AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC

Section 11.3 provides the following: “Each Party agrees and acknowledges that (a) the actual damages that the Non-Defaulting Party would incur in connection with a Terminated Transaction would be difficult or impossible to predict with certainty, (b) the Damage Payment or Termination Payment described in Section 11.2 or this Section 11.3 (as applicable) is a reasonable and appropriate approximation of such damages, and (c) the Damage Payment or Termination Payment described in Section 11.2 or this Section 11.3 (as applicable) is the exclusive remedy of the Non-Defaulting Party in connection with a Terminated Transaction but shall not otherwise act to limit any of the Non-Defaulting Party’s rights or remedies if the Non-Defaulting Party does not elect a Terminated Transaction as its remedy for an Event of Default by the Defaulting Party.” (Emphasis added.)

The Damage Payment is defined as the amount of Development Security, that is, “cash or a Letter of Credit in the amount set forth on the Cover Sheet.) (PPA pp. 5-6.) The PPA Cover Sheet states that Development Security is $6 million. (PPA Cover Sheet p. 3.)

The Termination Payment is defined as the aggregate of all settlement amounts, plus any or all other amounts due to or from the Non-Defaulting Party. (PPA pp. 18, 46.)

Section 11.6 provides the following: “Except where an express and exclusive remedy or measure of damages is provided, the rights and remedies of a Party pursuant to this Article 11 shall be cumulative and in addition to the rights of the Parties otherwise provided in this Agreement.”

Exhibit B attached to the PPA provides for major project development milestones and commercial operation. “Commercial Operation” is defined as “the condition existing when (i) Seller has fulfilled all of the conditions precedent in Section 2.2 of the Agreement and provided to Buyer the COD Certificate and (ii) Seller has notified Buyer in writing that it has provided the required documentation to Buyer and met the conditions for achieving Commercial Operations. (PPA, Exh. B, § 2, emphasis omitted.)

Section 19.1 of the PPA is an integration provision, which states that the Agreement, the Cover Sheet, and the Exhibits, “constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between the Seller and Buyer with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements relating to the subject matter hereof, which are of no further force or effect.” (PPA § 19.1.)

Pursuant to the sworn declaration of Gustavo Luna, Edwards’ Senior Vice President, in early

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517 February 2022 through December 2022, Edwards informed Ava that Edwards could not build the Facility or otherwise perform under the PPA. (Luna Decl. ¶ 4; EUMF 6.) In a letter dated December 28, 2022 from Mr. Luna to Howard Chang, Ava’s Chief Operating Officer, “[a]s Seller has repeatedly advised Buyer, due to permitting limitations, Seller was unable to construct the Facility described in Exhibit A of the PPA.” (Edwards Exh.

4. EUMF 7.) Edwards contends that its failure to construct the Facility fell within the scope of Section 11.1 of the PPA, as it occurred before the Commercial Operation Date, and as such, Ava was entitled to a Damage Payment of $6 million, pursuant to the PPA’s terms. (Id., EUMF 7.) Edwards requested that Ava accept the Damage Payment, but Ava declined to do so. (EUMF 11, 22, 33.)

Edwards did not deliver Products to AVA, as defined and obligated under the PPA. (EUMF 9, 20, 31.) Ava did not pay Edwards for any Products under the PPA. (EUMF 10, 21, 32.)

Ava initiated this action against Edwards on May 6, 2024. The operative TAC filed on December 29, 2025, that Defendant breached its obligations under the PPA and states three causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) declaratory relief.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all three claims in the TAC, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. Defendant contends that the PPA unambiguously limits Ava’s remedies to a $6 million Damage Payment, which Defendant had attempted to tender.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.) “That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon.” (Id.) Further, “the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Id.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Id.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment may demonstrate that the plaintiff’s cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established. (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 564.)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

As to Ava’s Request for Judicial Notice, notice is GRANTED IN PART as to Exhibits 16-31.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517 Notice is taken of documents filed in other actions, and not the truth of the factual matters asserted therein. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal. 4th 261, 280.) As to Exhibits 1-15, notice is DENIED. (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 [only relevant material may be judicially noticed].)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court declines to rule on Ava’s evidentiary objections, as the Court does not consider them material to the Court’s determination of the instant motion.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The motion was originally set for hearing on June 8, 2026. Ava had opposed the motion, and, in the alternative, requested a continuance pursuant to C.C.P. § 437c(h). The Court heard oral argument as to Ava’s requested continuance for discovery, and on June 12, 2026, the Court issued an Order denying Plaintiff’s request for a continuance to permit further discovery. However, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended, statutorily compliant opposition brief and separate statement, but no new evidence, declarations, or legal arguments, and continued the hearing. (6/12/26 Order at p. 4.)

