AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al.

However, the testimony and arguments have provided enough information for the Court to provide a ruling that is not wholly abstract. California Labor Code §6304.5 provides that: “Neither the issuance of, or failure to issue, a citation by the division shall have any application to, nor be considered in, nor be admissible into, evidence in any personal injury or wrongful death action, except as between an employee and his or her own employer.” At the same time, it provides that “Sections 452 and 669 of the Evidence Code shall apply to this division and to occupational safety and health standards adopted under this division in the same manner as any other statute, ordinance, or regulation.”

Both Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 935-936 and Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 884, 900 make it clear that though the investigations and citations of OSHA are inadmissible in this personal injury action, there is nothing preventing the use of the regulations to show knowledge or foreseeability, among other things.

As such, the Court finds that the fact of OSHA regulations, the Plaintiff’s knowledge of such and behavior in relation to the regulations is admissible; however, citations for violations of OSHA and OSHA’s investigations of American Eagle are inadmissible and excluded.

The admissibility of any BAR report, witness statements in an OSHA or BAR investigations is reserved. None of this evidence was presented to the Court for the Court to decide its admissibility. Any specific evidence, such as a BAR report, witness statement from an OSHA or BAR investigation will be addressed at the time of trial and should be brought to the attention of the opposing party and the court before it is presented to the jury.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #3

Motion to Preclude using OSHA as a Defense Shield

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendants from using OSHA as a defense shield for arguing non-liability is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff contends that admission of this evidence would be unduly confusing and timeconsuming under Evidence Code §352; that the Defendants’ obligations and standard of care cannot be vitiated by the OSHA guidelines; and the OSHA guidelines do not have anything to do with causation in this case.

Defendants argue that the OSHA permissible exposure limit (“PEL) and short-term exposure limit (“STEL”) are relevant to show whether Plaintiff’s employer should bear any fault in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference RE: Motions In Limine in Department 512 Plaintiff’s claims for damages and responds that the OSHA and ACGIH guidelines are relevant to show historical knowledge and may demonstrate whether its actions were reasonable.

While the court agrees that the OSHA PELs and STELs do not establish the standard of care in this case and cannot vitiate the Defendants’ obligations, the Court also agrees that subject to any other admissibility issues OSHA PELs and STELs may be relevant to provide historical context about the knowledge of asbestos hazards. Accordingly, although the presentation of this evidence may consume trial time, the court does not find that the evidence is unduly prejudicial or time consuming for purposes of Evidence Code §352. If the OSHA PELs or STELs are admitted into evidence, the court will consider giving the jury a limiting instruction concerning the duty applicable to this case if not otherwise addressed by the CACI instructions.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #4

Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Prior Business Dispute and Lawsuit

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to exclude reference to Plaintiff’s prior business dispute and lawsuit is GRANTED IN PART.

Plaintiff seeks to exclude any reference to Plaintiff’s business dispute with his former business partner and the lawsuit between them that was settled.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for loss of income are affected by or related to the claims of lost income in the lawsuit which was settled with his former business partner. Defendants argue that they should be able to question Plaintiff regarding this overlap of income reporting and loss.

The Court finds that other than the issue of Plaintiff’s claim of lost income and whether the level of income loss is related to the actions of Plaintiff’s business partner vs his illness, the substance of the dispute between the Plaintiff and his former business partner is irrelevant to this matter. It would be an undue consumption of time to delve into the lawsuit and Plaintiff’s claims. To this extent, this evidence is excluded.

On the other hand, Defendants are free to cross-examine or question the Plaintiff and present otherwise admissible evidence regarding the sources of the Plaintiff’s income and the alleged sources of the Plaintiff’s loss of income.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #5

Motion to Preclude Defense Expert John Brady

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to preclude expert John Brady is DENIED.

Plaintiff seeks to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. John Brady as unsubstantiated and based on

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference RE: Motions In Limine in Department 512 speculation.

