Wesley Leonard Pastorius vs. General Motors, LLC

34-2022-00328432-CU-BC-GDS: Wesley Leonard Pastorius vs. General Motors, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Wesley Leonard Pastorius’ (“Plaintiff”) motion for attorneys fees is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the specific issues, attorney fees and/or costs that will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Overview

This is a lemon law action arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2021 GMC Sierra 1500. Plaintiff, represented by Consumer Law Experts, PC, (“CLE”) filed suit in October 2022 and ultimately agreed to settle with Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) in November 2024.

According to the moving papers filed on February 3, 2026, Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorney fees of $38,038.00 (consisting of $32,788.00 for past attorney’s fees representing over 72 hours of attorney time plus $2,625.00 for anticipated attorney’s fees to be incurred with reviewing the opposition to this motion, preparing a reply and attending the hearing, as well as an additional $2,625.00 for anticipated attorney fees

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related to opposing Defendant’s anticipated motion to tax costs).

Defendant opposes, arguing that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied in its entirety as untimely. In this regard, Defendant argues that this motion was filed 397 days after Notice of Settlement was filed with the Court. (Opposition at 4:2-10.) Defendant insists that Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 644 (“Hatlevig”) supports a denial on the basis of timeliness. (Ibid.) Defendant further argues, that should the Court decline to deny the motion outright, no more than $9,812.82 should be awarded in fees given Plaintiff’s [“[c]ounsel’s repeated use of templated filings and several months of zero billing entries shows that this lawsuit was a routine lemon law case like the thousands of other lemon law cases that [Plaintiff’s counsel] has filed against [Defendant].” (Opposition at 4:11-25.)

Discussion

Timeliness of Motion

Defendant first argues that this motion, which was filed 397 days after the “dismissal date” is untimely and should thus be denied in its entirety. Defendant relies upon California Rules of Court, Rules 3.1702 and 3.1385(b), as well as the recent case of Hatlevig, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th 644 as support that the deadline to file this motion began running at the very latest, 45 days from the date of the Notice of Settlement was filed in this case, or on January 2, 2025.

Defendant argues that Hatlevig found a court-ordered or automatic dismissal under Rule 3.1385(b) constitutes a “judgment” sufficient to trigger the deadline under rule 3.1702 and that the Court of Appeal expressly rejected the argument that the absence of a formal order of dismissal means “the deadline for filing the fee motion was never triggered,” noting that accepting this argument “would allow [the fee claimant] to extend the time to file a fee motion indefinitely by violating court orders to file a dismissal[.]” (Hatlevig, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at 647.)

The Court must first note for clarity that Hatlevig involved subsection (b) of rule 3.1385. In this case, the settlement was conditional, and thus subsection (c) is the correct legal rule. Pursuant to rule 3.1385(c) (conditional settlement), “[i]f the plaintiff or other party required to serve and file a request for dismissal within 45 days after the dismissal date specified in the notice does not do so, the court must dismiss the entire case unless

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.” Regardless, the same general policy of both subsections (b) and (c) is that the court must dismiss the case by a certain deadline if a request for dismissal is not filed.

The Court concludes that Hatlevig is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Hatlevig, on June 2, 2023, Hatlevig’s counsel notified the trial court that the case had settled, and the court ordered a dismissal filed within 45 days. The clerk later mailed the parties notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a dismissal was filed or a party showed good cause why the case should not be dismissed. That date came and went, but no dismissal was filed, and no good cause was shown why the case should not be dismissed. Hence, the Hatlevig court concluded that, “consistent with the notice of dismissal, the case was dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023.” (Hatlevig, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 650.)

Although the trial court did not file a formal dismissal order until June 17, 2024, the Hatlevig court concluded that the later order did not establish the operative dismissal date for purposes of calculating the deadline to seek attorney’s fees. Rather, the order merely carried out the court’s mandatory duty to dismiss settled cases and was intended to operate nunc pro tunc to correct the earlier failure to enter the dismissal order on August 15, 2023. (Ibid.)

Here, the condition Notice of Settlement was filed on January 2, 2025, and states that a request for dismissal would be filed no later than July 2, 2025. Plaintiff never filed a request for dismissal. However, and unlike in Hatlevig, the Court never sent notice that the case would be deemed dismissed if a request for dismissal was not filed by July 2, 2025 or that good cause had not been shown why the case should not be dismissed, nor was a dismissal ever entered by order or otherwise. While this should have occurred pursuant to Rule 3.1385, the Court is not persuaded that its inadvertent failure to dismiss the case should be used as a basis to deny this motion as untimely. Accordingly, the Court declines to deny the motion on this basis.

