Guerrero vs. BJ’s Restaurants, Inc.

There are three grounds for a demurrer to an answer: (1) failure to state facts sufficient to

constitute a defense; (2) uncertainty; and (3) failure to state whether a contract alleged in an answer is written or oral. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20.) “Generally, a party must raise an issue as an affirmative defense where the matter is not responsive to essential allegations of the complaint. [] Thus, where a defendant relies on facts not put in issue by the plaintiff, the defendant must plead such facts as an affirmative defense.” (Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 698.) Like a complaint, the answer must plead “ultimate facts.” (See FPI Development, Inc. v.

Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.) However, if the answer merely negates “some essential allegation of the complaint” as “not true,” these matters are put at issue by the general denial and do not need to be specially pleaded in the answer. (Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial at ¶ 6:437, citing City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 780, fn. 58.)

Here, the first affirmative defense, for failure to state a claim, does not need to be specially pleaded because it raises no “new matter” and is an “unwaivable” objection to a complaint or cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.80, subd. (a).) Likewise, the Court finds Defendant adequately pled its second affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 458.) Thus, the demurrers to the first and second affirmative defense are overruled.

Additionally, the Court finds the following defenses have been put at issue by the allegations in the complaint, and that no “new matter” needed to be pleaded in order to support them: workers’ compensation exclusivity (13th); third party conduct/superseding cause (23rd and 36th); intentional tort/criminal act as superseding cause (24th); laches (41st); and, arbitration (45th).

The Court sustains the demurrers to the remainder of Defendant’s affirmative defenses, because they require pleading new matter that are not responsive to any allegations in the complaint. In its opposition, Defendant argues its answer is sufficient so long as it “provides Plaintiff with notice of its defenses.” (Opp’n at pp. 6-7, citing Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) This argument is not persuasive because Doe was addressing the less particularity doctrine and whether the plaintiff was allowed to plead allegations based on information and belief. (Doe v.

City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549–550, citation omitted.) Here, there is no indication that Plaintiff would have “particularized knowledge” of the facts that could potentially support Defendant’s affirmative defenses, or that allegations on information and belief are necessary. The Code specifically requires the answer to contain “a statement of any new matter constituting a defense.” Because Defendant has alleged defenses that are outside of the matters put at issue by Plaintiff, the onus is on Defendant to plead the ultimate facts on which they are based.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules the demurrers to the 1st, 2nd, 13th, 23rd, 24th, 36th, 41st, and 45th affirmative defenses in Defendant’s answer. The remainder of Plaintiff’s demurrer is sustained with 15 days leave to amend.

The order to show cause is discharged. The case management conference is continued to October 19, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Department C27. Each party is ordered to file a timely updated case management statement prior to this date.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the ruling.

106 2023-01339201 1. Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication 2. Order to Show Cause