Demurrer; Motion to Strike
Given Plaintiffs do not oppose the demurrer to the fraudulent inducement by concealment cause of action in the FAC, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs have not alleged a viable fraud cause of action as the demurrer to said cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. Punitive damages are thus not available based on the fraud claim. Plaintiffs’ remaining allegations against Defendant relate to statutory violations under the Song Beverly Act, which provides for civil penalties but not punitive damages. (See Covert v. FCA USA, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 821, 828, fn. 3; Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 228.) The motion is thus GRANTED without leave to amend.
The Court notes on April 15, 2026, Defendant filed a duplicate demurrer and motion to strike directed to the FAC, which are set for hearing on July 27, 2026. (ROA 100, 101.)
Given the Court’s rulings on the instant motions, the hearings set for July 27, 2026 are VACATED.
Counsel for Defendant shall give notice. 11 Benoliel v. Before the Court at present are the Demurrer and Motion to Strike FAC US, LLC filed on 2/19/26 by Defendants FCA US, LLC (“FCA”) and Tuttle Click Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram (“Dealer”) (together “Defendants”), as to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff Menasse M. Benoliel (“Plaintiff”) on 1/20/26.
The Demurrer is SUSTAINED on the First, Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action (each a “COA”) as they appear time-barred on their face under Comm. Code §2725, and the allegations of delayed discovery remain insufficient here. Where a pleading shows on its face that a claim would otherwise be time-barred, the burden is on the plaintiff to state specific facts to show delayed discovery: conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer. (Carrillo v. County of Santa Clara (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 227, 234.) The FAC does not meet that here.
Plaintiff asserts that after the 2014 purchase, Plaintiff sought service on five occasions, with different complaints, between 2016 and 2021. (FAC ¶¶ 14-19.) But none of those service complaints, as alleged, appear to be based on the alleged “death wobble” or “steering defect” otherwise described in the FAC. The FAC still fails to articulate, for any specific defect alleged, what the specific defect is, and when and how that was discovered by Plaintiff.
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For COA 5, the Demurrer is again OVERRULED, for the same reasons previously stated in the 1/5/26 ruling.
For COA 6, the Demurrer is again SUSTAINED, as the claim as pled still lacks adequate specificity. Plaintiff has still provided only a
vague description of the alleged defect(s) in the subject vehicle. (FAC ¶¶ 14-20.) Plaintiff seems to be alleging that the subject vehicle suffers from the described “Steering Defect” in some manner, but if so, the FAC has failed to state when and how that was discovered in the subject vehicle. Generic claims of defects, without more, will not suffice to state the claim, as “[t]he very existence of a warranty presupposes that some defects may occur.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 345.) Greater specificity as to this specific vehicle is required to state this claim.
For COAs 1-4 and 6, Plaintiff is granted 15 days leave to amend. However, continued leave to amend should not be presumed. Plaintiff should ensure that any further amendment fully articulates the factual basis for each.
In light of the foregoing rulings on the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.
Counsel for Defendants are to give notice of these rulings. 12 Lannagan v. O/C Andersen Windows, Inc. 13 Alvarado vs. A) Motion to Compel Arbitration Alleviate Partners LLC Defendants Alleviate Partners LLC and Shawna Mosley’s (“Defendants” together for this ruling) Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Motion”) is DENIED.
Defendants have produced a copy of a valid arbitration agreement (“Agreement”) between Defendants and plaintiff Sandy Alvarado (“Plaintiff”), which requires arbitration between the parties under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). (Mosely Decl., Ex. A.)
“Under both the FAA and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity for voiding any contract. [Citation.] Such challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements can be divided into two types. [Citation.] One type specifically challenges the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. The second challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders the whole contract invalid. (Ibid.)” (Winter v.
Window Fashions Pros., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal. App. 4th 943, 947 (“Winter”).) “As a matter of federal law, arbitration clauses are “ ‘ “separable” from the contracts in which they are embedded.’ ” [Citation.] . . . a challenge to the arbitration clause itself must be decided by the court. [Citation.] Nevertheless, a court still must consider one type of challenge to the overall contract, i.e., a claim that the party resisting arbitration never actually agreed to be bound.” (Winter, supra, 166 Cal.
App. 4th at 947–48.)
“Only ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 of the FAA.” (Giuliano v.