Prevailing Party

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action by obtaining a net monetary recovery. Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b) provides that “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” The

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prevailing party for purposes of section 1032(a)(4) is defined as including the party with the net monetary recovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032(a)(4).) The general definition of prevailing party in section 1032(a)(4) applies to actions under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Reveles v. Toyota By The Bay (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1158 [overruled on other grounds].) Further, Civil Code section 1794(d) provides that a prevailing buyer is entitled to recover “costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Attorneys’ Fees

Next, the Court evaluates the reasonableness of the fees requested. The general standards and authorities guiding the Court’s consideration of this motion are wellestablished, and will receive summary recitation here. The “fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “It is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney’s fees under the lodestar method.

Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked, and the tasks performed are sufficient.” (Conception v. Amscam (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324.) The appropriate hourly rate used to arrive at the lodestar is measured by “the prevailing billing rates of comparable private attorneys as the ‘touchstone’ for determination of that value.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643; see Ketchum v. Moses (2002) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court then determines whether the lodestar should be enhanced or decreased by a “multiplier,” based on factors such as “‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1216.) “‘There is no hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation.’ [Citation.]

There are numerous such factors, and their evaluation is entrusted to a trial court's sound discretion; any one of those factors may be responsible for enhancing or reducing the lodestar.” (Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 947.) Here, Plaintiff does not request a multiplier therefore, the Court will only consider the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328432-CU-BC-GDS: Wesley Leonard Pastorius vs. General Motors, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

lodestar.

Number of Hours

Defendant challenges a number of specific time entries claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel, CLE. (See Opposition at 8:22-12:5.) Specifically, Defendant argues that CLE primarily uses templates for its motions, discovery drafts, and meet and confer letters, and therefore the time spent drafting these documents should be reduced. Defendant also challenges entries it claims are related to routine business tasks or clerical work that is non-compensable. Finally, Defendant argues that several entries show padding by CLE and the hours for those tasks should be reduced.

Absent circumstances rendering an award unjust, a fee award should “ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent.” (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 897 [emphasis added].) “Generally speaking, hours are reasonable if they were ‘reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter.’” (Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont. Ed. Bar 3d ed. 2016) § 9.4, pp. 9-10 [quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 431].) “Hours that would not be billed to a fee-paying client because they are unreasonably duplicative or excessive for the task performed are not reasonable.” (Id. [citing Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 434].)

The Court has considered the evidence and arguments regarding the reasonableness of the hours expended and claimed by Plaintiff's counsel in prosecuting the action. Specifically, the Court has carefully reviewed the billing records, all declarations of counsel, and the Court's own Register of Actions that chronicle the history and progression of this case. Further, the Court has considered Defendant's arguments set forth in its opposition and finds that some of Defendant's concerns have merit.

The Court will reduce the fees as follows:

 “Templated Set One Discovery and PMQ Deposition Notices—January 3, 2023; October 24-25, 2025:” According to the opposition, Plaintiff’s attorney, Ms. Rivero billed 6.9 hours ($3,622.50) to draft Plaintiff’s discovery requests, PMQ Deposition notice, and amended notices. (See Opposition at 8:22-25 citing to the Walker Decl.). Defendant contends that this discovery is the “exact same in every

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case against [Defendant].” (Id., at 8:25-28.) In reply, Plaintiff asserts that, “[a]lthough templates are used as a starting point, this process involves formulating case specific requests that attempt to curtail potential objections and obtain admissible evidence specific to the subject vehicle and the interactions between Plaintiff, GM, and GM’s authorized repair facilities. Discovery requests and deposition notices may follow an established pattern, but are always case specific, utilizing case facts to formulate the requests and categories.” (Reply at 6:12-17.) The Court agrees that 6.9 hours of attorney time to prepare Plaintiff’s first set of discovery and PMQ deposition notices is excessive. Thus, the fees sought by Plaintiffs related to their discovery responses is reduced by $2,000.00.

 “Review of [Defendant’s] Discovery Responses & Preparation of Templated Meet-and-Confer Correspondence—February 2, 21-22, 2023; March 6 and 17, 2023:” Defendant argues that Ms. Rivero billed 1.7 hours ($892.50) to review Defendant’s discovery responses and $4.2 hours ($2,205.00) to prepare templated meet-and-confer correspondences and protective order. According to Defendant, these charges are unreasonable because the CLE’s discovery requests and Defendant’s corresponding responses are materially identical from case to case, and the related meet-and-confer letters likewise consist of substantially the same standardized language.. (Opposition at 9:4-13.)

Accordingly, Defendant contends that it should not have taken more than one hour to review Defendants standard responses and one hour to draft the “templated” meet-and-confer correspondence. On reply, Plaintiff contends that “ while [Defendant] admits that it serves essentially the same discovery responses in every case (an assertion that suggests that [Defendant] is not acting in good faith when responding to a plaintiff’s discovery requests), it would be highly inappropriate for Plaintiff’s counsel to simply take [Defendant] at its word and assume that responses provided are the same from case to case.

