Derek Salkeld v. General Motors LLC

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

DEREK SALKELD, Case No.: CIVSB2508090 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND v. DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ GENERAL MOTORS LLC, FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff Derek Salkeld (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against

Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM” or “Defendant”), based on an alleged defective 2021

Chevrolet Silverado 1500, purchased new in March 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 9.) Plaintiff’s complaint

alleges three causes of action relating to violations of Song-Beverly Act.

On October 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement of the entire case.

On March 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed the current motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, and

supporting declaration. On March 18, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs. On April 15,

Defendant filed its opposition, including a supporting declaration. Plaintiff filed his Reply in

Support on April 21. After reviewing the written submissions, issuing a tentative ruling, and

conducting a hearing on the motion, the Court now issues its final ruling.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Where the buyer of a vehicle prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act, they

“shall be allowed by the court to recover ... a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and

expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to

have been reasonably incurred ... .” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

“[T]he starting point of every fee award ... must be a calculation of the attorney’s

services in terms of the time he has expended on the case. Anchoring the analysis to this concept

is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is

obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.” (In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.

App. 4th 1041, 1058, internal citation omitted.) “[T]he award of attorney fees under the Song-

Beverly Act, unlike other fee-shifting statutes, is limited to actual hours both expended and

determined by the court to be reasonably incurred.” (Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47

Cal.App.5th 1105, 1112.) “In determining the methodology to be used to award attorney fees

under the Song-Beverly Act, the appellate courts have unanimously concluded the lodestar

adjustment method of calculating attorney fees is appropriate for two reasons: (1) ‘the lodestar

adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective

starting point of the analysis,’ and (2) ‘the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for

calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and

no such contrary intent is apparent ... .’” (Ibid., quoting to Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel

Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 820-21; original italics.) “The lodestar

(or touchstone) is produced by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel

by a reasonable hourly rate.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 819,

833.)

Although the parties should start with the lodestar method, trial courts have broad

authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22

Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.) “[R]easonableness of attorney fees is ... to be determined from a

consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the

experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also

consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.”

(Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are

reasonable. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188

Cal.App.4th 603, 615.) “[Parties] are not entitled to compensation for this work merely because

it was performed. It [is] their burden to persuade the trial court the work was reasonably

necessary, both as to the particular tasks performed and the amount of time devoted to them.”

(Baxter v. Bock (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 775, 793.)

Competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered must be presented

on a motion for attorney’s fees. Detailed time records are not required and an attorney’s

testimony alone may suffice. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559.)

Nonetheless, where time records are submitted, such are a starting point for the court’s lodestar

determination. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359,

397.)

The Court can reduce hours that appear unreasonably inflated. (Chavez v. City of Los

Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 990.) Additionally, inefficient or duplicative efforts are not

subject to compensation. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins.

Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 556.)

On the other hand, the total fee may be enhanced or adjusted upwards by a multiplier by

considering the following factors: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the

skill displayed in presenting them; (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded

other employment by the attorneys; and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the

point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility

for an award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Appellate courts review of a trial court’s awards of attorneys’ fees is deferential. (In re

Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051-52.)

III. EXPLANATION OF THE COURT’S RULING

In the current action, the parties agree that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees, but dispute

the amount. Plaintiff seeks $22,062.52 in attorneys’ fees, which includes $2,250.00 in fees

related to the reply and motion hearing, and $1,952.91 in costs and expenses. (E. Ryu Decl.

¶ 53.)

A. Attorneys’ Fees

1. Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ Hourly Rates

Mr. Ryu submits the hourly rates of all the billers who worked on the matter as part of the

American Lemon Law Group, LLP, as follows:

Name Title/Position Year of Bar 2025/2026 Hourly

Admission/Lemon Rate

Law Experience

Astrid Souto Junior Associate 2025 $300

Nicole Basilio Litigation Paralegal 2021 $250

Alejandra Pastor Case Resolution Manager 2021 $150

Carrie Shumake Senior Litigation Attorney 2018 $475

Ezra G. Ryu Senior Litigation Attorney 2017 $500

Grace Gonzaludo Legal Assistant $125

Alyssa Ontiveros Settlement Paralegal $250

Franchesca Ann Legal Assistant $125

Carolyne Castillo Litigation Paralegal 2025 $200

(E. Ryu Decl. ¶¶ 44-52, Ex. 7.)

