While “Plaintiffs cannot recover liquidated damages under section 1194.2 unless they have a valid claim under section 1194,” as explained above, Plaintiffs have stated a claim for failure to pay minimum wage and thus have stated a claim for liquidated damages. (Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 49, fn. 11.) The court OVERRULES Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action.

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s third cause of action for unpaid overtime on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege their on-call time was compensable. As explained above, Plaintiffs allege that “in addition to their regularly scheduled shifts, [they] were frequently contacted while off-duty in order to work last-minute shifts; often in instances in which Belfor [Defendants’] clients had an emergency that needed their attention. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that they were not adequately compensated for these on-call hours, and were particularly deprived of the proper overtime and double-time hourly rates.” (FAC, ¶ 26.)

The FAC also alleges that Plaintiffs “frequently worked overtime[.]” (FAC, ¶ 102.) However, the FAC is not clear if Plaintiffs allege that they should have been paid for time spent on call, or if they are alleging that they should have been paid overtime for shifts worked outside of regularly scheduled shifts. The court SUSTAINS Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action with 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s fourth and fifth causes of action for meal and rest breaks because employers are permitted to reschedule meal breaks. However, Plaintiffs allege that Belfor Defendants never gave Plaintiffs rest periods. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Thus, Plaintiffs adequately alleged that they were never given rest breaks. However, the FAC does not allege that Belfor Defendants failed to provide meal periods, but rather that “[t]hroughout their employment, Plaintiffs were frequently not afforded lawfully compliant meal periods.

Despite having a typically designated ‘mealtime,’ Plaintiffs were frequently told that there was more work to be done and that the meal period would need to be taken later. As a result, Plaintiffs were frequently required to eat while on-route to another job site.” (FAC, ¶ 25.) Having a meal break postponed is different from being denied a meal break entirely. Plaintiffs do not allege that they were never given meal periods, but rather that their meal periods were delayed. The court SUSTAINS Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for failure to provide meal periods with 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

The court OVERRULES Belfor Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for failure to provide rest breaks.

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s sixth and seventh causes of action for failure to provide accurate wage statements and wages upon termination because Plaintiffs’ other claims fail. Belfor Defendants also demur to the FAC’s sixth cause of action because Plaintiffs do not allege an injury. However, this court has overruled Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first, second and fifth causes of action. The court OVERRULES Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s seventh cause of action. As for the sixth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that they

“on numerous occasions, had to contact Trademark and correct issues” with their paystubs not accurately reflecting the total number of hours they worked per pay period such that “if they did not notice these mistakes, [Plaintiffs] would have been deprived of their lawful wages.” (FAC, ¶ 27.) Belfor Defendants argue on demurrer that Plaintiffs thus do not allege injury because Plaintiffs allege they were ultimately paid for hours worked. However, by pleading that Belfor Defendants failed to pay wages owed, among other cause of action, Plaintiffs have alleged “knowing and intentional failure by an employer” to comply with Labor Code section 226’s requirement that employers provide accurate and complete paystub information. (Lab. Code, §§ 226, subds. (a) & (e)(1).) . The court OVERRULES Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s sixth cause of action.

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s eighth cause of action for failure to reimburse business expenses because Plaintiffs do not adequately allege separate business expenses. “The elements of a section 2802, subdivision (a) cause of action, as delineated by the statutory language, are: (1) the employee made expenditures or incurred losses; (2) the expenditures or losses were incurred in direct consequence of the employee's discharge of his or her duties, or obedience to the directions of the employer; and (3) the expenditures or losses were necessary.” (Gallano v.

Burlington Coat Factory of California, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 953, 960, internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that they were not adequately compensated for clothing maintenance and labor costs, or for maintaining all methods of communications. (FAC, ¶¶ 156, 157.) Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that their clothing and laundry costs were incurred in direct consequences of the employee’s discharge of duties, as Plaintiffs presumably would have clothing or laundry costs independent of their employment responsibilities.

However, Plaintiffs do allege that “they were required to maintain methods of communication, should Defendants require unscheduled on-call shifts or work, and Plaintiffs paid for all costs associated with these methods of communication.” (FAC, ¶ 157.) Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a cause of action for failure to reimburse business expenses. (See Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1144 [an employer must always reimburse an employee for the employee’s reasonable expense associated with mandatory use of a personal cell phone], see also Kong, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047 [demurrer cannot be sustained to part of a cause of action].)

The court OVERRULES Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s eight cause of action.

The court OVERRULES Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. The court SUSTAINS Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s third and sixth causes of action WITH 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

ii. Causes of Action Nine through 14

Belfor Defendants demur to causes of action nine through 14 on the basis that this court has already sustained a demurrer to those causes of action without leave to amend based on workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine. (Demurrer, p. 5:15-17.) This court’s order, dated March 3, 2025 (“March Order”), sustained Belfor Environmental’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ causes of action for negligence, medical monitoring, breach of contract, unlawful business practices, intentional infliction of emotional, and negligent infliction of emotional distress without leave to amend. (March Order, p. 27:9-11.) However, Belfor USA did not demur to Plaintiffs’ Complaint jointly with Belfor Environmental as they do now to Plaintiff’s FAC, and thus the ninth through fourteenth causes of action against Belfor USA in Plaintiffs’ FAC are

not precluded by this court’s prior order sustaining Belfor USA’s demurrer. Nevertheless, the FAC does not allege any additional facts that change this courts’ analysis of Plaintiffs’ ninth through fourteenth causes of action as applied to Belfor USA. Plaintiffs concede that the FAC’s ninth through fourteenth causes of action fall within workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine.(See Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”]; see also Westside Center Associates v.

Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [failure to challenge a contention in a brief results in the concession of that argument].) Plaintiffs state that they will seek leave to amend to allege facts that fall outside the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine, but do not explain how the FAC could be amended. (See Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 [plaintiff must demonstrate specific manner that complaint can be amended to address pleading deficiencies].)

The court SUSTAINS Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through fourteenth causes of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

iii. Causes of Action 15 through 19

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s fifteenth cause of action because it is timebarred and lacks sufficient allegations, and to causes of action sixteen through nineteen because they are barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine. (Demurrer, pp. 8:12- 14, 12:10-11.)

As to the fifteenth cause of action, a PAGA action must be brought within one year of the alleged Labor Code violation and is tolled for only 65 days from the time a prefiling notice is submitted to the Labor Workforce Development Agency. (Arce v. The Ensign Group, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 622, 630.) Here, Plaintiffs’ employment with Belfor Defendants ceased in November 2023, and Plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege a cause of action under PAGA in May 2025. Plaintiffs’ fifteenth cause of action under PAGA is time barred. Plaintiff makes no argument regarding how the fifteenth cause of action is not time barred nor how the FAC can be amended to state a claim. Accordingly, the court SUSTAINS Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s fifteenth cause of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Belfor Defendants demur to the FAC’s sixteenth and seventeenth causes of action for retaliation on the basis that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is derivative of their claimed injuries of asbestos exposure, which are barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine. (Demurrer, p. 8:15-17.) Plaintiffs concede by failing to make any argument tocounter Belfor Defendants’ contention that the retaliation-based causes of action are barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine. The court SUSTAINS Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s sixteenth and seventeenth cause of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

The FAC’s eighteenth and nineteenth causes of action allege injuries based on asbestos exposure and do not allege additional facts to support diverging from this court’s prior order that Plaintiffs’ causes of action based on asbestos exposure are barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine and not subject to exceptions to that doctrine. (March Order, pp. 10:1-22:28.) The court SUSTAINS Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s eighteenth and nineteenth cause of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED. Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through nineteenth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Trademark’s Demurrer

Trademark demurs to Plaintiffs’ FAC for failure to state a claim and additionally demurs to Plaintiffs’ fifteenth cause of action for PAGA violations for being outside the statute of limitations. Trademarks demurs to the same causes of action as Belfor Defendants on the same bases. Plaintiffs do not distinguish Trademark from Belfor Defendants such that the court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ FAC would apply differently between Defendants.

In addition, Plaintiffs argue in opposition that Trademark failed to meet and confer prior to filing a demurrer to cause of action one through eight. As explained above, “[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) The court will not overrule Trademark’s demurrer on that basis. However, neither the letter attached as an exhibit to the Declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel Allan A.

Villanueva (“Villanueva Decl.”) nor the Declaration of Amande Lee show that Trademark’s meet and confer attempts prior to filing the demurrer included objections to causes of action one through eight. Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires the demurring party to “identify all of the specific causes of action that it believes are subject to demurrer and identify with legal support the basis of the deficiencies.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(1).) Trademark evidently did not communicate their intent to demur to causes of action one through eight in their meet and confer attempts.

Trademark argues in reply that it met and conferred with Plaintiffs telephonically a number of times subsequent to sending the letter, but Trademark still does not state it explicitly discussed objections to causes of action one through eight with Plaintiffs prior to filing a demurrer. Trademark is admonished to comply with its meet and confer requirements in the future.

Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED. Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND, and Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through nineteenth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

III. MOTIONS TO STRIKE

A.

Legal Standard

A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter asserted in a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) A court may also strike out all or any part of a pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of the State of California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) The court’s decision to strike the petition pursuant to section 436 is discretionary. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 436 [“The court may . . . strike”].)

B. Belfor Defendants’ Motion to Strike Belfor Defendants move to strike the entirety of Plaintiffs’ FAC because Plaintiffs did not properly seek leave to amend. This court’s prior order sustained Belfor Environmental’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ ninth through fourteenth causes of action without leave to amend, but as noted above, Belfor USA did not join Belfor Environmental in that demurrer. The FAC specifies that the nineth through fourteenth causes of action (but not the twelfth cause of action) apply only to Belfor USA, Trademark, and Does 1 through 100.

Thus, the FAC is timely as to Belfor USA. Moreover, Belfor Defendants’ own authority cited for the proposition that Plaintiffs cannot file the FAC after Belfor USA filed an answer actually supports the contrary. (See Barton v. Khan (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1220-1221 [Thus, in this case of first impression, we must determine whether one defendant’s filing of an answer divests plaintiff of the right to amend the complaint with respect to the causes of action brought against other demurring defendants.

We conclude that it does not.”].) The court DENIES Belfor Defendants’ motion to strike the entirety of Plaintiffs’ FAC. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b) [striking all or any part of any pleading not filed in conformity with an order of the court is in the court’s discretion].)

Belfor Defendants also move to strike the paragraphs of the FAC relating to Plaintiffs’ asbestos exposure, retaliation, and fraud claims. As this court has sustained Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through nineteenth causes of action, the court DENIES Belfor Defendants’ motion to strike because it is moot.

C. Trademark’s Motion to Strike Trademarks moves to strike the same portions of the FAC as Belfor Defendants on the same bases, with the exception that Trademark did not move to strike the entire complaint because Plaintiffs amended without leave to amend. As explained above, Plaintiffs do not distinguish Trademark from Belfor Defendants such that the court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ FAC would apply differently between Defendants. Thus, the court DENIES Trademark’s motion to strike as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED. Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. Belfor Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through nineteenth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action is OVERRULED. Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND, and Trademark’s demurrer to the FAC’s ninth through nineteenth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Belfor Defendants’ motion to strike the FAC is DENIED as moot. Trademark’s motion to strike the FAC is DENIED as moot.

The court will prepare the Order.

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