Motion to Charge Members’ Interests in Limited Liability Companies
application of the factors set forth in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward- Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 supports a finding that the settlement between Villalbaso and Plaintiff was made in good faith. Ledesma failed to meet her burden of demonstrating lack of good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(d).)
Accordingly, the application for determination of good faith settlement filed by Villalbaso is APPROVED.
Villalbaso shall submit a proposed order in accordance with this ruling.
Counsel for Villalbaso is ordered to give notice. 5 Kwok v. Before the Court is a Motion to Charge Members’ Interests in Limited Genera Corp. Liability Companies by defendant/judgment creditor Genera Corporation (Judgment Creditor). For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is DENIED, without prejudice.
Judgment Creditor seeks an order charging the membership interests of plaintiffs/judgment debtors Jackson Kwok and Annie Wong (collectively, Judgment Debtors) in five limited liability companies with payment of the unpaid balance of the judgment entered December 2, 2025 and as amended on February 18, 2026. The five entities are: (1) Singgong LLC, (2) Cat & Mouse Investments, LLC, (3) AOK Consulting, LLC, (4) Oneroadfat LLC and (5) Camstars LLC (collectively, LLC’s).
Here, although Judgment Creditor asserts in the motion that both Judgment Debtors have a membership interest in each of the LLC’s, the evidence presented by Judgment Creditor with the moving papers does not establish this.
Corporations Code section 17705.03 states “on application by a judgment creditor of a member or transferee, a court may enter a charging order against the transferable interest of the judgment debtor for the unsatisfied amount of the judgment.” (Corp. Code, § 17705.03(a).) Corporations Code section 17705.03 also states it is the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor seeking to enforce a judgment against a member or transferee may satisfy the judgment from the judgment debtor’s transferable interest. (Corp. Code, § 17705.03
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The Court notes that Judgment Creditor submitted additional evidence along with the reply in order to show the Judgment Debtors are members of the LLC’s. The Court declines to consider the new evidence submitted along with the Reply. (See, e.g., Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 241 - “general rule of motion practice . . . is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.”)
Nonetheless, even if the new evidence were considered, nothing in the new evidence shows that Annie Wong was a member or had a transferrable interest in the LLCs. Further, the Court did not see trial testimony in the exhibits attached showing Jackson Kwok stated he owned Cat & Mouse Investments, LLC, and AOK Consulting, LLC.
In addition, the relief requested in the motion is overbroad. In the motion, Judgment Creditor seeks an order that any money to be paid by a member of the LLC, or the LLC, to the Judgment Debtors, regardless of the reason, be charged. Section 17705.03 only allows the Court to order “the limited liability company to pay over to the person to which the charging order was issued any distribution....” While Judgment Creditor states in its Reply that it “seeks only a charging order that requires all distributions that would go to Judgment Debtors to be paid to Genera” (Reply at 7:17-18), that is not what is requested in the subject motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Judgment Debtors are ordered to give notice of this ruling. 6 Kaar v. Arka The demurrer filed by cross-defendants Vlada Kaar and Dallas New Luxury Home Builders, LLC (collectively, Moving Party) directed to the first Windows and amended cross-complaint (FACC) of cross-complainant AG East- Doors West Enterprise, Inc. d/b/a ARKA Luxury Windows and Doors (ARKA) is OVERRULED.
Moving Party is to file an answer to the FACC within 20 days. Moving Party demurs to the sole cause of action for defamation asserted in the FACC. “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87, 97.)
Specificity: Moving Party argues the FACC merely asserts falsity without alleging facts showing why the statements are false, such as the actual manufacturer pricing, ARKA’s pricing structure, or any objective data. Moving Party’s cited authorities do not hold defamation claims must be pled with the level of detail Moving Party seeks. The cited authorities simply confirm that courts use the totality of the circumstances test when deciding whether a statement implies a provably false assertion of fact, and it is a question of law for the court whether the challenged statement is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory interpretation. (See e.g., Bently Reserve LP v.
Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 428– 429; Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 669, 695; Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 884; Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 381-382.)
Here, the FACC alleges “Cross-Defendants intentionally and maliciously posted online reviews asserting false and defamatory statements of fact which were not protected by any privilege and made with the intent to injure Cross-Complainant.” (FACC ¶ 16.)