GM argues that Plaintiff’s counsels’ rates are inflated and should be reduced, but a

review of court decisions has found that the hourly rates proposed by Plaintiff are within the

range other judges have found reasonable in other similar Song-Beverly fee motions. (See, e.g.,1

Hamm v. FCA US LLC (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2019), No. 3:17-cv-0577-AJB-BGS, 2019 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 141480, at *8-9 (finding rates of $350-$550/hour to be reasonable); (Petropoulos v. FCA

US LLC (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2019), No. 17-CV-0398 W (KSC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89984, at

*5-6 (finding rates of $275-$550/hour to be reasonable); Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC

(2016), 4 Cal. App. 5th 462, 473-74 (finding a rate of $575 reasonable where BMW argued the

case was not complex and provided evidence that counsel for BMW charged much lower hourly

rates); Shaw v. Ford Motor Co., (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2020), No. 5:18cv1169 JLS (KK), 2020 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 2320, 2020 WL 57273, at *3 (approving rates between $200 and $550); Canani v.

Ford Motor Co., No. 2:21-CV-03346-SB-JC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106409, 2022 WL

2102893, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2022) (approving rates of $490 per hour for partner and $425

and $435 per hour for associates); Odadjian v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC (C.D. Cal. Aug.

18, 2022, No. 2:21-cv-09333-SB-GJS) 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215767, at *5, finding that “a rate

of no more than $500 is reasonable for an attorney with,” 15 years of experience.)

1 Unpublished federal district court decisions are “citable notwithstanding California Rules of Court rule 977, which only bars citation of unpublished California opinions. Therefore, [unpublished federal district court decisions] are citable as persuasive, although not precedential, authority.” (City of Hawthorne ex rel. Wohlner v. H&C Disposal Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1678, fn. 5 (emphasis in original).)

There are only three attorneys who have billed to this case, namely, Mr. Ryu, who began

practicing in 2017, with a billing rate of $500/hour; Ms. Shumake, who began practicing in 2018,

and has a billing rate of $450/hour; and Ms. Souto, a junior associate with a billing rate of

$300/hour. Based on their years of experience, seniority of their titles, and proportional billing

rates, the Court finds the attorney billing rates to be reasonable.

GM also contests paralegal/administrative rates. These professionals are listed with rates

of $125-$250/hour. “Paralegal and secretarial support services are recoverable in statutory fee

awards.” (Garcia v. Ford Motor Co. (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2023, No. 22-cv-1474-GPC) 2023 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 102160, at *10; see also Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (Cal.

Ct. App. 1985) 172 Cal. App. 3d 914, 951 (stating “necessary support services for attorneys, e.g.,

secretarial and paralegal services, are includable within an award of attorney fees”).)

“The Southern District of California has upheld paralegal rates ranging from $155/hour to

$265/hour in recent ‘lemon law’ cases.” (Blood v. Mercedez-Benz USA, LLC (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22,

2024, No. 23-cv-1463-WQH-AHG) 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213350, at *15.) In Garcia v. Ford

Motor Co., supra, the District Court confirmed as reasonable “paralegal and legal assistants at

rates from $235 to $265 per hour.” (Garcia v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

102160, at *11.) Some courts have approved even higher rates. (See, e.g., Avila v. Ford Motor

Co. (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2024, No. 5:22-cv-00395-SPG-SHK) 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119601, at

*12 (approving a “Senior Certified Paralegal” rate of $300/hour) and White v. FCA US LLC

(N.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2024, No. 22-cv-00954-BLF) 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170479, at *15

(approving paralegal rates of $250 and $300 per hour.)

As such, the Court find the legal professional billing rates to be reasonable.

2. Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Charged Hours

In addition to contesting the billing rates, Defendant opposes certain charges as being

excessive and unreasonable.

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it

is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged.” (Premier

Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th

550, 564; see also Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp., (2009) 178 Cal. App. 4th 44, 101 (“The

party opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers

objectionable”).)

