Daniel Patrick Hawkins, et al. v. General Motors LLC, et al.

any consumer who is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with a written warranty.

(Id., at ¶ 16.)

On January 16, 2025, Defendant filed its Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

B. Instant Motion

Now at issue before the Court is Defendant GM’s Motion for Summary Judgment. GM

contends that Plaintiffs cannot maintain the single count of Magnuson-Moss Act without a viable

state law cause of action, which does not exist in the FAC.

In support of the motion, GM provides the Declaration of Bryan Jensen (“Mr. Jensen”),

Declaration of Kyle Roybal, Esq. (“Mr. Roybal”), and a Separate Statement with 8 claimed

undisputed material facts. Mr. Jensen is GM’s Litigation Support Manager for the Western

Region Customer Care and Aftersales. He authenticates the following exhibits: Exhibit B (GM’s

View Vehicle Delivery Information report), Exhibit C (2021 GMC Limited Warranty and Owner

Assistance Information booklet) and Exhibit D (GM’s View Vehicle Summary). Mr. Roybal is

counsel of record for GM. He authenticates Exhibit A (the Retail Installment Sale Contract dated

January 4, 2024).

Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They first argue that there are other triable issues of fact

which do not allow summary judgment. In the alternative, they request leave to amend. In

support of the opposition, Plaintiffs provide the Declaration of Zachary B. Powell, Esq.

(“Mr. Powell”), and they respond to Defendant’s Separate Statement along with 6 additional

claimed undisputed material facts. Mr. Powell authenticates the following exhibits: Exhibit 1

(Repair Orders for subject vehicle) and Exhibit 2 (Retail Installment Sales Contract for the

subject vehicle). Defendant does not reply to the opposition. After issuing a tentative ruling and

holding a hearing on the motion, the Court now issues its final ruling.1

II. PROCEDURAL CONCERN RE: THE OPPOSITION The opposition is untimely. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(2),

states that “[a]n opposition to the motion shall be served and filed not less than 20 days

preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders

otherwise.” Twenty days prior to the original hearing date of May 27, 2026, was Thursday, May

7, 2026. Plaintiffs did not file their Opposition until 6 days later on May 13, 2026.

The court in its discretion may reject the opposition as untimely and treat the motion as

without an opposition. (Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (d) [“If the court, in its discretion,

refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate.”].) On the other

hand, the court may consider a late filing if there is no prejudice. (Juarez v. Wash Depot

Holdings, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1202 [Filing 2 days late with no showing of

prejudice by other side supported court’s discretion in “view of the strong policy of the law

favoring the disposition of cases on the merits”].) If there is prejudice, the court may continue the

hearing. (Kapitanski v. Von’s Grocery Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 29, 33 [Noted in the context

of a summary judgment that “If the court here believed its receipt of Kapitanski’s untimely

declaration would have prejudiced Von’s, it could have continued the hearing ....”].)

1 The Court finds that the moving party has complied with its meet-and-confer obligation.

Here, in the absence of any claimed or apparent prejudice, the Court exercises discretion

to consider Plaintiff’s Opposition. In addition, the hearing was continued from May 27, 2026, to

July 23, 2026, which means Defendant had the opportunity to reply on the merits and it appears

to have chosen not to do so. Further, there is a “strong public policy favoring a trial on the

merits,” and there is also a strong public policy favoring resolution of a motion for summary on

the merits as “its sole purpose is to determine from the affidavits where there is an issue of fact

to be tried.” (Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 497, 502; House v. Lala

(1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 412, 416.)

III. WHY THE COURT IS GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT A. Defendant’s Separate Statement.

In support of its motion, GM provides 8 Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”). Plaintiffs

dispute UMFs Nos. 3 and 6-8 to the extent that GM contends the remaining warranty balance

was unenforceable by them. The vehicle at issue is a model year 2021 GMC Sierra 1500, VIN:

1GT9EEL3MZ276940 (“Subject Vehicle” or “Sierra”), which Plaintiffs purchased on January 4,

2024, from Pacific Auto Center. (UMF # 1 [Undisputed].)

Plaintiffs did not buy the Sierra new; they bought it used, with 49,061 miles on the

odometer. (UMF # 2 [Undisputed].) GM was not a party to the transaction between Plaintiffs and

Pacific Auto Center. (UMF # 3 [Undisputed].)