Dr. Brady’s opinion as a geologist is grounded in his expertise. From all the evidence presented, Dr. Brady intends to offer his opinion that based on his studies of the history of geological formation he believes that asbestos being found in talc mined in Montana and Vermont is unlikely. Dr. Brady is sufficiently qualified to give this opinion, and his opinion is not based on pure speculation. Plaintiff’s arguments for excluding Dr. Brady, to wit, that he relied on unsupported and unreliable methods for determining the presence of asbestos in talc and that he does not have data specifically from the mines where Evercoat sourced its talc, go to the weight and not admissibility of his testimony.

Plaintiff’s experts are well qualified to attack defense opinions and plaintiff’s counsel is competent to cross-examine these witnesses. It is up to the jury to decide which expert opinion to accept and/or to what extent it will consider the differing expert opinions. This order does not preclude Plaintiff from challenging the witness’ qualifications to testify as an expert witness on the subject areas proffered.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #7

Motion to Limit the Testimony of Defense Expert Brian Taylor regarding Plaintiff’s Life Expectancy

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to limit expert Brian Taylor’s testimony is DENIED.

Plaintiff seeks to limit the testimony of Dr. Brian Taylor as it relates to Plaintiff’s Life Expectancy due to his substance abuse disorder.

Dr. Taylor’s opinion as a pulmonologist and critical care physician is grounded in his expertise. From all the evidence presented, Dr. Brady intends to state that Plaintiff’s substance abuse disorder related to his opium use is a comorbidity that reduces Plaintiff’s life expectancy. Dr. Taylor is sufficiently qualified to give this opinion, and his opinion is not based on speculation. Dr. Taylor presented articles and literature that form the basis of his opinion. Though Plaintiff initially did not receive full copies of the articles upon which Dr.

Taylor relied, the Court understands that as of July 23, 2026, Plaintiff had received a copy of the materials. The materials are peer-reviewed articles upon which a clinician would typically rely. Plaintiff’s arguments for limiting Dr. Taylor’s testimony, to wit, that the materials he relied upon do not directly apply to the Plaintiff, go to the weight and not admissibility of his testimony. Plaintiff’s experts are well qualified to attack defense opinions and plaintiff’s counsel is competent to crossexamine these witnesses.

It is up to the jury to decide which expert opinion to accept and/or to what extent it will consider the differing expert opinions. This order does not preclude Plaintiff from challenging the witness’ qualifications to testify as an expert witness on the subject areas proffered.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #8

Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Tax Information

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference RE: Motions In Limine in Department 512

The Court is inclined to GRANT this motion in limine IN PART. The Court provides the following to inform the discussion of this motion at the hearing.

Plaintiff seeks to exclude his tax information, including tax returns, filing or failure to file tax returns, and any other tax related information, other than the 1099’s produced in this matter.

The Court recognizes that there is a taxpayer privilege protecting tax information and compelled disclosure of tax returns. (Webb v. Standard Oil Co. (1957) 49, Cal.2d 509, 512-13.) This privilege includes seeking information regarding entries on a return. (Save-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1, 7.) However, this privilege is not absolute and yields where the Plaintiff has acted in a way that surrenders his reasonable expectation of privacy in the confidentiality of the tax information sought. (Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 482.) Any such waiver must be narrowly construed. (Id.)

Here, the Plaintiff has presented 1099’s to support his claim for loss of income but has admitted that the 1099’s do not represent the full picture of his income because the amounts represent gross income and not his true profits. Plaintiff has testified that he no longer has receipts or any other documentation regarding the expenses that would correspond to the gross income.

The parties should be prepared to discuss at the hearing what evidence is being presented by the Plaintiff regarding his loss of income, specifically income before the injury and after, as well as the time periods these relate to. Defendants should be prepared to discuss what, if any tax information, they intend to present to the jury regarding this issue.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #1

Motion to Exclude Post-2015 Exposure Evidence

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Post-2015 Exposure Evidence is DENIED.

This is not a proper motion in limine as it is not directed at a “particular, identifiable body of evidence.” (Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 250; Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 670-671). Defendants do not mention any specific piece of evidence that they wish to exclude. Without more, it is impossible for the Court to determine the relevance or admissibility of this evidence. Further, it appears that this motion is moot as the Plaintiff has affirmed that he does not intend to produce any evidence or opinion that any post-2015 exposure has caused his mesothelioma.