Defendant argues that many entries are related to the same task, making them both

duplicative and then, cumulatively excessive. A review of the invoice submitted by Plaintiff

reveals counsel does appear to repeat tasks. First, Mr. Ryu spent 4.2 hours reviewing the case file

and creating a case timeline, separating it into two separate entries. The vehicle history prior to

filing this lawsuit (attached to Mr. Ryu’s declaration as exhibits 1-2) is not extensive and 4.2

hours towards its review and notation seems excessive. As such the Court reduces the number of

time allowed for these tasks to 2 hours, resulting in a reduction of $1000.

Similarly, Mr. Ryu billed 3 hours to drafting an 11-page, formulaic complaint with few

details specific to this litigation. As such, the Court removes an hour of time from drafting the

complaint, resulting in a reduction of $500.

In July 2025, Ms. Shumake billed six minutes for every email she wrote or received

related to scheduling the mediation, resulting in 14 individual time entries for 0.1 each. This

seems excessive. Her time is reduced to 0.5 for these emails, resulting in a reduction of $427.50.

On February 2, 2026, Mr. Ryu billed one hour to compiling repair orders to use as

exhibits for the current motion. These orders were not necessary for this motion; the Court

reduces the award by $500 as a result, for the hour billed for this time.

On February 26, 2026, Mr. Ryu has two different billing entries related to reviewing the

case file and drafting the current motion on fees, one for 1.8 hours and 1.4 hours. Given their

duplicative nature, the Court removes the entry for 1.4 hours, resulting in a reduction of $700.

Further, Plaintiff seeks to bill for several clerical tasks, which do not seem necessary or

reasonably incurred. “Clerical tasks are generally not recoverable.” (Kohan v. LUCID Grp. USA,

Inc. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025, No. 3:24-cv-02030-JSC) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262171, at *14.)

“Calendaring, internal filing, and scanning are some examples of tasks that are purely clerical

and either non-compensable or compensable at a reduced billing rate.” (Solace Glob., Inc. v.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025, No. 2:25-cv-00119-ODW (AGRx)) 2025

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 269219, at *10.)

As such, the Court disallows reimbursement for the following entries:

• 02/19/25 Nicole Basilio - $50.00 - Uploaded cert receipt for prelit letter

• 10/07/25 Alejandra Pastor - $15.00 - searched for OSC date

• 10/08/25 Alejandra Pastor - $15.00 - Saved fully executed SAR

• 10/13/25 Alejandra Pastor - $15.00 - Calendared OSC date and updated

settlement terms.

• 10/14/25 Alejandra Pastor - $15.00 - calendared vehicle surrender

• 10/30/25 Alejandra Pastor - $15.00 - created Fed ex label

• 12/17/25 Nicole Basilio - $25.00 - docket check

• 12/23/25 Alejandra Pastor - $15.00 - Saved conformed copy of NOS

(E. Ryu Decl. Ex. 7.) Removing these entries would result in a reduction of $165.00.

Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s charges for work related to the current fees

motion are excessive, including the fees anticipated for the reply and upcoming hearing. Some

do appear to be. For example, on March 11, paralegal Carolyne Castillo billed 2.1 hours for

compiling “all of the emails in chronological order for fee motion.” (E. Ryu Decl. Ex. 7 at 6.)

This task seems wholly unnecessary to the current motion, and is not “reasonably incurred,” in

prosecution of this case. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Further, Mr. Ryu seeks $2,250 (or 4.5

hours) for “anticipated” charges related to the upcoming hearing and reply. Both seem excessive,

so the Court reduces the award by $1170, removing Ms. Castillo’s 2.1 hours and 1.5 hours of Mr.

Ryu’s “anticipated” time.

Otherwise all of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing entries seem reasonable, and the Court is

awarding them as is.

B. Plaintiffs’ Costs

Plaintiff seeks $1,952.91 in costs and expenses, all of which are accounted for in a

Memorandum of Costs, which was filed March 18. Service is not contested by Defendant.

Pursuant to California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1700, subdivision (b)(1), costs are to be challenged

via motion to strike or tax costs, which must be served and filed 15 days after the costs memo is

served. (Cal. R. Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).) No motion to tax costs has been filed by Defendant, so

this Court is awarding Plaintiffs’ costs in full.

IV. CONCLUSION The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court awards a total of

$19,552.93 in attorneys’ fees and costs, based on an award of:

1. $17,600.02 in attorneys’ fees (reduced from $22,062.52); and 2. $1,952.91 in costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court