The Court further stated that the “MSJ proceeds against the Third Amended Complaint only. Theories, parties, and claims from the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint are not part of the summary judgment record.” (Id.) On June 24, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ava’s amended opposition brief references (1) the need for further discovery to oppose the motion; and (2) allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint. The Court previously denied Ava’s section 437c(h) continuance request on June 12, 2026. As that Order explained, although the supporting declaration of Ava’s counsel failed the first and most critical requirement for a continuance because it did not establish the nexus between the discovery sought and the contract-interpretation issues this motion raises. (Id. at pp. 2-4.) Ava’s amended opposition presents no showing warranting a different result, and in any event the June 12, 2026 Order disallowed any new evidence, declarations, or legal arguments. Moreover, as discussed above, the allegations set forth in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint are irrelevant for purposes of this motion.

In addition, Plaintiff’s amended separate statement still improperly contains argument and attempts to create factual disputes where there are none. (E.g., EUMF 2-5, 7-11.) “The opposing party’s responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists.” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875.)

Trial courts have the inherent power to strike a moving party’s proposed undisputed facts that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517 fail to comply with statutory requirements and that are formulated so as to impede rather than aid an orderly determination of whether the case presents triable issues of material facts. (Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 106.) Failure to comply with separate statement requirements may result constitute sufficient grounds for granting the motion. (Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 72.)

Pursuant to the foregoing, the Court deems the above-referenced material facts as undisputed in light of Plaintiffs’ repeated failure to provide a procedurally compliant responsive separate statement.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s three claims asserted in the TAC – breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief – are all premised on Edwards’ breach of the contract, that is, failure to deliver the Facility and energy to Ava pursuant to the PPA. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s remedies as a result of Edwards’ breach to the $6 million damage payment, which Edwards attempted to tender but Ava refused.

Breach of Contract – Second Cause of Action

A breach of contract claim requires (1) a contract between the parties; (2) plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) resulting damages to plaintiff. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Causation of damages in contract cases requires that the damages be proximately caused by the defendant’s breach, and that their causal occurrence be at least reasonably certain. (Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863, 871.) A proximate cause of damages is something that is a substantial factor in bringing about that damage, that is, something more than a slight, trivial, negligible, or theoretical factor in producing the particular result. (Id. pp. 871-827.)

For purposes of summary judgment, Edwards concedes the first three elements of breach of contract. (Memo. of Pts. and Auth. p. 5.) However, Edwards contends that Ava argues that there is no triable issue of material fact as to damages. More specifically, Edwards argues that its breach of the PPA could not have proximately resulted in any recoverable damages to Ava because the PPA, by its own unambiguous terms, provides for a “sole and exclusive” remedy of the $6 million Damage Payment. As support, Edwards cites Ava’s discovery responses to support its contention that the PPA is unambiguous. (EUMF 3, 14, 25.)

Moreover, Section 19.1 is an integration clause which states that the PPA, its Cover Sheet, and Exhibits, are the entire agreement. As such, the intent of the contracting parties is a legal question determined by reference to the contract’s terms, and no extrinsic evidence need be considered to contract the clear and unambiguous terms of a written, integrated contract. (Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 432.)

Edwards contends that under the efficient breach of contract theory, where it is worth more to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517 promisor to breach rather than to perform the contract, it is more efficient for the law to allow the promisor to breach the contract and pay the promisee damages based on the benefit the promisee expected to gain by the completed contract. (Huynh v. Vu (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1199.)

Here, the record before the Court establishes that Edwards advised Ava as early as February 2022, and through December 2022, that it would not perform under the PPA. As such, Edwards did not meet the Guaranteed Commercial Operation Date milestone of 12/31/22. Edwards did not deliver the Facility or any Products to Ava, and Ava did not pay Edwards for the Facility or the Products. Edwards attempted to pay the Damage Payment to Ava pursuant to Section 11.3 of the PPA, but Ava did not accept payment. Edwards contends that Ava cannot establish that Edwards proximately caused any damages to Ava where Edwards tendered the Damage Payment.

Edwards has met its burden of proof to establish that Ava cannot establish resulting damages other than the Damage Payment. The burden shifts to Ava to demonstrate the existence of a material disputed fact.

Ava contends that Edwards’ repudiation of the PPA does not entitle Edwards to relief, as the repudiations amount to an anticipatory breach, wherein Ava was entitled to wait until Edwards’ performance was due and Edwards failed to perform. (Am. Opp. at p. 25.) As support, Ava cites McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 959; Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 489; Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130, 137; Alder v. Drudis (1947) 30 Cal.2d 372, 381-382.