Plaintiff’s opposition suggests that the motion is directed at other post-2015 evidence related to the Defendants’ behavior which may be relevant to punitive damages. As drafted, however, the Court cannot see that the motion was intended to be so broad. As such, the motion is denied.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #2

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference RE: Motions In Limine in Department 512 Motion to Preclude Reference to or Evidence of the Profits of Defendants or Defense Counsel

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to or Evidence of Profits or Financial Status of Defendants or Defense Counsel is GRANTED.

Defendants’ motion is unopposed. Further, the wealth or lack of it is not relevant and is excluded. (Hoffman v. Brandt (1966) 65 Cal.2d 549, 552-553.) The Court will give CACI 117 as part of the opening instructions to the jury.

Plaintiff may present evidence regarding punitive damages, specifically any evidence of malice or conscious disregard, but any evidence or reference to the Defendants’ finances is precluded unless and until there is a punitive damages phase of the trial.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #3

Motion to Preclude Evidence of, Reference to or Reliance on “Made for Litigation” Articles

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to preclude evidence of, reference to, or reliance on the Moline, Gordon or Emory Papers is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Defendants seek to exclude evidence of, reference to, or reliance on:

(1) “Asbestos in Commercial Talcum Powder as a Cause of Mesothelioma in Women” (2014) by Ronald E. Gordon et al. (“Gordon”); (2) “Mesothelioma Associated with the Use of Cosmetic Talc” (January 2020) by Dr. Jacqueline Moline et al. and “Exposure to Cosmetic Talc and Mesothelioma” (2023) by Dr. Jacqueline Moline et al. (collectively “Moline”); and

(3) “Malignant Mesothelioma Following Repeated Exposures to Cosmetic Talc: A Case Study of 75 Patients” (March 5, 2020) by Dr. Theresa Emory et al. (“Emory”)

arguing that they are unreliable, irrelevant, and likely to confuse the issues and Defendants are precluded from cross-examination regarding the validity of the studies because the authors are absent. These objections are not well-founded.

There is no dispute that the articles were peer-reviewed. If a testifying expert for Plaintiff relies on these articles as the basis for an opinion, the articles will not be admissible on direct examination without foundation. The various concerns raised by Defendants, including that they discuss cosmetic talcum powder that is not at issue here, they were created for the purpose of litigation, and the Moline and Emory articles are the subject of pending litigation about their contents, go to their weight and not admissibility. To the extent Plaintiff’s counsel or experts refer to these articles, Defendants’ counsel can cross-examine the expert(s) and attack their reliance on the data and findings reported in the articles.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference RE: Motions In Limine in Department 512 Joint Defense Motion in Limine #4

Motion to Exclude Nonparty Documents and Testing

Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Nonparty Documents and Testing is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

This is not a proper motion in limine as it is not directed at a “particular, identifiable body of evidence.” (Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 250; Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 670-671). Defendants do not identify the specific documents that they wish to exclude. Without more, it is impossible for the Court to determine the relevance or admissibility of this evidence. The parties must comply with the rules of evidence with respect to each document offered into evidence. On this record, the Court cannot decide whether Plaintiff is unable to do so.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #5

Motion to Preclude Reference or Evidence Pertaining to Prior Lawsuits against Defendants

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference or Evidence Pertaining to Prior Lawsuits against Defendants is GRANTED IN PART.

Defendant’s motion seeks a blanket exclusion of other lawsuits against Defendants, but no other specific cases or verdicts are referenced. Nevertheless, the motion is GRANTED as to prior verdicts, settlements or judgments, or the results of other litigation.

The Court recognizes that the parties will find it necessary to refer to other litigation, particularly during examination of expert witnesses and potential presentation of deposition designations from other litigation. Witnesses who have testified in prior cases may be cross-examined regarding that testimony and it may be put into context without unnecessarily bringing out the facts of that case or the results. The testimony should be identified by date with no unnecessary indication that Defendants in this case were a defendant.