Diligence requires that Plaintiff’s counsel read and analyze each response regardless of how similar they may be to previous cases.” (Reply at 7:20-25.) The Court finds that the total fees billed for these routine tasks are unnecessarily excessive and will therefore reduce these fees by $1,500.00.

 “Draft Templated Discovery Responses—March 6, 2023; April 5, 2023:” According to Defendant, Ms. Rivero billed 3.0 hours ($1,575.00) to prepare Plaintiff’s discovery responses, which Defendant contends is excessive because

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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Defendant’s “discovery requests do not substantially differ from case to case.” (Opposition at 9:14-20.) In reply, Plaintiff’s counsel contends that despite Defendant’s argument that it serves substantially the same set of discovery in every case “failing to thoroughly review and analyze [Defendant’s] discovery requests would be a poor show of diligence on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel argues he cannot simply assume that the set of discovery served will be identical to previous sets served in previous cases by, potentially, different attorneys.” (Reply at 6:18-22.) The Court again finds that the fees billed for these routine tasks are unnecessarily excessive. Accordingly, the Court reduces these fees by $700.00.

 “Templated Motion to Compel—March 17 and 20-21, 2023:” According to Defendant, Ms. Rivero billed 10.5 hours ($5,512.50) to prepare Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production and Special Interrogatories. (Opposition at 9:21-27.) Again, Defendant contends that the motions to compel filed by CLE are the “exact same in every case against [Defendant], except for the caption and vehicles referenced, and other minor (factual) details” and thus the amount billed is excessive. (Ibid.)

In reply, Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s assertion that these are templated motions, but rather argues that these motions are large, “resulting in hundreds of pages of attorney crafted legal arguments and work product” and that the motions were successful, and thus the time spent was “patently reasonable.” (Reply at 7:26- 28.) The Court has reviewed the billing entries and agrees that a reduction is warranted, but will reduce these fees only by $1,500.00.

 “Templated Third-Party Deposition Subpoenas, and Notices—October 25, 2024:” Defendant next contends that Ms. Rivero billed 2.2 hours ($1,555.00) to draft deposition subpoenas for third-party dealerships. Defendant first asserts that these notices did nothing to advance Plaintiff’s case and thus were completely unnecessary. (Opposition at 10:1-8.) Defendant next argues that these notices are templates and are “virtually identical from case to case.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, Defendant argues that this time should be stricken in its entirety. (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues in reply that these third-party deposition subpoenas and notices were necessary, but does not challenge Defendant’s assertion that the notices were templated work. Plaintiff’s recovery of these fees shall be reduced by $777.50.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328432-CU-BC-GDS: Wesley Leonard Pastorius vs. General Motors, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

 “Templated Memorandum of Costs, Fee Motion, and Timesheet Auditing—December 11, 2025; January 2, 2026; February 2, 2026; ‘Anticipated’:” Defendant also contends that CLE should “not get full credit for the 3.6 hours ($1,779.50) Ms. Rivero spent preparing the cost memorandum and this fee motion, let alone the additional $2,625.00 in “anticipated” fees to review GM’s opposition, prepare a reply brief, and attend the hearing re: Motion for Attorney Fees, or the additional $2,625.00 in “anticipated” fees for to review GM’s opposition, prepare a reply, and attend the hearing re: GM’s Motion to Tax Costs.” (Opposition at 10:10-28.)

Defendant contends that the time spent auditing and reconciling fee and cost records is clerical work rather than compensable legal services. (Ibid.) Defendant further urges that the time claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel is excessive and unreasonable. (Ibid.) Defendant asks the court to cap the total amount awarded for the cost memorandum and fee motion at 3.0 hours, resulting in a reduction of $315.00 and that Plaintiff’s counsel not be awarded anything in anticipated fees. (Ibid.) In reply, Plaintiff’s counsel first seems to misunderstand Defendant’s opposition argument as they argue that Defendant suggests that Plaintiff should recover no more than $315.00 in attorney time related to this line item, which Plaintiff argues is a meritless request. (Reply at 8:289:2.)

Regardless of the misunderstanding among parties, the Court finds the total amount of time spent preparing this motion and the requested anticipated time is slightly excessive given the multitude of other similar motion’s plaintiff’s counsel has filed in the past. Accordingly, the Court will award a total of 2.5 hours of attorney time related to preparing this motion, at Ms. Rivero’s rate ($525) for a total of $1,312.50. This results in a total reduction of $466.50. The Court will address the “anticipated” fees requested by Plaintiff’s counsel below.

