Motion to Compel Arbitration
vague description of the alleged defect(s) in the subject vehicle. (FAC ¶¶ 14-20.) Plaintiff seems to be alleging that the subject vehicle suffers from the described “Steering Defect” in some manner, but if so, the FAC has failed to state when and how that was discovered in the subject vehicle. Generic claims of defects, without more, will not suffice to state the claim, as “[t]he very existence of a warranty presupposes that some defects may occur.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 345.) Greater specificity as to this specific vehicle is required to state this claim.
For COAs 1-4 and 6, Plaintiff is granted 15 days leave to amend. However, continued leave to amend should not be presumed. Plaintiff should ensure that any further amendment fully articulates the factual basis for each.
In light of the foregoing rulings on the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.
Counsel for Defendants are to give notice of these rulings. 12 Lannagan v. O/C Andersen Windows, Inc. 13 Alvarado vs. A) Motion to Compel Arbitration Alleviate Partners LLC Defendants Alleviate Partners LLC and Shawna Mosley’s (“Defendants” together for this ruling) Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Motion”) is DENIED.
Defendants have produced a copy of a valid arbitration agreement (“Agreement”) between Defendants and plaintiff Sandy Alvarado (“Plaintiff”), which requires arbitration between the parties under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). (Mosely Decl., Ex. A.)
“Under both the FAA and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity for voiding any contract. [Citation.] Such challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements can be divided into two types. [Citation.] One type specifically challenges the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. The second challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders the whole contract invalid. (Ibid.)” (Winter v.
Window Fashions Pros., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal. App. 4th 943, 947 (“Winter”).) “As a matter of federal law, arbitration clauses are “ ‘ “separable” from the contracts in which they are embedded.’ ” [Citation.] . . . a challenge to the arbitration clause itself must be decided by the court. [Citation.] Nevertheless, a court still must consider one type of challenge to the overall contract, i.e., a claim that the party resisting arbitration never actually agreed to be bound.” (Winter, supra, 166 Cal.
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App. 4th at 947–48.)
“Only ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 of the FAA.” (Giuliano v.
Inland Empire Pers., Inc. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1285.)
"The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 (“Engalla”); Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79, 91-92.)
Defendants have met their initial burden of showing an arbitration provision exists between the parties covering the issues alleged in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), with the FAA controlling. The burden transfers to Plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 972.)
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021
Plaintiff argues the Agreement is unenforceable under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”). “[T]he EFAA rejects the policy of favoring enforceability of arbitration agreements, and replaces it with a rule of unenforceability . . . .” [Emphasis in original.] (Casey v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 575, 585 (“Casey”); 9 U.S.C., §§ 2, 401-402.) “[W]here a plaintiff's lawsuit contains at least one claim that fits within the scope of the EFAA, “ ‘ “the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to all claims asserted in the lawsuit.” [Citation.] The EFAA provides that it applies to “a case” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a))—as opposed to a claim—that a plaintiff brings alleging sexual harassment, meaning that the EFAA applies to an entire case. “ (Casey, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at 588.)
The EFAA covers all disputes between the parties that “relate to conduct that is alleged to constitute” sexual assault and sexual harassment, regardless of the theory of liability. (9 U.S.C. § 401(3)- (4).) The statute provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, . . . no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute. (9 U.S.C., § 402(a).)” [Emphasis added.] (Casey, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at 584.)
“[T]he EFAA does not refer to a “sexual harassment claim” or “sexual harassment cause of action,” but rather a “sexual harassment dispute.” Moreover, several courts have rejected the argument that a plaintiff is barred from invoking the EFAA simply “because none of her claims are styled as ‘sexual harassment’ claims.” ‘ “ (Lee v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., No. 25-CV-01169-EMC, 2025 WL 2689263, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2025)(“ Lee”).) The fact the plaintiff did not assert a cause of action for sexual harassment or
hostile work environment (under Title VII or FEHA) did not bar the plaintiff from relying on the EFAA. (Ibid.)
Defendants argues the EFAA does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims and that the definition of sexual harassment that must be used is the federal and not state definition. “In defining “sexual harassment,” the Guidelines first describe the kinds of workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title VII. These include “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985).” (Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 65.) This is incorrect.
In a case brought under state law, such as FEHA and CFRA in the present matter, the court looks to the definition of sexual harassment in the code sections the case is based upon. (See, Lee, supra, 2025 WL 2689263, at *1 [Case for constructive discharge due to sexual harassment based upon pregnancy and gender under FEHA was subject to EFAA; motion to compel arbitration was denied].)
Under Gov’t Code § 12940(j), it is illegal to harass an individual based upon, among other things, sex, gender, and reproductive health decisionmaking, which includes pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11034(f), sexual harassment is not necessarily motivated by sexual desire, but rather there can be “hostile work environment” sexual harassment.
“Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome comments or conduct based on sex unreasonably interfere with an employee's work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11034(f)(2).) Thus, under California law, “harassment creating a hostile environment may constitute sexual harassment if the plaintiff can prove ‘“‘she would not have been treated in the same manner’”’ if she were a man.” (Thomas v. Regents of Univ. of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 613.) “[A] hostile work environment, need not have anything to do with sexual advances.” (Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 349 (1993), as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 20, 1993), overruled on other grounds by Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798.)
Plaintiff has pled sufficient fats to support, under the totality of the circumstances pled, “hostile work environment” sexual harassment based upon pregnancy. (FAC ¶ 14; Lee, supra, 2025 WL 2689263, at *12; Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney's Off. (2024) 16 Cal. 5th 611.)
The EFAA applies to the FAC, which in turn invalidates the Agreement. As the EFAA applies to invalidate the Agreement against a single claim, it applies to invalidating the Agreement against all of Plaintiff’s claim. (Casey, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at 588.)
The Motion is DENIED.
B) Joinder
As the Motion was denied, defendant ADP Totalsource, Inc.’s Joinder to the Motion is also DENIED.
Plaintiff to give notice. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21