| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
|---|
Demurrer to Cross-Complaint; Motion to Strike
notarizing the Grant Deed and PCOR that falsely recited the transfer as a “bona fide gift” between “husband and wife,” with “no consideration,” and falsely claimed a principal-residence exemption for Ms. Nguyen. (FAC ¶¶ 25–32, 97–99, 116– 120, 125–130, 138.) Pham then decided not to record Plaintiff’s deed at all, leaving title in Nguyen’s name while using Plaintiff’s funds to pay down Nguyen’s debt to himself. (FAC ¶¶ 28–32, 116–120, 125–130, 126, 143–144.) These allegations show that an officer/director of AD&TK personally authorized and carried out the wrongful acts.
Thus, the Motion is denied.
14. 2025-1488027 Demurrer Njoord Incorporated, a Cross-Defendant Njoord Incorporated dba Newport Power’s California demurrer to the Cross-Complaint is sustained with 15 days leave to corporation vs. amend as to the 3rd cause of action and overruled as to the 4th cause Fred Erdtsieck, of action. III Trustees Of The Erdtsieck A demurrer presents an issue of law regarding the sufficiency of the Family Trust, allegations set forth in the complaint. (Lambert v. Carneghi (2008) Dated October 158 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126.)
The challenge is limited to the “four 6, 2017 corners” of the pleading (which includes exhibits attached and incorporated therein) or from matters outside the pleading which are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code §§ 451 or 452. Although California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought. (Leek v.
Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.)
On demurrer, a complaint must be liberally construed. (CCP § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) All material facts properly pleaded, and reasonable inferences, must be accepted as true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67
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3rd cause of action for fraud
The elements of fraud are “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)
Generally, causes of action for fraud are subject to stricter pleading standards; fraud must be plead with specificity. (Committee on Children’s Television v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197,
216-227.) Facts must be plead to “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1614.)
The Cross-Complaint alleges that on 3/3/23, Cross Defendant “provided an engineering calculation of power savings for Cross- Complainants to consider as a basis for purchasing a large solar panel power generating array. These representations were made by JAMES REEVES, a senior managerial officer of Cross- Defendant....” (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 28.) Cross-Complainants alleges that these representations were false, that Reeves overrepresented the solar power generation by over 1,000%, which was an intentional misrepresentation. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Cross-Complainants allege that they were damaged as a result, including the $300k paid for the system, the $800k in promised power savings, property damage, repair costs and loss of rental space. (Id. at 31.)
While these allegations are sufficiently specific to support fraud, the economic loss rule bars this cause of action as it is currently pled.
In Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, the California Supreme Court held that
...under the economic loss rule, tort recovery for breach of a contract duty is generally barred (but see generally, fns. 3 & 5 at 324 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 444-445, 553 P.3d at pp. 1222- 1223, ante, & 324 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 447-448, 553 P.3d at pp. 1225-1226, post) unless two conditions are satisfied. A plaintiff must first demonstrate the defendant’s injury- causing conduct violated a duty that is independent of the duties and rights assumed by the parties when they entered the contract. Second, the defendant’s conduct must have caused injury to persons or property that was not reasonably contemplated by the parties when the contract was formed.
(Id. at 20–21.)
Cross-Complainants argue that their fraud claim is based on the inducement by Njood to enter into the contract. Cross- Complainants state they never would have paid Njood if Njood did not trick them into paying with the false engineering report.
This fraudulent inducement claim is not alleged in the Cross- Complaint. Rather, Cross-Complainants only allege facts to support fraudulent misrepresentation.
The fraud claim is predicated on the alleged breach of contract. There are no allegations that Cross-Defendant violated a duty independent of the contract.
Accordingly, the demurrer to the 3rd cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
4th cause of action for quiet title
The elements of quiet title include: (1) plaintiff’s title and its basis (2) the existence of adverse claims to that title. (Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1010.)
Cross-Complainants allege that they are the sole owners of the commercial property at issue, and that Njood has wrongfully encumbered the property by filing a Mechanic’s Lien. (Cross- Complaint, ¶¶ 35, 37.)
“A mechanic’s lien gives a contractor, supplier, or laborer a security interest in real property to secure the right to payment for work performed or materials delivered.” (RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 422.) “Claimants enforce their mechanic’s liens through foreclosure, and must commence a foreclosure suit within 90 days after recording the lien.” (Id. at 423.)
Based on the above, a mechanic’s lien qualifies as an adverse claim to Cross-Complainants’ title.
Cross-Defendant contends that this claim is subject to an anti- SLAPP motion under Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16. While filing a mechanics lien is protected activity, in order to prevail in on an anti- SLAPP motion, Cross-Defendant would additionally need to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. (See id. at 426.) This determination is not proper pursuant to a demurrer.
The demurrer to the 4th cause of action is thus overruled, as Cross- Complainants have pled sufficient facts to support this claim.
Motion to Strike
Cross-Defendant Njoord Incorporated dba Newport Power’s motion to strike Cross-Complainants’ alleged damages of $800,000.00 from the Cross-Complaint is denied.
A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading or strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court
rule or an order of the court. Code Civ. Proc. § 436. “Irrelevant” matters include: allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10(b).) A motion to strike can also strike legal conclusions. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:179 (2010).) Conclusory allegations are permitted, however, if they are supported by other factual allegations in the complaint. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App. 3d 1, 6.)
Motions to strike are disfavored. Pleadings are to be construed liberally with a view to substantial justice. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:197 (2010).) The allegations of the complaint are presumed true; they are read as a whole and in context. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
Cross-Defendant cites to the parties’ contract which includes a provision for the waiver of damages. (See Cross-Complaint, Ex. B, § 9.14.) Whether this provision precludes the requested damages or alternatively is unconscionable, is a determination for another day. Similarly, whether the claimed damages are speculative as they are based on an engineering calculation of estimated cost savings, is irrelevant at the pleading state.
Because Cross-Complainants adequately plead damages as a result of the alleged breach of contract, the motion to strike is denied.
15. 2025-1522605 Defendant Javid F. Osafi, DMD’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Elizabeth S. Leach vs. Qsafi Leach’s Complaint is sustained with 15 days’ leave to amend.
In her “opposition,” Plaintiff represents that she has agreed to dismiss her claims for breach of contract and medical battery, and that she intends to file a first amended complaint for professional negligence. (ROA 26.)
The Court finds it is in the interests of justice to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend. Defendant’s Motion to Strike is put off calendar as moot.
Plaintiff shall file and serve her amended pleading within 15 days of the notice of ruling.
Defendant shall give notice of the ruling.