Espino vs. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC

6 Espino vs. Jaguar Land TENTATIVE RULING: Rover North America, LLC Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs Javier Espino and Veronica Espino move for an award of attorney’s fees and costs from Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiffs shall recover $28,845.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees. Plaintiff shall recover no prejudgment costs.

Relevant Facts

On 03/20/2024, Plaintiffs contacted Defendant and requested voluntary repurchase of the subject vehicle. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 28.) Defendant refused.

Plaintiff filed this action on 04/23/2024. On 12/02/2025, the parties settled the claims when Plaintiffs accepted Defendant’s 998 settlement offer. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 40.)

Standard on Motions for Attorney’s Fees

On a motion for attorney’s fees, the moving party has the burden of: (1) establishing entitlement to an award, and (2) documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

The Song-Beverly Act provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) Courts use the lodestar adjustment method to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to award in Song-Beverly actions. (Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1112.)

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (“Ketchum”).) It is “based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.’ [Citation.] [The California Supreme Court] expressly approved the use of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar... In referring to ‘reasonable’ compensation, [the Court] indicated that trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the

form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Id. at pp. 1131-1132.)

When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998; see also Environmental Protection Info. Ctr. v. California Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248.) It is moving party’s burden of proof to show the fees they incurred and that the fees were reasonably incurred. (See Christian Research Institute v.

Alno (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320; Maughan v. Google Tech., Inc. (2007) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1254.) To oppose a showing of a fee request supported by declarations describing the efforts taken with billing records to establish the hours of work, a party may “attack the itemized billings with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate, or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.” (Premier Med.

Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id. at p. 564.)

The court then has the discretion to increase or decrease the lodestar figure by applying a positive or negative multiplier; “such an adjustment is commonly referred to as a ‘fee enhancement’ or ‘multiplier.’ [Citation.]” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 (“Mikhaeilpoor”).) The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 247; Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.)

“‘[T]he lodestar method vests the trial court with the discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were “reasonably spent” on the litigation’ [Citation] and to determine the hourly rates that should be used in the lodestar calculus. [Citation.]” (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 246-247.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court . . . . [Citation.]” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

Entitlement to Fees

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (See generally Opp.; Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)

Lodestar Method

Plaintiffs submit billing records, itemizing attorney work performed in this matter. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. A.) The billing records set forth the services by timekeeper, date, amount of time incurred, and description of work performed. The billing records reflect 63.0 hours of work performed and 7.5 anticipated hours of work on this case by six separate timekeepers as summarized in the table below:

Timekeeper (bar Rate Hours Total admission) Billed Billed Attorney Daghighian (2005) $625 7.5 $4,687.50 Attorney Rosenstein (1993) $700 5.8 $4,060.00 Attorney Shippen-Murray $550 39.6 $21,780.00 (2012) Attorney Martinez (2016) $400 1.2 $480.00 Attorney Hamblin (2007) $550 2.5 $1,375.00 Attorney Ortiz (2006) $525 6.4 $3,360.00 TOTAL INCURRED 63.0 $35,742.50 Attorney Rosenstein $700 7.5 $5,250.00 [Anticipated] TOTAL REQUESTED 70.5 $40,992.50

1. Reasonable Rates

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009; 569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal. App. 5th 426, 437.)

The rates billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel appear unreasonably high for this type of litigation. This is a straightforward lemon law case that involved a single discovery motion that was later withdrawn, and limited written discovery. Defendant challenges the hourly rate charged, proposing an alternative rate of $450 for all work.

A blended rate between $350 and $450 appears reasonable in these circumstances. Given Defendant’s proposal of $450, the court finds $450 to be a reasonable blended rate.

2. Reasonable Hours

Defendant JLRNA contends in only general terms that counsel’s hours are excessive and should be reduced by this court. (See Opp. at pp. 6:11-7:1.) However, the time records on their face raise a few potential issues:

First, the billing records reflect that Attorney Rosenstein 1 billed 3.5 hours to draft and prepare the fees motion, but both the moving papers and declaration are signed by Attorney Daghighian. Given the court’s decision to apply a blended rate for all attorney work, this does not change the fee recovery for the motion but generally does raise some questions about the accuracy of the billing records themselves.

Second, given that Plaintiffs billed 3.5 hours to draft and prepare the fees motion, the anticipated 5.0 hours to respond to the opposition and additional 2.5 hours to (remotely) appear at hearing appear to be unreasonable estimations. The opposition did not challenge specific time entries, presenting straightforward arguments for Plaintiffs to respond. Also, again, while counsel had anticipated Attorney Rosenstein would draft the reply, Attorney Daghighian signed the reply brief. Therefore, the court will award 1.5 hours for the reply and hearing.

Finally, the time records show Attorney Shippen-Murray to be the principal handling attorney on this matter, with five other timekeepers chipping in on certain assignments (Attorney Martinez drafting the CMC statement, Attorney Hamblin drafting the joint discovery letter for IDC, and Attorney Ortiz attending the IDC). This resulted in some duplication of efforts, as Attorney Murray would have needed to (and the billing records show he did in fact) bill time to bring these one-off attorneys up to speed. For these reasons, the court will cut the time by 0.4 hours from the requested time.

In sum, the court will award $28,845 in attorney’s fees, which is the $450 blended rate multiplied by all billed time incurred as of the date of the motion, with an additional 2.0 hours of time to prepare reply and 0.5 hours to attend hearing on this motion.

1 Coincidentally, the highest billing attorney.

3. Multiplier

In determining whether to apply a multiplier, the court considers a variety of factors that the court did not consider when determining the lodestar figure, such as the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, the skill displayed in presenting them, the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. (See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1134; Northwest Energetic Servs., LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 879-82; Graciano v.

Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Galbiso, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.) The contingent nature of fee award is relevant where it is “uncertain that the attorneys would be entitled to an award of fees even if they prevailed.” (Weeks v Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1175.) On the other hand, contingent nature is not generally sufficient where contingency is limited to whether or not the party will prevail. (Id., at pp. 1174- 1175.)

A multiplier is more typically seen in cases where counsel undertakes a difficult case in the public interest, not a personal injury case brought by a single plaintiff to recover her own economic damages. (Id., at p. 1174.)

Here, the Ketchum factors do not weigh in favor of a multiplier. Plaintiffs do not show the warranty issues presented to be novel or difficult, the case settled early in the litigation, the contingent nature is limited to whether the plaintiff will prevail, and counsel did not undertake a complex case in the public interest.

Thus, the court awards $28,845.00 in attorney’s fees.

Costs

Prejudgment costs must be claimed and contested in accordance with the rules adopted by the Judicial Council. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1034(a).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1) provides in relevant part that a prevailing party “must serve and file a memorandum of costs.”

Here, the court record shows no memorandum of costs filed. (See generally ELF.) For these reasons, the court denies, without prejudice, Plaintiffs’ motion to the extent Plaintiffs request recovery of prejudgment costs.

Plaintiffs to give notice.