Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens
probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.)
Here, although not pled at the time the motion was filed, Plaintiff pleads a cause of action for quiet title in her First Amended Complaint. The allegations of the petition determine whether a “real property claim” is involved; no independent evidence is required. (Urez Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1149.) In this case, the quiet title cause of action would affect title to and right to possession of the property at issue. (See Verified FAC ¶¶ 4, 6.) Accordingly, it is a real property claim within the meaning of the statute.
To establish the probable validity of her claim, Plaintiff must show “it is more likely than not that [she] will obtain a judgment” on the real property claim. (Newell v. Superior Court (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 728, 735.)
Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden. Plaintiff contends that she was fraudulently induced into executing escrow documents transferring the subject property to Defendants because Plaintiff’s mother (Tang) told her that Tang owed Defendants money for the construction of an ADU on the property. (Verified FAC ¶ 16.) Additionally, Tang told Plaintiff that substantial medical liens would be recorded on the property if title was not transferred to someone else, due to Plaintiff’s father’s ever-increasing medical expenses. (Verified FAC ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff does not deny that she executed various documents on 4/6/25 before a notary public (ROA 40, Luc Decl. ¶ 7.) However, she claims that she did not realize at the time that one of the documents was a grant deed transferring her interest in the property to Defendants. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also denies executing Amended Escrow Instructions on 4/7/25 which purport to show that the consideration for the transfer of the property to Defendants were the loans previously made by Defendants for the construction of the ADA. (Id. at ¶ 10; Mai Decls. ¶¶7-8, Exhs.
B.)
Based on the assertions in Plaintiff’s verified FAC, however, it appears more likely than not that Plaintiff was aware on 4/6/26 that she was executing documents for the purpose of transferring title to Defendants, and that she did so for the purpose of repaying the construction loan and avoiding medical liens on the property.
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Accordingly, the motion to expunge is GRANTED.
Defendants may file a separate motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to CCP §405.38.
Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are denied as immaterial to the disposition of this motion and because Defendants failed to provide the Court with copies of the subject documents.
The Court notes that Plaintiff made several informal requests for judicial notice in the body of her briefs. These requests do not comply with CRC 3.1113(l) and are denied.
Defendants to give notice. 112 Alpine Equipment Funding, Inc. vs. Guerra, 23-01328771
Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor, Alpine Equipment Funding, Inc. (“Judgment Creditor”), moves for an order (1) authorizing the Los Angeles County Sheriff to enter private property located at 6409 Planada Avenue, Los Angeles, California, for the limited purpose of levying identified vehicles owned by the Judgment Debtor pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 699.030; and (2) authorizing Judgment Creditor, while the Sheriff is executing the levy, to repossess equipment owned by Judgment Creditor and wrongfully retained by the Judgment Debtor, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 187 and applicable commercial law.
Judgment Creditor asserts that it seeks a narrowly tailored order authorizing entry onto private property to enforce a valid judgment that has gone unsatisfied despite extensive post judgment enforcement efforts. Judgment Creditor provides that on January 12, 2024, the Court entered a default judgment in favor of Judgment Creditor against Judgment Debtor Mario Guerra, Jr. (“Judgment Debtor”) in the amount of $140,356.85, and that Judgment Debtor has paid nothing towards satisfaction of the judgment and has refused to participate in any post-judgment proceedings.
Judgment Creditor contends that it has identified non-exempt assets belonging to Judgment Debtor, including four vehicles titled in his name, which are regularly kept at or around his residence and frequently stored behind a locked six-foot fence, and that Judgment Creditor has probable cause to believe that Judgment Debtor continues to possess specialized equipment owned by Judgment Creditor and leased to Judgment Debtor under equipment finance lease agreements that are in default—namely, the Dancutter System and Perma-Liner pipelining systems (the “Equipment”).
Judgment Creditor asserts that because the vehicles and equipment are concealed within a private area inaccessible to the levying officer, Judgment Creditor seeks an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 699.030 authorizing the Sheriff to enter the premises for the limited purpose of levying the identified vehicles as well as seeks authorization under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to repossess its own equipment while the Sheriff is lawfully present executing the levy.
Code of Civil Procedure section 699.030 provides, in part:
“If personal property sought to be levied upon is located in a private place of the judgment debtor: [¶.] “(b) The judgment creditor may apply to the court ex parte, or on noticed motion if the court so directs or a court rule so requires, for an order directing the levying officer to seize the property in the private place. The application may be made whether or not a writ has been issued and whether or not demand has been made pursuant to subdivision (a). The application for the order shall describe with particularity both the property sought to be levied upon, and the place where it is to be found, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the judgment creditor.
The court may not issue the order unless the judgment creditor establishes that there is probable cause to believe that property sought to be levied upon is located in the place described. The levying officer making the levy, at the time delivery of the property pursuant to the order is demanded, shall announce his or her identity, purpose, and authority. If the property is not voluntarily delivered, the levying officer may cause the building or enclosure where the property is believed to be located to be broken open in such manner as the levying officer reasonably believes will cause the least damage, but if the levying officer reasonably believes that entry and seizure of the property will involve a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm to any person, the levying officer shall refrain from entering and shall promptly make a return to the court setting forth the reasons for believing that the risk exists.
In such a case, the court shall make such orders as may be appropriate.”
The standard of probable cause has been discussed in the context Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, as to the warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for felony, or misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence. (Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 370.) “ ‘[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ [Citation.] (Id. at pp. 370-371.) “The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 371.) “We have stated, however, that ‘[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979).” (Ibid.)