As to any other exclusions, the Court DENIES this motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court makes no ruling currently about other uses for evidence from other litigation. The Court cannot rule on these issues abstractly but must be presented with the specific evidence sought to be admitted. (See Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 250; Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 670-671). Any issues related to specific evidence from other litigation will be addressed at the time and should be brought to the attention of the opposing party and the court before it is presented to the jury. Otherwise, all counsel is admonished to instruct their witnesses, experts, or otherwise, that there should be no mention of other cases or lawsuits, verdicts, judgments or settlements.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #6

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference RE: Motions In Limine in Department 512

Motion to Limit the Testimony of Barry Horn

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Barry Horn is DENIED.

Defendants seek to limit the testimony of Dr. Horn in two respects: to exclude his testimony regarding Plaintiff’s life expectancy absent mesothelioma and his testimony regarding Plaintiff’s medical expenses.

Dr. Barry Horn is a board-certified physician with expertise in diagnosis and treating asbestosrelated diseases. His opinion regarding Plaintiff’s life expectancy absent mesothelioma is grounded in this expertise as well as his review of Plaintiff’s medical records. Contrary to the Defendants’ assertion that Dr. Horn makes a leap with his opinion by “disregarding” the Plaintiff’s substance abuse disorder, Dr. Horn bases his opinion on the status of damage to the Plaintiff’s organs from his current level of substance abuse. This is sufficient. The concerns raised by Defendants as to this opinion can be addressed on cross-examination as they go to the weight of his opinion and not admissibility. As such, this is DENIED.

As for Dr. Horn’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s costs of treatment, Defendants’ motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Dr. Horn offers opinions regarding the reasonable cost of Plaintiff’s future medical treatment. Nothing in the record provided to the Court thus far provides any support that Dr. Horn has any expertise, knowledge, or grounding in medical billing by Kaiser or otherwise. Dr. Horn’s opinion about what future treatments are likely to be prescribed or needed is squarely within his expertise and delineated in his testimony and CV, but there is nothing that supports his opinion of the costs of such treatment.

At the same time, the Court cannot determine on this record whether Dr. Horn may have such expertise and was just not questioned about it. On that basis, this motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants may raise this objection at trial regarding Dr. Horn’s expertise as to reasonable medical costs.

Joint Defense Motion in Limine #7

Motion to Limit the Testimony of Gerald Markowitz

Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Gerald Markowitz is DENIED.

Defendants seek to limit the testimony of Dr. Markowitz regarding the development of the J4-1 testing methodology and its adoption by the FDA as irrelevant and prejudicial. Defendants argue that Dr. Markowitz does not know what PPG actually knew at the time and that PPG was not directly involved in the debate regarding J4-1 testing. Nevertheless, the Court finds that his testimony is relevant. Dr. Markowitz will not testify as to the knowledge of any particular defendant, but as a “state of the art” expert who relies on historical documents, he may testify of what was over time known or knowable regarding asbestos and hazards of asbestos, including articles or statements from trade magazines or trade organizations even of which defendants

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/31/2026 Pre-Trial Conference RE: Motions In Limine in Department 512 were not a part.

At the same time, Dr. Markowitz is precluded from describing activities by the “talc industry.” Dr. Markowitz may testify to the specific participants or trade organizations involved. Any other concerns Defendants have with Dr. Markowitz’s testimony go to the weight and not the admissibility and can be addressed on cross-examination. Further, the Court is inclined to give the limiting instruction proposed by the Plaintiff: “Dr. Markowitz’s testimony concerning CTFA, FDA, and the J4-1 Method is admitted solely for the purposes of evaluating industry knowledge, the reliability and limitations of talc/asbestos testing and “nondetected” reporting, and knowability of the harm. His testimony may not be considered evidence of PPG’s or Mac’s actual knowledge or of their participation in CTFA.”

The Court continues to work on the remaining motions in limine and will issue tentative rulings for the remaining tentative rulings before the August 5 hearing.