Gross, Rickey Glenn v. Gervin, Donald Joseph

infliction of emotional distress related to conduct on, or directly above, plaintiffs’ property. (Id., ¶¶ 29–63.) Lastly, plaintiffs allege defendants failed to maintain their easement across the plaintiffs’ property by allowing heavy trucks to damage the paved driveway. (Id., ¶¶ 24–28.)

On July 18, 2025, defendants filed a cross-complaint alleging nuisance and quiet title claims related to the driveway easement.

In opposition to the motion to compel, plaintiffs cite the California constitutional right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) A party asserting a privacy right under the California Constitution “must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 532 [citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35].)

The requesting party “may raise in response whatever legitimate or important countervailing interests disclosure serves,” and the party seeking protection “may identify feasible alternatives.” (Williams, 3 Cal.5th at p. 532.) “A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Id.) Even though plaintiffs contend that the inspection (without any entry into any structures on their property) is facially protected by the right to privacy, “[t]he right to privacy . . . is not absolute.” (John B. v.

Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1199 [citing Hill, 7 Cal.4th at 37].)

In this case, the court has balanced plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation of privacy with defendants’ interests in discovery that is relevant and probative to the parties’ claims and defenses. The court concludes that defendants have failed to demonstrate good cause for an inspection of the property in its entirety and less intrusive means of obtaining relevant information exist. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310.(b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98