Plaintiffs were not Sierra’s original owners. (UMF # 4 [Undisputed].) Hall Chevrolet

GMC delivered the Sierra to its original owner(s) on April 9, 2021, with 14 miles on its

odometer. (UMF # 5 [Undisputed].) In connection with that delivery of the Sierra to its original

owner(s), GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty (the “Warranty”), providing bumper-to

bumper coverage for the earlier of 3 years or 36,000 miles, and powertrain coverage for the

earlier of 5 years or 60,000 miles. (UMF # 6 [Undisputed].)

The Warranty’s coverages began when Hall Chevrolet GMC delivered the Sierra to its

original owner(s) on April 9, 2021. (UMF # 7 [Undisputed].) GM did not issue or provide any

new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the vehicle when Plaintiffs bought the Sierra

used; Plaintiffs received only the balance of any coverage remaining under the Warranty that

GM issued when the Sierra was delivered to its original owner(s). (UMF # 8 [Undisputed].)

B. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement

In response, Plaintiffs provide 6 Additional Material Facts (“AMF”). During the

applicable warranty period, Plaintiffs presented the Subject Vehicle to authorized GM repair

facilities on multiple occasions for diagnosis and repair of defects. (AMF # 1.) Despite multiple

repair attempts, the Subject Vehicle continued to exhibit nonconformities. (AMF # 2.) GM was

provided with a reasonable opportunity to repair it but failed to conform the vehicle to its

warranties. (AMF # 3.) Plaintiffs suffered diminution in value and loss of use as a result of GM’s

failure to repair. (AMF # 4.)

The repair history creates triable issues as to whether defects covered by GM’s written

warranty were repaired within a reasonable time and reasonable number of opportunities. (AMF

# 5.) Plaintiffs’ repair history and GM’s warranty documents create triable issues regarding

whether GM complied with its written warranty obligations and whether Plaintiffs have a viable

warranty theory supporting their Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim. (AMF # 6.)

C.

Analysis

The Court finds that Defendant meets its initial burden and Plaintiffs do not. Plaintiffs’

only cause of action is for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act. (FAC, at p. 1 & at ¶¶ 12-22.)

“The Magnuson-Moss Act is designed to protect consumers against deceptive warranty practices.

[Citations.] Although the Magnuson-Moss Act ‘does not require any manufacturer or seller to

extend a warranty with its product, any ‘“written warranty”’ offered with a consumer product is

subject to the [Magnuson-Moss Act’s] regulatory requirements.’ [Citation.] Furthermore, the

Magnuson-Moss Act applies to all sales of consumer products costing more than a de minimis

value in which a written warranty is given. [Citations.]” (Lake v. Unilever U.S., Inc. (N.D. Ill.

2013) 964 F.Supp.2d 893, 919-20.) It “‘allows a consumer to bring a suit where he claims to be

damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any

obligation under [the MMWA] or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service

contract.’” (In re Apple iPhone 3G Products Liability Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2012) 859 F.Supp.2d

1084, 1089.)

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides that a consumer who is damaged by a

supplier, warrantor, or service contractor’s failure to comply with statutory-imposed obligations

or those under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract may bring suit for

damages. (15 U.S.C. § 2310, subd. (d).) Defendant GM only advances one argument as to the

FAC’s sole cause of action. GM argues Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because there is

no viable state-law cause of action. Defendant cites to cases such as Daugherty v. Am. Honda

Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833 (“Daugherty”), Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler

Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (“Clemens”) and Birdsong v. Apple, Inc. (9th Cir.

2009) 590 F.3d 955, 958, for authority that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act calls for the

application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law.

It then argues because Plaintiffs have no state law breach of warranty claim, their claims under

the Magnuson-Moss Act fail and summary judgment should be granted.

Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment should be denied as triable issues of fact exist

regarding whether GM breached its warranties under the standards incorporated into the

Magnuson-Moss Act. Plaintiffs concede that courts have held that such a claim depends upon the

existence of a viable state-law warranty claim, such that the disposition of the state-law warranty

claim determines the disposition of the Magnuson-Moss Act claim. (See Clemens, supra, 534

F.3d 1017, 1022.) Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that the following allegations sufficiently

establish a breach of express written warranty under California law: the existence of GM’s

written warranties, presumption of the subject vehicle for warrantable repairs to authorized

facilities, GM’s failure to repair the subject vehicle within a reasonable time and reasonable

number of attempts, and the resulting damages. Plaintiffs thus contend they have a viable

Magnuson-Moss Act claim. Plaintiffs also contend that Daugherty, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 824,

held that a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim fails where no state-law warranty claim exists,

but a viable state-law written warranty foundation is adequately alleged and supported by the

evidence. Plaintiffs further state that Daughtery does not stand for the proposition that a

transferable manufacturer’s written warranty is unenforceable by a subsequent owner.

