Hood v. Hyundai Motor America

Defendant Hyundai Motor America’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).)

Plaintiff Maggie Hood’s evidentiary objection is OVERRULED. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 [authentication of arbitration agreement is not required].)

Defendant brings this motion under both the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. section 1 et. seq. (FAA) and the California Arbitration Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 1285, et. seq. (CAA). There is no dispute the FAA applies. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355; Declaration of Ali Ameripour (“Ameripour Decl.”), Ex. 2 at p. 14.) Both the FAA and CAA require a finding that an agreement exists for arbitration between the parties and the agreement covers the dispute. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1981.2; 9 U.S.C. § 2; AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648-49.) State law principles of contract formation govern whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute. (Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 30 F.4th 849, 855.)

Here, Defendant relies on the arbitration provision in the Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (the “Handbook”). (Ameripour Decl., Ex. 2.) But Defendant has not shown the Handbook reflects an actual agreement with Plaintiff. Defendant does not claim Plaintiff signed or accepted the arbitration provision in the Handbook or was even informed of its existence. Instead, Defendant argues that equitable estoppel applies, as Plaintiff’s claims rely on that warranty. But an essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent. (Donovan v.