Motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication
affirmative act that interefered with Plaintiffs’ contracts, but rather, only a refusal to act is alleged - There is no authority requiring Defendant to provide financial information or to sign an encroachment license - No causal link is alleged between any of Defendant’s conduct and a disruption of Plaintiff’s contractual relationships - No damages are alleged None of these arguments provide a persuasive basis to sustain a general demurrer. The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are: (1) a valid contract between the Plaintiff and a third party; (2) Defendant’s knowledge of the contract; (3) Intentional conduct on the part of the Defendant that was intended to or would necessarily result in a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) an actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damages. (See Quelimane Co. v.
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.)
The FAC sufficiently alleges each of these elements. Plaintiff alleges it had existing contracts with its clients. (FAC ¶79 and 80.) Plaintiff alleges that it was required to maintain its status as a small business enterprise and to increase its bonding capacity to maintain these contractual relationships with these third parties. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant refused to cooperate in the certification processes necessary to maintain its status as a small business enterprise and refused to cooperate in obtaining increased bonding capacity and/or lines of credit. (FAC ¶¶84-85.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware of these contractual relationships. (FAC ¶84.) Plaintiff alleges that this refusal to cooperate has disrupted its contractual relationships. (FAC ¶86.) Plaintiff alleges that it has sustained economic losses as a result of this conduct. (FAC ¶87.) Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts so as to overcome a challenge to the pleadings.
Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED.
Defendant shall file an answer within 15 days of this ruling.
Plaintiffs shall provide notice of this ruling.
59. Tush Law Defendant Olen Commercial Realty Corp.’s motion for Ltd v. Olen summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, is Commercial DENIED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c [authorizing motion].) Realty Corp. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to Exs. 4 and 6. (Evid. Code, § 452
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2023- (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 01360457 872, 889 [while judicial notice may be taken of the existence of government websites, “the same is not true of their factual content ... we know of no ‘official Web site’ provision for judicial notice in California”]; Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 514, 519 [“although it might be appropriate to take judicial notice of the existence of the websites, the same is not true of their factual content;” emphasis in original].)
Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection no. 3 to the Meyer Decl. is SUSTAINED (improper legal conclusion). Plaintiff’s remaining objections to the Meyer Decl. are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection no. 12 to the Taylor Decl. is SUSTAINED IN PART, as to the portion reading “thereby accepting possession and the benefits of the Lease without objection until April 2023” (lacks personal knowledge, improper legal conclusion). Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection no. 14 to the Taylor Decl. is SUSTAINED IN PART, as to the portion reading “Plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $18,321.96. A true and correct copy of the Computation of Damages is attached hereto as Exhibit B” (lacks personal knowledge, inadequate business-records foundation [Evid. Code, § 1271].) Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection nos. 16 and 17 to the Taylor Decl. are SUSTAINED (improper legal conclusion). Plaintiff’s remaining objections to the Taylor Decl. are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection no. 18 to the Gifford Decl. is SUSTAINED as to the second sentence (relevance). Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection no. 19 to the Gifford Decl. is SUSTAINED (improper legal conclusion). Plaintiff’s remaining objections to the Gifford Decl. are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff’s objection no. 21 (Meyer Exhibit A / Taylor Exhibit A / Gifford Exhibit B) is OVERRULED.
The court has not considered defendant’s Reply Separate Statement (ROA 411). (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(4) [“The reply shall not include any new evidentiary matter, additional material facts, or separate statement submitted with the reply and not presented in the moving papers or opposing papers”]; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 [“There is no provision in the statute” for a “reply separate statement”].)
Summary adjudication is DENIED because moving party’s notice of motion and Separate Statement do not identify any specific cause of action, nor specify each fact in support of any specific cause of action, such that the court cannot determine
which facts apply to which cause of action. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1350, subds. (b), (d) [summary adjudication requirements]; Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 523 [court’s discretion to deny summary judgment / adjudication due to failure to comply with separate statement requirements].)
Summary judgment is DENIED because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether moving party interfered with Plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment and use of the premises, so as to constitute breach of the lease. (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (p)(2) [burden, triable issues]; Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821 [breach of contract elements]; Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 185 [moving parties’ own evidence, and inferences therefrom, may disclose triable issues]; Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 8-10, 21 [alleging breach, including interference with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment and use of the premises, by notification of an upcoming “heavy remodel,” as well as failing to provide more specific information despite multiple requests, leading Plaintiff to conclude it had no choice but to find alternative space]; Moving Party Separate Statement, Fact Nos. 7, 10, and evidence cited in support thereof; Responding Party Separate Statement, Response to Fact No. 10 [referring to “Olen's course of conduct constituting strategic ambiguity” and “four-month nonresponse”], and evidence cited in support thereof; Meyer Decl., ¶¶ 5 and 6, and Exs.
C and D thereto [responding to plaintiff’s inquiries and promising more information]; id., Ex. B [10-7-22 letter advising of upcoming “heavy remodel”], Ex. E [1-24-23 internally inconsistent email stating “we are not going to be doing anything in there before your lease expiration of 9/30,” unclear whether this refers to construction in plaintiff’s unit, or the premises generally; while at the same time promising “a better update in June” and offering to assist plaintiff to “move into another Olen property at that time,” which is unclear as to time]; see also Huynh v.
Ingersoll-Rand (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 825, 830 [single triable issue requires denial of summary judgment].)
Defendant shall give notice of this ruling.
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