However, those cases establish only that a party facing anticipatory repudiation may elect to keep the contract in force and await performance instead of suing immediately. These cases are not germane to the salient issue here, which is what remedy the PPA provides for Edwards’ default. As discussed below, even if Ava kept the PPA in force and did not elect a Terminated Transaction, the PPA limits Ava’s remedy to the Damage Payment. Ava’s election therefore does not create a triable issue as to recoverable damages.

Ava further contends that Edwards’ motion fails to meet its initial burden because Edwards did not address all theories of liability set forth in the TAC. A defendant who seeks summary judgment must define all theories alleged in the complaint and challenge each factually. (Lopez v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 705, 713-714.) Ava contends that it also seeks liability against Edwards on breach of contract theories based on Ava’s exercise of its option under Section 3.7(e) of the PPA; and Edwards’ breach of Section 19.12 of the PPA. (Amended Opp.

Br. pp. 12-13.) The Second Cause of Action does allege a breach of the Further Assurances Clause (PPA § 19.12) and a failure to sell “Power and Storage Capacity” to Ava. (E.g., TAC ¶ 145.) Neither, however, is a theory of breach independent of Edwards’ failure to deliver Product under the PPA. The TAC ties the Section 19.12 allegation to Edwards’ refusal to perform that same delivery obligation, and identifies no distinct “assurance” Edwards was required to give apart from effectuating delivery.

Likewise, Ava’s exercise of its Section 3.7(e) storage option seeks the delivery of Storage Capacity, which the TAC pleads as part of the same breach. (TAC ¶¶ 145-146.) Because these allegations rest on the same pre-COD non-performance that Edwards

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517 concedes, they are governed by the same exclusive Damage Payment remedy analyzed below, and Edwards’ showing negates them.

Ava cannot change its story to avoid summary judgment, as Edwards is entitled to rely on the allegations of the operative pleading, which contain judicial admissions and conclusive concessions which frame the disputed issues. (Castillo v. Barrera (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1324.) The allegations of the TAC set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment. (Vulk v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 243, 255.) A party may not oppose summary judgment based on a claim or theory that is not alleged in the operative pleadings. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that the PPA delineates two tiers of breach – bilateral material breaches under Section 11.1(a) and partial breaches under Section 11.1(b). No such terms are expressly used in the PPA, however, and Plaintiff provides no further explanation for its interpretation of these sections. A plain reading of Section 11.1 provides different circumstances which would constitute an event of default. Subsection (a) sets forth a Defaulting Party’s conduct that would constitute an event of default, while subsection (b) sets forth occurrences in which a Seller would be the Defaulting Party.

Ava contends that the Damage Payment is not a global cap on all material breaches, and it does not apply to Section 11.1(a). As noted, the PPA does not distinguish between “material” or “partial” breaches, nor does Ava cite specific provisions of the PPA which states as much.

Section 11.2(b) states the following in pertinent part:

If an Event of Default with respect to a Defaulting Party shall have occurred and be continuing, the other Party (“Non-Defaulting Party”) shall have the following rights: to accelerate all amounts owing between the Parties and to collect as liquidated damages (i) the Damage Payment (in the case of an Event of Default by Seller occurring before the Commercial Operation Date, including an Event of Default under Section 11.1(b)(ii)) or (ii) the Termination Payment calculated in accordance with Section 11.3 below (in the case of any other Event of Default by either Party);

(PPA, § 11.2(b), emphasis added.)

The plain language of Section 11.2(b) thus distinguishes when a Non-Defaulting Party is entitled to the Damage Payment – where an Event of Default occurs before the COD – or the Termination Payment, “in the case of any other Event of Default by either Party.” Here, it is undisputed that Edwards notified Ava that it would be breaching the PPA before COD. Thus, Section 11.2(b)(i) applies and Ava is entitled to the Damage Payment. Based on a plain reading of the statutory language, the Termination Payment applies only where there is an Event of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517 Default after COD. Here, there was no time period after COD because COD was never met by Edwards. Ava’s interpretation of the PPA to permit its potential receipt of the Termination Payment or other damages beyond the Damage Payment is unsupported by the express terms of the PPA.

Ava’s reliance on Section 11.3(c) does not alter this conclusion. (Am. Opp. at pp. 16-18.) That provision preserves a Non-Defaulting Party’s rights where it “does not elect a Terminated Transaction.” However, by its terms, it operates only in connection with a Terminated Transaction, which Section 11.2(a) defines as an early termination that “ends the Delivery Term.” Because COD was never achieved, the Delivery Term never commenced, no Terminated Transaction was possible, and Section 11.3(c)’s preservation clause has no application to Edwards’ pre-COD default.

Nor does the phrase “including an Event of Default under Section 11.1(b)(ii)” in Section 11.2(b)(i) narrow the Damage Payment to that single default. The PPA provides that “including” means “including without limitation” (PPA § 1.2(g)), so that clause confirms, rather than limits, that a pre-COD failure to achieve Commercial Operation is covered by the Damage Payment.

