Mitchell vs. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

These moving parties were named as Doe defendants. However, the allegations as to Doe defendants (SAC, ¶¶ 6-10), are largely conclusions without supporting facts, which are insufficient. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966–967 [court “treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded ... [t]he court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law”].) While agency allegations are ultimate facts (Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 437), the general agency allegations at ¶ 7 of the SAC are insufficient, in the face of the other extensive factual allegations against named defendants (SAC, ¶¶ 11-33), and the absence of any charging factual allegations against Doe defendants. (Gentry v. Ebay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 827 [specific factual allegations control over inconsistent general allegations].)

Plaintiffs shall file a Third Amended Complaint, if at all, within 10 days.

2. Motion to Bifurcate

Defendants / cross-defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for

NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2007-1 NovaStar Home Equity Loan Asset- Backed Certificates, Series 2007-1, PHH Mortgage Corporation, and Western Progressive LLC’s motion to bifurcate and try equitable issues first is DENIED, without prejudice. Moving parties have not presented sufficient evidence showing that trying equitable causes of action first will further convenience, avoid prejudice, or be conducive to expedition and economy. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 597, 598, 1048, subd. (b).)

However, the Court will consider revisiting the issue via a Motion In Limine prior to trial, upon a better evidentiary showing by Moving Parties.

3. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Cross-complainant George Goubran’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the 1st through 7th causes of action in his verified First Amended Cross-complaint [FACC] is DENIED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438 [authorizing motion]; Engine Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034 [“Motions by a plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings ... are the equivalent of a demurrer to an answer ... the appellate court will assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded in the answer and will disregard the controverted allegations of the complaint ... Such a motion must be denied if the defendant's pleadings raise a material issue or set up affirmative matter constituting a defense;” internal citations omitted.)

Both parties’ requests for judicial notice of various recorded documents pertaining to the subject property are GRANTED, limited to the fact of recordation, but not the truth of their contents. (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-265 [judicial notice of recorded documents]; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th

1106, 1117 [“the fact a court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein”].) Moving defendant’s remaining requests for judicial notice of documents filed in this action is GRANTED, limited to the fact of filing, but not of the truth of their contents. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1) [court records]; In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314 [“while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files;” emphasis in original; internal citation omitted]; Williams v.

Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, FN 7 [judicial notice of the truth of facts in court documents generally limited to orders, statements of decision, and judgments].)

Judgment on the pleadings is DENIED, as the verified Answer to the verified First Amended Cross-complaint states sufficient facts denying moving party’s contention that the March 2014 reconveyance extinguished all rights and obligations under the first loan and deed of trust, on which all of moving party’s claims are based. (Answer, ¶¶ 10-12, 16-17, 19, 22-26, 28-33, 40, 42, 44, 49, 51-54, 57, 62, 65-67, 72, 74, 78, 79, 83-87, 90, 92-93; Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216 [“judgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution”].)

Further, whether cross-defendants’ ability to claim any rights under the first loan and deed of trust are barred by laches, waiver, or estoppel are all questions of fact for the trier of fact, and may not be determined as a matter of law unless the facts are undisputed, which is not the case here. (Schabarum v. California Legislature, supra at 1216 [denial of motion upon sufficient allegations of factual disputes]; Estate of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971, 997 [“the existence of laches is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all of the

applicable circumstances ... [h]owever, the issue may be addressed as one of law if the facts are undisputed”]; In re Campbell (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 742, 755 [“The issue of a waiver is generally a question of fact”]; Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 652 [“In the usual case, estoppel is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of facts ... [h]owever, when the facts are undisputed, the existence of an estoppel is a question of law;” internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

Similarly, whether cross-defendants’ ability to claim any rights under the first loan and deed of trust is barred by any applicable statute of limitations, does not “clearly and affirmatively” appear from the face of the pleadings. (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781; emphasis added, internal citation omitted.)

Plaintiffs shall give notice of all the above.

7 Cruz vs. PAC Auto Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award Group, Inc.

Plaintiffs Anthony Cruz and Veronica Solis Beas’s petition/motion to confirm arbitration award is GRANTED, as follows. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1286, 1286.6; see also Pacific Law Group: USA v. Gibson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 577, 580 [“Confirmation is mandatory under Code of Civil Procedure section 1286” et seq. unless the court corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding; nothing in these sections limits the confirmation of arbitration awards based on whether the respondent has/has not satisfied its payments obligations under the award].)

The Court confirms the arbitration award as made in the final award dated 6/18/26, which adopts and incorporates the interim award