 “Pre-Litigation Work—September 26-27, 2022:” Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel billed 0.5 hours ($290.50) for tasks such as “review repair chronology.” Defendant asks that the counsel’s time spent on “pre-litigation” tasks incurred September 26-27, 2022 be struck, arguing that “[t]ime spent evaluating a prospective client before the engagement is not incurred ‘in connection with the commencement and prosecution’ of the action (Civ. Code, § 1794(d)), and is not the type of charge ordinarily billed to a fee-paying client and therefore should not be charged to [Defendant]”. The Court agrees that some of the time appears to be related solely to case management and is excessive. Therefore, the Court reduces the time by $150.00.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328432-CU-BC-GDS: Wesley Leonard Pastorius vs. General Motors, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

 “Excessive Communications and Intra-Office Conferencing— Throughout:” Defendant takes issue with 2.4 hours ($1,260.00) billed for intraoffice communications such as “T/C with client,” “[d]rafted e-mail following up re T/C”, and “memos to file”. The Court has reviewed the billing records and agrees that several of these generic entries do not appear reasonably necessary under the circumstances and therefore, Plaintiff’s award will be reduced by $500.00.

 “Paralegal Clerical Time and Block-Billed Time—Throughout:” Defendant takes issue with 16.5 hours ($3,547.50) billed by CLE’s paralegals, Mr. Gomez, Ms. Carreno, Mr. Aguilar, Ms. Garcia, and Mr. Acebo. Defendant argues that these fees were incurred for clerical work that is not recoverable as attorney’s fees. Defendant also adds that Mr. Gomez has block-billed his time entries, making it impossible for the Court to assess the reasonableness of his time entries. The Court has reviewed the billing entries and finds that the bulk of the paralegal work is clerical in nature or has not been adequately demonstrated to be otherwise, and thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish that such amounts are properly chargeable to Defendant. Therfore, the fees billed by CLE’s paralegals will be reduced by $2,500.00.

 “Clerical & Administrative Tasks Billed at Attorney Rates—Throughout:” According to Defendant, Ms. Rivero billed 8.8 hours ($4,648.00) for various clerical tasks or administrative tasks, such as reviewing client file, reviewing case assignment, etc., which are not recoverable as attorney’s fees. The Court agrees that some of this time appears to be clerical and excessive. Thus, Plaintiff’s award will be reduced by $2,000.00.

Hourly Rates

The reasonable market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of the reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094.) The lodestar rate should reflect rates charged in the “community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) The trial court “possesses personal expertise in the value of the legal services rendered in the case before it.” (Russell v. Foglio (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 661.) The “trial judge is the best judge of the value

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of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132; accord PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.)

Plaintiff provides those who have worked on this matter, their rates, and the number of hours spent as follows:

Timekeeper Rate Per Hour Total Hours Total Amount Billed

Jessica Anvar $595 0.7 $416.50 (attorney, practicing since 2007)

Carey Wood $560 0.2 $112.00 (attorney, practicing since 2013)

Bobby C. Walker $440 1.3 $572.00 (attorney, practicing since 2018)

Diana Rivero $525 53.6 $28,140.00 (attorney, admitted in February 2014) (partner rate)

David Gomez $215 1.6 $344.00 (paralegal rate)

Katherine Carreno $215 2.4 $516.00 (paralegal rate)

Robert Aguilar $215 7.1 $1,526.50 (paralegal rate)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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Isabel Garcia $215 1.0 $215.00 (paralegal rate)

Jorge Acebo $215 4.4 $946.00 (paralegal rate)

Total Fees: $32,788.00

(Walker Decl., ¶¶ 11-15, Exhibit 23.)

Defendant contends the rates are not reasonable rates for Sacramento County and that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the rates are commensurate with those prevailing in the area.

In the Court’s independent judgment, the requested hourly rates for attorneys Jessica Anvar and Carey Wood are slightly high for this type of case, in this community, for attorneys of similar skill and experience. The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his/her court. (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) Accordingly, the Court reduces Jessica Anvar’s hourly rate to $550 and Carey Wood’s hourly rate to $530. This reduces the total fee award by $37.50.

Anticipated Fees

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s counsel also seeks fees related the time spent responding to GM’s motion to tax and related to the time spent drafting the reply brief for this motion as well as an additional hour for attending the hearing on this motion. On reply, Plaintiff’s counsel submits evidence that it spent 3.9 hours at $450/hour ($1,755.00) related to Defendant’s motion to tax and 4.3 hours plus 1 hour for attending the hearing on this motion at $450/hour ($2,385.00). The Court finds that fees incurred for these tasks was excessive and thus the Court reduces the time related to Defendant’s motion to tax by $855 and the time related to this motion (including the anticipated hearing attendance time) by $1,485.00 for a total reduction of $2,340.00.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in the amount of $23,234.00 ($32,788.00 in past fees plus $1,800 in anticipated fees - $2,000

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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-$1,500 - $700 - $1,500 – $466.50 - $150 - $500 - $2,500 - $2,000 - $37.50).

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)