Ava does not meet its burden of proof to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether Edwards’ breach of the PPA caused damage to Avan. As such, summary adjudication of the Second Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing – Third Cause of Action

Edwards contends that there is no triable issue of material fact as to Ava’s Third Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

“Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing providing that no party to the contract will do anything that would deprive another party of the benefits of the contract.” (Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 873, 885, internal citations omitted.) “Although breach of the implied covenant often is pleaded as a separate count, a breach of the implied covenant is necessarily a breach of contract.” (Id., internal citations omitted.)

An implied covenant may be imposed where the following is established: “(1) the implication must arise from the language used or it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties; (2) it must appear from the language used that it was so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the grounds of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where it can be rightfully assumed that it would have been made if attention had been called to it; [and] (5) there can be no implied covenant where the subject is completely covered by the contract.” (Avidity Partners, LLC v. State of California (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1207, internal citations omitted.) “[N]o covenant of good faith and fair dealing where the contract is adequately supported by adequate consideration regardless of the discretionary power.” (Id. at p. 1207,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517 internal citations omitted.)

Edwards argues that Ava has not and cannot identify what “indispensable” term must be implied into the PPA out of “legal necessity” or what term was not covered by the PPA. Ava’s verified discovery response to the Form Interrogatory inquiring as to any part of the agreement not in writing stated “not applicable.” (EUMF 24.) Edwards contends that any conduct alleged by Ava to deprive it of the benefits of the PPA either is a breach of an express contract provision, or an implied term pursuant to statute, which is improper because the implied covenant cannot extend or create an obligation not intended by the parties. (Avidity at p. 1206.)

Edwards further argues that Ava’s Third Cause of Action does not go beyond breach of contract, relies on the same acts as the Second Cause of Action, and improperly seeks the same damages. (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395 [allegations of breach of implied covenant may be disregarded as superfluous where allegations, acts, and damages are the same as alleged in breach of contract claim].)

Ava contends that Edwards breached the implied covenant through “deliberate, bad-faith conduct, including refusal to perform, refusal to allocate fairly among off-takers, false statements that Ava’s project would not be built, and conduct designed to deprive Ava of the PPA’s benefits.” (Am. Opp. at p. 13.) Ava cites its separate statement Nos. 7, 18, and 29 in support of this contention. No. 7 states what is attached as Exhibit P to the PPA. No. 18 states that in March and April 2022, Edwards stated that the Facility would not be built. No. 19 further states that in Edwards’ July 6, 2022, Edwards again stated that the Facility would not be built.

None of the foregoing allegations, even if true, do not amount to more than breach of contract, that is, Edwards’ failure to perform its obligations under the PPA to deliver a Facility to Ava. Ava provides no further evidence or argument that any of these terms were not completely covered by the PPA, as required to impose an implied covenant.

Summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Declaratory Relief – First Cause of Action

Edwards further contends that Ava’s First Cause of Action for declaratory relief is duplicative of its breach of contract claim and fails for the same reasons.

“When summary judgment is appropriate, the court should decree only that plaintiffs are not entitled to the declarations in their favor.” (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1402.) “Thus, in a declaratory relief action, the defendant’s burden is to establish the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration in its favor. It may do this by establishing (1) the sought-after declaration is legally incorrect; (2) undisputed facts do not support the premise for the sought-after declaration; or (3) the issue is otherwise not one that is appropriate for declaratory relief.” (Id.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517

Edwards does not meet its burden of proof to establish that Ava is not entitled to a declaration in its favor as to its fifth request “For a judicial declaration that Edwards Solar’s failure to perform under the PPA constitutes an Event of Default under PPA § 11.1.” Edwards concedes this point. Memo of Pts. and Auth. p. 15.) Summary adjudication of the entirety of the First Cause of Action is not proper, however, as Plaintiff’s claim seeks seven other judicial declarations, and summary adjudication must completely dispose of a cause of action. (C.C.P. § 437c(f)(1).)

The parties are encouraged to submit a stipulation as to the fifth request for declaratory relief pursuant to C.C.P. § 437c(t).

Summary adjudication is DENIED as to the First Cause of Action.

CONCLUSION

Summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the Second and Third Causes of Action and DENIED as to the First Cause of Action.

HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?

THROUGH ECOURT

Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 p.m. (but by Noon if possible) at least one (1) court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select "Search" 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select "Click to Contest this Ruling" 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select "Proceed"

BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4pm (but by Noon if possible) at least one (1) court day before the scheduled hearing.

BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.

ZOOM LOG-IN INFORMATION FOR DEPARTMENT 517 IS BELOW.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV074431: AVA COMMUNITY ENERGY AUTHORITY vs EDWARDS SOLAR 1B, LLC 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 517

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