Alternatively, if the Court concludes that Plaintiffs must separately plead the underlying

state-law warranty theory in addition to the Magnuson-Moss Act cause of action, Plaintiffs

request leave to amend to add a cause of action for breach of express written warranty and

related California warranty law based on GM’s written warranty and Plaintiffs’ warranty repair

history. Plaintiffs are correct that it is established policy that courts are to liberally permit

amendments at any stage of the proceeding. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (Frederick Henry Vickers)

(1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-89 [“Trial courts are vested with the discretion to allow

amendments to pleadings ‘in furtherance of justice.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) That trial courts

are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been established

policy in this state since 1901. [Citations.]”].)

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the only cause of

action in the FAC because it has met its burden of proof to show there is no factual basis for

relief for the Plaintiffs and Defendant is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is an

undisputed fact that Plaintiffs purchased the Sierra used, and Defendant was not a party to the

transaction between Plaintiffs and Pacific Auto Center. (UMF # 1-5.) It is also undisputed that

Defendant issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty which began when the vehicle was delivered

to its original owner(s) on April 9, 2021, and it did not issue or provide any new or additional

warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the vehicle when it was purchased used on January 4, 2024.

(UMF # 1, 6-8.) The FAC frames the first cause of action as Defendant failed to comply with the

express and implied warranties of the vehicle and as such, Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under

the Magnuson-Moss Act. (See FAC, at ¶¶ 16-22.) There is no other cause of action within the

FAC.

As shown by Defendant, many cases, both California and federal, have found that

without a valid state law breach of warranty claim, there can be no claim under the act. (See, e.g.,

Arana v. Tesla Motors, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2023) 2023 WL 1796956, at *2–3; See also Troup

v. Toyota Motor Corp. (9th Cir. 2013) 545 F.App’x 668, 669; Clemens, supra, 534 F.3d at pp.

1022, 1027; Daugherty, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 833.)

Arana v. Tesla Motors, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2023) 2023 WL 1796956 (“Arana”) is persuasive,

and its facts are comparable to the facts in the instant proceeding. Arana involved claims brought

under the Song-Beverly Act and the Magnuson-Moss Act pertaining to a used 2020 Tesla Model

3 purchased from a third-party dealership. (Id., at *1.) In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the

federal court found, in pertinent part, as follows:

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s two claims fail for two distinct reasons. First, his express warranty claim under the SBA applies only to new (or “like-new”) vehicles, and therefore his claim, premised upon his used-vehicle purchase,

cannot stand. Second, Defendant avers that MMWA claims rise or fall with underlying state-law claims, and because Plaintiff’s SBA claim fails, so must his MMWA claim. The Court agrees.

(Arana, supra, 2023 WL 1796956, at *3.)

The district court granted the motion and dismissed the entire complaint, finding that,

“[b]ecause Plaintiff’s sole state-law claim fails, and because his MMWA claim is predicated

solely on that claim, the MMWA claim must fail as well.” (Arana, supra, 2023 WL 1796956, at

*6-7.) While unpublished and therefore not binding,2 Arana provides persuasive authority

supporting the conclusion that, absent a viable state law breach of warranty claim, a claim under

the Magnuson-Moss Act cannot proceed. (Ibid.)

Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Troup v. Toyota

Motor Corp. (9th Cir. 2013) 545 F.App’x 668, 669 (“Troup”), stated: “[g]iven the Troups’

failure to state a claim for breach of an express or implied warranty, the district court also

properly dismissed their claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, a federal cause of

action requiring a breach of warranty under state law. See Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955,

958 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (‘[B]ecause we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for

breach of an express or implied warranty, their claim[] under the[] [Magnuson-Moss Warranty

Act is] also properly dismissed.’).” Troup did not involve the Song-Beverly Act. It concerned an

alleged design defect in a Toyota Prius that did not fall within the scope of the warranty at issue;

and it concerned the failure to allege that the Prius was unfit for its intended purpose. (Id., at

*668-69.) Nevertheless, while unpublished and not binding, Troup also provides persuasive

2 “[T]he California Rules of Court do not prohibit citation to unpublished federal cases, which may properly be cited as persuasive, although not binding, authority.” (Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Servs. United States (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1022, fn. 9 (“Reynaud”) [internal quotations omitted].)

authority supporting the conclusion that, absent a viable state law breach of warranty claim, a

claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act cannot proceed.

