Kwok v. Genera Corp.

5 Arguelles v. O/C Albertson’s LLC 6 Jones v. Jaime The motion to strike filed by defendant Maria Jaime (Defendant) directed to the complaint of plaintiff Lydell Jones (Plaintiff) is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

The allegations in the complaint fail to plead circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice. (See Civ. Code, § 3294(a), (c).) The allegation Defendant fled the scene, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate malice, oppression, or fraud as required to support entitlement to punitive damages. For instance, there is no allegation Defendant knew Plaintiff was injured. The Complaint also does not plead facts showing Defendant intended to harm Plaintiff. The Complaint also contains no allegations that Defendant engaged in any fraudulent conduct intended to cause injury to Plaintiff. The allegations as pled fall short of demonstrating despicable conduct carried on with a conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. (Civ. Code, § 3294(c); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.)

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant shall give notice of this ruling. 7 Kwok v. The motion for new trial is DENIED as untimely. Genera Corp. The Court determined moving parties’ previous notice of intention to move for new trial as to the original judgment was untimely. The amended judgment merely added costs and interest and did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Case law is clear that the mere addition of attorney fees, costs and interest does not restart post-trial timelines as to the matters determined in the original judgment. See Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 214, 222 (“It is well settled . . . that ‘[w]here the judgment is modified merely to add costs, attorney fees and interest, the original judgment is not substantially changed and the time to appeal it is therefore not affected.’”)

Moving parties cite Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 854, for the proposition that the entry of an amended judgment restarts the time for the filing of a motion for new trial. But Seeley does not specify the nature of the amended judgment involved in that case. Given that the amended judgment in Seeley was entered just one day after the original judgment, it would be illogical to assume it merely added costs, interest, and/or attorney fees.

Moving parties also cite Dickens v. Lee (1001) 230 Cal.App.3d 985, 987; but in Dickens, the original award did not include costs, which were first added in the later judgment. The Court of Appeal noted that as to these costs, “the judgment is appealable on this point.” (Emphasis added.) Applied here, Dickens simply stands for the proposition that the time for appeal of the added costs runs from the

new judgment. It does not suggest that an amended judgment adding costs restarts the deadlines for the entire judgment.

Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758, 767, also cited, is inapposite because the change in judgment reduced the damages awarded, which affected the substantial rights of the parties.

Finally, moving parties argue that because neither judgment addressed the roles of the cross-defendants as trustees, the time for bringing a new trial motion as the original judgment’s substantive issues never commenced. The Court previously determined that the time for bringing a new trial motion as to the original judgment had both commenced and run before the first notice of intention to move for new trial had been filed. Arguing that the original judgment was never final constitutes a procedurally improper motion for reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling.

Genera to give notice. 8 Hashimi v. Before the Court is the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed American on 2/19/26 by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Honda Motor (“Honda”), as to the Fifth Cause of Action asserted in the Complaint Co. Inc. filed by Plaintiff Mer Hashimi (“Plaintiff”) on 3/13/25. Plaintiff filed a “Non-Opposition” on 5/5/26.

The Motion is GRANTED. For the Fifth Cause of Action, the Complaint makes only vague assertions about alleged defects in this vehicle. Generic claims of defects, without more, do not suffice to state the claim, as “[t]he very existence of a warranty presupposes that some defects may occur.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 345.) Plaintiff also has not alleged where and how he acquired the vehicle, or the circumstances surrounding the purchase. Greater specificity is required to state the claim.

The Motion is therefore GRANTED as to the Fifth Cause of Action in the Complaint. As Plaintiff filed a “Non-Opposition,” and thus failed to show that he can amend to cure these defects, this ruling is without leave to amend.

Honda is to give notice of this ruling. 9 Yousefian v. Before the Court is a motion by General Motors, LLC (GM) for an General order striking, or alternatively, taxing the memorandum of costs Motors, LLC filed by plaintiff Arlen Yousefian. The motion to strike is DENIED and the motion to tax is GRANTED, in part, as set forth herein.

GM first argues the entire memorandum of costs is untimely because it was filed 204 days after plaintiff accepted its Section 998 offer. Rule 3.1700 requires the memorandum of costs be filed 15 days after service of notice of entry of judgment or 180 days after entry of judgment. Neither occurred in this case. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.

GM next argues that several specific items should be taxed.