AHMADZAI vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

25CV014582: AHMADZAI vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Faisal Ahmadzai’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) is ruled on herein.

Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise opposing counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Plaintiff’s counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Factual Background

This is a lemon law action arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe. On June 20, 2025 Plaintiff filed his Complaint against defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”). The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement, wherein, as relevant here, Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff’s counsels fees in an agreed-upon amount or reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Barahmand Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A; Aminpour Decl., ¶ 3. Exhibt A.) Plaintiff’s counsel requested attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $10,000, and Defendant counteroffered $5,000. (Barahmand Decl., ¶ 5; Aminpour Decl., ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff now brings the instant motion to recover attorneys’ fees of $8,652.50, $626.52 in recoverable costs, a lodestar multiplier of 1.1 in the amount of $865.25, and an additional $2,500 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s opposition.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014582: AHMADZAI vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

Defendant filed a late opposition on June 4, 2026, wherein it requests that the Court accept its late opposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The Court continued the matter to allow Plaintiff to file a reply brief.

Legal Standard

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) provides that a prevailing buyer is entitled to recover “costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

The “fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “It is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked, and the tasks performed are sufficient.” (Conception v. Amscam (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324.) The appropriate hourly rate used to arrive at the lodestar is measured by “the prevailing billing rates of comparable private attorneys as the ‘touchstone’ for determination of that value.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643; see Ketchum v. Moses (2002) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court then determines whether the lodestar should be enhanced or decreased by a “multiplier” based on factors such as “‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1216.) “‘There is no hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation.’ [Citation.] There are numerous such factors, and their evaluation is entrusted to a trial court’s sound discretion; any one of those factors may be responsible for enhancing or reducing the lodestar.” (Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 947.)

Discussion

Plaintiff’s counsel Brandon Aminpour (“Aminpour”) attests to billing 9.65 hours at a rate of $400.00 an hour, totaling $3,860. (Aminpour Decl., ¶ 6, Exhibit B.) Plaintiff’s counsel Navid Barahmand (“Barahmand”) attests to billing 11.5 hours at a rate of $425, which Barahmand computes as $3,645. (Barahmand Decl., ¶ 6.) Barahmand also estimates recoverable costs in the amount of $626.50. (Id. at ¶ 7., Exhibit C.) Initially, Aminpour’s claimed attorneys’ fees of $3,860 (9.65 hours × $400.00 per hour) are supported by the accompanying declaration and exhibit (see Aminpour Decl., ¶ 6, Exhibit B). Barahmand’s accompanying declaration and Exhibit B show that Barahmand’s hourly rate increased from $400 to $425 in October 2025 and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014582: AHMADZAI vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

that Barahmand billed a total of $4,792.50 for 11.5 hours in this matter. (See Barahmand Decl., Exhibit B.)

Taken together, Aminpour’s claimed attorneys’ fees of $3,860 and Barahmand’s attorneys’ fees of $4,792.50 set forth in Exhibit B to Barahmand’s declaration yield a lodestar of $8,652.50, which is consistent with the amount of attorneys’ fees requested in Plaintiff’s motion. (See MPA, p. 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel also request a lodestar multiplier of 1.1 in the amount of $865.25, plus additional $2,500 in connection with drafting the present motion and reply brief, for a total fee award of $12,017.75. Plaintiff’s counsel further request costs of $626.52, as set forth in Appendix 1 to Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibit C to the Barahmand Declaration, which allocates $20 to the filing fee for Plaintiff’s reply to Defendant’s opposition to the present motion. In total, Plaintiff’s counsel request attorneys’ fees and costs of $12,644.27.

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsels’ claimed fees are unreasonable and excessive. Defendant disputes all claimed fees for 2.9 hours of prelitigation work, arguing that the time spent evaluating potential clients prior to engagement and preparing fee agreements is a business expense routinely treated as overhead. Defendant also disputes 1 hour of 1.5 total hours claimed in drafting the Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff’s counsel impermissibly combined multiple discrete tasks into a single billing entry (e.g., drafting multiple documents and filing the same) and that the Complaint filed in this action was standard lemon law complaint that was not drafted from scratch.

Next, Defendant disputes duplicate entries for.3 hours and.2 hours for billed by both Aminpour and Barahmand on August 7, 2025, and October 5, 2025, as well as 9.8 hours billed for routine communications and internal discussions, arguing that the billing descriptions are vague and fail to establish the substance or necessity of the work performed. Lastly, Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s counsels’ claimed anticipated fees and costs in the amount of $2,500 and $100, respectively, arguing that such claimed amounts represent speculative bill padding.

On reply, Plaintiff’s counsel argue that their pre-litigation work was not overhead but instead reasonably related to the commencement and prosecution of the action. Counsel also insist that their internal communications were reasonable and non-duplicative. Counsel further argue that the time spent on the present motion is compensable within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1794, subdivision (d).

The reasonable market value of an attorney’s services is the measure of the reasonable hourly rate, which is the rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095.) The Court exercises its own judgment and its own familiarity with these matters and finds that the requested hourly rates of $400 and $425 are reasonable for this type of case, in this community, for attorneys of similar skill and experience.

Defendant’s counsel challenges Plaintiff’s counsels’ 2.9 claimed hours of prelitigation work on

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014582: AHMADZAI vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

the basis that such work constitutes overhead, citing Goglin v. BMW of North America LLC, (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462. However, the Court of Appeal in Goglin affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff who refused to accept a prelitigation settlement from vehicle manufacturer defendants due to the settlement’s unfavorable terms. The Court is unclear how Goglin supports Defendant’s counsel’s argument or relates to the facts this case, which did not involve a prelitigation settlement. Furthermore, Code of Civil Procedure section 1794, subdivision (d) explicitly allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees in connection with the commencement and prosecution of an action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Accordingly, the Court declines to strike the 2.9 hours from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s claimed attorneys’ fees. For the same reason, the Court declines to strike the Plaintiff’s counsels’ “speculative” fees and costs of $2,500 and $100, respectively, for drafting the present motion and reply brief, as such work was not speculative and was in fact performed as part of the prosecution of this action.

However, Defendant is correct that the billing records indicate that some of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ time entries contain block-billing which prevents the Court from determining whether the time entries are reasonable. The Court also agrees that Plaintiff’s counsels’ billing entries reflect some lack of efficiency with duplicate entries on August 7, 2025, and October 5, 2025. “It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted." (Morris v.

Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 29.) The Court finds that 1 hour of 1.5 total hours claimed in drafting the Complaint and related documents in a standard lemon law action should be stricken from the claimed hours, representing a reduction of $400. Because both Aminpour and Barahmand claimed a total of.5 hours on August 7, 2025, and October 5, 2025 for reviewing Defendant’s Answer and for “document production,” respectively, Court reduces claimed fees by such amount, equal to $200.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff's attorneys’ billing records reflect excessive and duplicative billing for communications with other counsel and the client given the nature of this action; indeed, it is unclear whether time allocated is to drafting or reading emails. Thus, the Court agrees that 4 of the 14 hours in this category, representing $1,650, will not be allowed.

Lastly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a lodestar multiplier for a relatively straightforward lemon law case that was not complex.

Based on the foregoing, the Court awards attorneys’ fees of $8,902.50 to Defendant’s counsel (i.e., claimed lodestar fees of $8,652.50, plus $2,500 for the present motion and reply, less adjustments of $400, $200, and $1,650.) The Court also awards costs of $626.52, for a total award of $9,529.02.

Disposition

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is GRANTED in the amount of $9,529.02.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014582: AHMADZAI vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 8D

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.