Moreover, Daugherty, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 824, involved a class action wherein it

was alleged that the defendant failed to disclose an engine defect until after the warranty on the

vehicle had expired. (Id. at p. 827.) The trial court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiffs’ claims,

finding that a defect discovered after the warranty expired cannot support a breach of warranty

claim under either California or federal law, and the appellate court affirmed. (Ibid.) As to

plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the Daugherty court stated it:

“authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty.

Magnuson-Moss ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the

creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a

regulating rule. [Citation.] (Id. at pp. 832-33.) Accordingly, the Daugherty court held that the

trial court did not err in finding that the failure to state a warranty claim under state law

necessarily constituted a failure to state a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority to support their contention that the applicable statutory

or case law does not require a plaintiff to plead a state-law warranty claim to pursue relief under

the Magnuson-Moss Act. In fact, Plaintiffs concede that courts have held a Magnuson-Moss Act

claim depends upon the existence of a viable state-law warranty claim, such that its disposition

determines the disposition of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty claim. (Opp. at p. 7:9-12.)

Therefore, given that Plaintiffs have no state law claim, the Court finds that the cause of

action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act cannot continue.

With respect to the leave to amend, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request. It is normally

liberally granted; however, an unwarranted delay justifies a denial of leave to amend. “The law is

well settled that a long-deferred presentation of the proposed amendment without a showing of

excuse for the delay is itself a significant factor to uphold the trial court’s denial of the

amendment.” (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 613

[Internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) Plaintiffs voluntarily removed their state

claims on December 24, 2024, when they removed the former causes of action for violation of

the Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty and violation of the Song-Beverly Act Breach

of Implied Warranty, and they could have added other state claims. Instead, they only brought a

cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act. “There can be no question but that an

amended complaint takes the place of the original, and that when filed the original ceases to

perform any further functions as a pleading.” (Pfister v. Wade (1886) 69 Cal. 133, 138.) Also, the

policy to allow leave to amend at any stage depends on whether no prejudice is shown to the

adverse party. (Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 175

(“Melican”).) In Melican, the Court of Appeal referenced Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th

732, 746, and stated “in Huff, three days before the scheduled hearing on the defendant’s

summary judgment motion, the plaintiff requested an order shortening time to bring a motion to

amend his complaint to add a new claim and to continue the summary judgment hearing. Huff

concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s request, noting

plaintiff gave no explanation for the delay in seeking to amend. The court further recognized that

based on the undisputed facts presented, no liability would lie under the new claim.” (Melican,

supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 175-76.) And as to its own case, the Melican court stated that:

“plaintiffs were aware of the facts underlying the purported contract between Joseph and UCI

from the time the agreement allegedly was formed. Consequently, this claim should have been

pleaded when Joseph was added as a party to the action in January 2000. Yet, plaintiffs never

sought to add the claim until they made their oral request during the summary judgment hearing

over five years later. Plaintiffs proffer no explanation for this clearly unreasonable delay. It

would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat UCI’s summary judgment motion by

allowing them to present a ‘moving target’ unbounded by the pleadings.” (Id., at p. 176.)

Plaintiffs do not explain the reason for the delay in requesting leave to amend, nor do they

articulate why another state law claim could not have been pleaded when the complaint was

amended over a year ago. As such, it would be unfair to Defendant to grant leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

1. Defendant GM’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend.

Evidence considered in relation to the MSJ: Defendant’s Mr. Roybal’s Declaration along

with Exhibit A (Retail Installment Sale Contract) attached thereto. Defendant’s Mr. Jensen’s

Declaration along with Exhibits B-D (GM’s View Vehicle Delivery Information, copy of the

2021 GMC Limited Warranty and Owner Assistance Information booklet and View Vehicle

Summary report for the Sierra) attached thereto. The undisputed material facts 1-8 in

Defendant’s Separate Statement, which are supported by the previously stated evidence. And

Plaintiff’s Declaration of Mr. Powell with attached Exhibits 1-2.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court