CITIBANK, N.A. vs CHANTHAVONGSA

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

23CV010988: CITIBANK, N.A. vs CHANTHAVONGSA 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment Under Terms of Stipulated Settlement in Department 8C

The Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment pursuant to the terms of a stipulated settlement, filed by Plaintiff Citibank, N.A. (“Plaintiff”), is unopposed but is denied. This is a consumer debt action. Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Defendant Khamsann Chanthavongsa (“Defendant”) on October 13, 2023, alleging a sole cause of action for breach of contract. On December 7, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a stipulation, whereby Defendant agreed to entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the principal sum of $5,659.58, plus court costs, and less credit for payments made. (Stipulation, 12/7/23, ¶ 1.)

The Court’s inquiry in ruling on a motion for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is generally limited to a determination of whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement, and the material terms thereof. (Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 209, fn. 4; see also Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182-1183.) Judgment may be entered under section 664.6 regardless of whether the parties are complying with the terms of the agreement. (Viejo Bancorp, 217 Cal.App.3d at 409, fn. 4.)

By enacting section 664.6, the Legislature endorsed the nonstatutory speaking motion procedure; the trial court is no longer limited to summary judgment in enforcing settlements. (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 994; Casa de Valley View Owner’s Assn. v. Stevenson (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189-1190; Richardson v. Richardson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 91, 96; Fiore v. Alvord (1984) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 565; City of Fresno v. Maroot (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 755, 760-761.) Pursuant to section 664.6, “[i]f parties to pending litigation stipulate in writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court, for settlement of the case, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.

If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6.) In evaluating a motion brought under section 664.6, the “trial court merely resolve[s] questions about the settlement.” (Malouf Bros. v. Dixon (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 280, 283-284.) “[N]othing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.” (J.B.B.

Investment Partners, Ltd. V. Fair (2014)232 Cal.App.4th 974, 984.) Thus, section 664.6 allows the Court upon motion to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of a settlement where the parties stipulate to that settlement.

Here, Plaintiff’s moving papers show the terms of the settlement between Plaintiff and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010988: CITIBANK, N.A. vs CHANTHAVONGSA 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment Under Terms of Stipulated Settlement in Department 8C

Defendant, memorialized and filed with the Court on December 7, 2023. (See Stipulation, 12/7/23.) As noted above, under the terms of the settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant, the balance due and owing by Defendant was $5,659.58. (Id., at ¶¶ 1-2.) The settlement provided that it was subject to section 664.6. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s representative signed the stipulation on November 30, 2023, and Defendant signed the stipulation on November 28, 2023. (Id., at p. 8.) The terms of the stipulation required Defendant to make certain specified monthly payments. (Id., ¶ 4.) The stipulation further provides that if Defendant failed to make the monthly payments as agreed upon, then Plaintiff could seek the full remaining balance and would be entitled to enter judgment for the original judgment amount, less credit for any payments received. (Stipulation, ¶¶ 4, 9.)

Normally, this would be the end of the Court’s inquiry, having found an original stipulation, a promise to pay, and the stipulation providing that the Court retains jurisdiction under section 664.6. However, it is at this point that the case diverged from the usual creditor motion to vacate the dismissal and enter judgment against the debtor Defendant.

On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a nearly-identical request to the motion now before the Court. Therein, Plaintiff requested that the court vacate the dismissal and enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the stipulation in the amount of $4,530.00. (Motion, 12/30/24, at p. 1.) On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a stipulated judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The terms of that stipulated judgment specified that Defendant owed Plaintiff $1,879.58 in damages and $533.50 in costs, for a total sum of $2,413.08.

Unlike the prior instance, the parties did not file a separate stipulation under section 664.6 to allow the Court to retain jurisdiction, or that entry of judgment would be delayed so long as Defendant did not default on the payments. Rather, only a stipulated judgment was filed, with no further explanation. The Hon. Christopher J. Krueger signed the judgment on February 10, 2025. On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion, seeking again to recover $4,530.00. There is no explanation in Plaintiff’s moving papers as to the increase in amount being sought between the stipulated judgment of February 10, 2025 ($2,413.08) and the amount Plaintiff seeks in this motion ($4,530.00).

In fact, Plaintiff’s moving papers fail to acknowledge the Stipulation of February 10, 2025, at all. Instead, Plaintiff simply seeks to take more in judgment than the most recent stipulation allows. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that Defendant has failed to comply with the terms of the February 2025 stipulation. Beyond that, on May 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal on Judicial Council

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010988: CITIBANK, N.A. vs CHANTHAVONGSA 07/29/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment Under Terms of Stipulated Settlement in Department 8C

form CIV-110. The clerk did not enter dismissal as requested, noting that judgment had been entered on February 10, 2025. The Court recites the foregoing to reflect the reasons for denial of the motion: 1) judgment has already been entered in this case, and the motion is improper; 2) since judgment is entered, the Court lacks jurisdiction, absent an express agreement between the parties for the Court to retain jurisdiction under section 664.6; and 3) even if the Court had jurisdiction, the motion is not support by either evidence or the Court’s own docket. The motion is denied. This minute order is effective immediately. No further notice or formal order shall be required. (CRC, Rule 3.1312.)