Chimenti vs. Lucid Group USA, Inc.

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7 Chimenti vs. Lucid Group USA, Inc.

2025-01459321 Motion for Attorney Fees

Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees: Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code sectio n 1794, subdivision (d) which states: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s Statutory Offer to Compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 on November 12, 2025, whereby Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $116,594.34. (Goethals Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.)

Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on November 19, 2025. (Goethals Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 2.)

Under the terms of the Judgment, Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff’s costs, expenses, and attorney fees. (Goethals Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 2.)

Therefore, Plaintiff is the prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.

Amount of Attorneys’ Fees: “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins wi th the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid. (citation omitted).)

“As the plain wording of section 1794, subdivision (d) makes clear, the trial court is ‘to base the fee award upon actual time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably incurred—both from the standpoint of time spent and the amount charged.’ [Citation.] In the case of contingency fee arrangements, ‘a prevailing buyer ... is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his or her attorneys.’ [Citation.] [¶] Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ‘ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.’ [Citation.]

Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. [Citation.] The prevailing party and fee applicant bears ‘the burden of showing that the fees incurred were ... “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.” ’ [Citations.]” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 (Mikhaeilpoor).)

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1794, subdivision (d) under the lodestar method in the amount of $23,537.50.

Plaintiffs also request either a lodestar multiplier of 1.5, for a total of $35,306.25 or a lodestar multiplier of 2.0, for a total of $47,075.00.

Defendant challenges both the hourly rate charged, and the total number of billable hours claimed by Plaintiffs’ attorneys.

As to the hourly rates, the court finds the hourly rate for Matthew T. Goethals, Esq. ($500/hour) is reasonable. The hourly rates requested for the remaining timekeepers are also reasonable.

As to the hours billed by Plaintiff’s attorneys, Defendant objects on the grounds: (1) Plaintiff cannot recover fees incurred during Better Business Bureau proceedings; (2) Plaintiff cannot recover fees for unreasonably opposing arbitration; (3) Plaintiff cannot recover for discovery during the period the case was stayed; (4) Plaintiff’s counsel billed an excessive number of entries for vague client communications; and (5) Plaintiff cannot recover fees for clerical work.

First, Defendant challenges fees sought by Plaintiff in connection with the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”) proceedings. Section 1794, subdivision (d) authorizes recovery of fees “reasonably incur red by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

The BBB process is a private, extra -judicial dispute resolution forum that is distinct from court action.

Plaintiff argues that the letter sent by Defendant denying Plaintiff’s repurchase request not only referred her to the BBB Auto Line but stated “You must use BBB AUTO LINE if you are required to use a manufacturer’s ADR program prior to seeking remedies under the ‘lemon law’ of your state.”

Plaintiff has not shown Plaintiff was required to use Defendant’s ADR program prior to seeking re medies under California’s lemon law.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s is not entitled to fees associated with the BBB proceedings. The hours requested are reduced by 9.7 hours for Matthew T. Goethals and 3.9 hours for David Womac.

Second, Defendant challenges fees Plaintiff incurred in opposing arbitration. Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s Petition to Compel Arbitration was not unreasonable, therefore, Defendant’s request to strike the hours requested to oppose arbitration is DENIED.

Third, Defendant challenges the hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel after Defendant filed its Petition to Compel Arbitration on 2/19/25. The filing of the Petition stayed the proceedings, therefore, time billed on discovery related tasks after the filing of the Petition was not reasonable.

Between 2/19/25 and 7/24/25, Plaintiff’s counsel, Matthew T. Goethals, billed 1.3 hours for discovery related tasks and paralegal Rebecca Goethals billed 1.6 hours.

Therefore, the hours are reduced by 1.6 hours for Rebecca Goethals and 1.3 hours for Matthew T. Goethals.

Fourth, Defendant challenges 11.8 hours for 50 entries in which Plaintiff’s counsel billed for calls, emails and letters to their cl ient. The entries are so vague that the court cannot determine whether these fees were reasonably incurred.

Therefore, the hours for client communications are reduced by 7.8 hours for David Womac and 3.6 for Matthew T. Goethals.

Lastly, Defendant challenges 2.1 hours billed for clerical work. Purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a lawyer or paralegal’s usual rate, regardless of who performs them. (Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10.)

Calendaring, preparing proofs of service, internal filing, preparing binders for a hearing, and scanning are examples of tasks that have been found to be purely clerical and thus noncompensable or compensable at a reduced billing rate. (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187.)

Here, paralegal David Womac billed for clerical work on 11/14/24, 11/19/24, 11/20/24 and 1/3/24 at the paralegal hourly rate of $200.

Paralegal Kristin N. Arndt billed for clerical work on 2/12/25, 2/20/25 and 12/3/25, however, Plaintiff is not requesting fees for these tasks performed by KNA.

Therefore, the hours for David Womac are reduced by 1.4 hours.

Tentative Ruling: The court awards attorneys’ fees of $13,257.75.

Multiplier to the Lodestar: “The Supreme Court has ‘set forth a number of factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar figure. These include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.” ’ ” (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 248.)

“The trial court is neither foreclosed from, nor required to, award a multiplier.” (Mikhaeilpoor, at p. 247.)

Plaintiffs seek either a 1.5 or a 2.0 multiplier on the attorney fees.

A multiplier to the lodestar is not warranted. This is a routine lemon law case, with no unusual facts or novel legal issues requiring exceptional skill.

Further, the availability of statutory fees for Song- Beverly cases significantly reduced the risk associated with working on contingency. (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1174-1175 [FEHA fees award].)

Tentative Ruling: The request for a multiplier is DENIED.

Costs: Plaintiff has filed a Memorandum of Costs in which she seeks $3,058.75 in costs. Defendant has not filed a motion to tax costs.

Accordingly, the court awards $3,058.75 in costs and expenses.

Plaintiff to give notice.

8 Ramirez vs. City of Santa Ana

2024-01404439 Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication OFF CALENDAR. Notice of Settlement filed 4/24/2026

9 L.I.T. Consulting, Inc. vs. DCE Construction, Inc.

2024-01450550 Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication

Plaintiff L.I.T. Consulting, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) moves for summary judgment of the remaining cause of action for breach of contract against Defendants DCE Construction, Inc. dba Mesa Garage Doors (“DCE”) and Mesa Home Resources, Inc. (“Mesa Home Resources”).

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied.

“A party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)

“A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at 851.)

Simply put, “[i]f a party moving for summary judgment in any action . . . would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary judgment.” (Id. at 855.)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(c).

Where a plaintiff seeks summary judgment, the burden is to produce admissible evidence on each element of a cause of action entitling him or her to judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1); S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 383, 388.)

“It is not plaintiff’s initial burden to disprove affirmative defenses and crosscomplaints asserted by defendant.” (Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v.