Norviel vs. FCA US LLC

Causes of Action, with 15 days leave to amend. In light of that ruling, the Zhou Demurrer is MOOT.

Yang/Guanjin shall give notice.

308 Malchow vs. Plaintiff Stephanie Malchow’s motion to serve Secure One defendant Secure One Capital Corporation is Capital CONTINUED to 5/26/26 at 1:30pm in Department Corporation C24.

The notice of motion, memorandum of points and authorities and declaration are not properly signed. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 128.7, subd. (a), § 2015.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.257(b).) Counsel’s declaration also fails to state whether efforts were made to serve the corporation through its officers by mail and acknowledgment of receipt pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30, subdivision (a) (in addition to attempts at personal service and substitute service). (See Corp. Code § 1702, subd. (a); Code of Civ. Proc. § 416.10, subd. (b).)

Plaintiff shall file corrected and updated documents at least 10 days before the next hearing date.

The court continues the OSC to 5/26/26 at 1:30pm.

309 Norviel vs. FCA Defendant FCA US, LLC’s (Defendant) demurrer to US LLC the first amended complaint (FAC) of plaintiff John Norviel (Plaintiff) is OVERRULED. Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.

Defendant shall file an answer to the FAC by 5/21/26.

Motion No. 1: Demurrer

Statute of Repose

The court concludes the six-year statute of repose under Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21,

subdivision (b) does not apply retroactively to Plaintiff’s claims.

Statute of Limitations (First through Third Causes of Action)

The warranty contract at issue provides for repair of the Subject Vehicle for five years after delivery. (FAC ¶ 9, Exh. A.) “A promise to repair defects that occur during a future period is the very definition of express warranty of future performance” under both the Song-Beverly Act and the California Uniform Commercial Code. (Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 217.) Accordingly, as Plaintiff argues, Plaintiff’s claims did not accrue until Plaintiff discovered or should have discovered Defendant’s breaches of the warranty.

The FAC alleges “Plaintiff discovered Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following FCA’s unsuccessful attempts to repair them.” (FAC ¶ 57.) It is thus not clearly and affirmatively shown from the face of the complaint that the first, second, and third causes of action are time-barred.

Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability expired because implied warranties have an absolute maximum duration of one year from the sale of new consumer goods. (See Civ. Code, § 1791.1(c).) Defendant argues because the FAC does not allege any defect arose within the restricted statutory period, Plaintiff’s implied warranty claim fails as a matter of law. However, the FAC alleges “[t]he subject vehicle was sold with one or more latent defect(s) set forth above.” (FAC ¶ 76.) The defects

alleged in the FAC consist of engine and powertrain issues, transmission defects, electrical defects, and others. (See FAC ¶¶ 15-24, 31.) The allegations in the FAC thus could reasonably be read to allege defects arising at the time of sale, i.e., within the applicable one-year warranty period.

Sixth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment

Defendant argues the fraud claim fails because: (1) it is time-barred by the three year statute of limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d); (2) it is not pled with the requisite specificity; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a direct transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose on the part of Defendant; and (4) the claim is barred by the economic loss rule.

Statute of Limitations: The allegations of the FAC are sufficient to support tolling of Plaintiff’s fraud claim. (See FAC ¶¶ 26-27, 56-57.)

Specificity: Fraud claims must be pled with particularity. Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically. The policy of liberal construction of pleading will not be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1332.) The allegations in the FAC are pled with sufficient specificity to support the fraud claim. (See FAC ¶¶ 35, 37-39, 42, 44, 84, 87-88.)

Transactional Relationship: Defendant relies on Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, in support of its argument that there must have been a direct transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant for a duty to arise and no such transaction exists here because the FAC does not allege Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle

directly from Defendant. However, the court in Bigler-Engler also held that “ ‘[a] duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as ‘... parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement.’ [Citation.]” (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 311). Here, Plaintiff alleges he entered into a warranty contract directly with Defendant regarding the Subject Vehicle, which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. (FAC ¶ 8). This appears sufficient to allege a transactional relationship between the parties.

Defendant argues a warranty is not a contract or a direct transaction that can create a duty to disclose. It cites Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, but that matter did not involve the issue of when a duty to disclose arises for fraudulent inducement claims. Ford Motor Warranty Cases addressed whether Ford was entitled to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ Song- Beverly and fraud claims by relying on an arbitration clause in the sales contracts between the buyers and seller dealerships.

Economic Loss Rule: Defendant’s argument that the fraudulent inducement claim is barred by the economic loss rule is no longer compelling following the ruling in Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843, wherein the court declined to apply the economic loss rule to a purchaser’s fraudulent inducement by concealment claim. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 840-841.)

Defendant points to Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, to support its argument that the economic loss rule bars Plaintiff’s fraud claim. Rattagan, however, dealt with whether, “[u]nder California law, a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual

relationship.” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 45.) As such, the economic loss rule would not bar Plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent inducement- concealment.

Motion No. 2: Motion to Strike

Because Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action remains viable, punitive damages may be recoverable pursuant to said claim. The FAC also sufficiently alleges authorization or ratification by an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant. (FAC ¶ 7; see also, Civ Code, § 3294(a), (b).)

Court continues the CMC to 6/1/26 at 8:45am.

Defendant shall give notice.

311 Dehbozorgi vs. The Demurrer by cross-defendant Jeffrey Michael AL E. CAT, Inc. Payne fdba J Payne Construction Company (Payne) is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Cross-complainant Al E. Cat, Inc. has leave to file a first amended cross-complaint by 5/21/26.

3rd Cause of Action, Breach of Contract. The cross complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute this cause of action. (See Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186 [elements]; Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307 [“If the action is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.”].)

The court continues the CMC to 8/17/26 at 8:45am in Dept. C24. All unserved defendants/cross- defendants must be served by the next date.

Payne shall give notice.