Minardi vs. General Motors

The Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable. However, the Court finds the number of hours billed to be excessive and thus reduces the total fees accordingly. Specifically, here, Plaintiffs had seven lawyers on an uncomplicated case that was not extensively litigated.

As for a multiplier, Plaintiff requests a multiplier of 1.25. The party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of showing why an enhancement is appropriate. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.)

This case was not complex or extensively litigated. There was no motion for summary judgment or trial. Plaintiffs have not identified any novel or complicated issue in this case or an aspect that necessitated exceptional lawyering. Nor does it appear any enhancement is due for risk of loss or delay in payment as these factors have already been included in consideration of the lodestar. Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.

For these reasons, no multiplier was applied.

Based on all of the above, Plaintiff is awarded fees of $19,401.05. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

103 2023-01370567 Motion for Attorney Fees

Minardi vs. Plaintiff John Minardi’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to Civil General Motors Code Section 1794(d) is granted. Plaintiff is awarded $40,231.00, in reasonable attorneys’ fees and $1,830.80, in costs and expenses, against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”).

Procedural Issues Defendant contends this motion is untimely. (Opp’n at p. 4, citing Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 644.) Hatlevig is distinguishable because, here, no dismissal has occurred.

Plaintiff requests the Court strike Defendant’s opposition for violating the spacing/line requirements of the Rules. Because Defendant does not appear to have used single-line spacing to circumvent page limitations, the Court declines to strike the opposing brief. The Court will exercise its discretion to consider the opposing memorandum, this time, but future violations may warrant disregarding the briefing in its entirety.

Merits Civil Code section 1794(d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” Further, Plaintiff’s right to seek an award of attorneys’ fees is a term of the CCP section 998 offer, here.

To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the court should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and employed in handling the matter, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42

Cal.App.4th 628, 659.) As to the reasonableness of the hours, “trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “In determining a fee's reasonableness, the court may also consider whether the motion itself is reasonable, both in terms of (1) the amount of fees requested and (2) the credibility of the supporting evidence.” (Guillory v. Hill (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 802, 811.) The court may make a downward adjustment if the billing entries are vague, “blockbilled,” or unnecessary. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 441.)

It is within the court’s discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were “reasonably spent” on the litigation. (Meister v. Regents of Univ. of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) A trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees, as an experienced trial judge is in the best position to decide the value of professional services rendered in court. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

Based on the supporting papers submitted by Plaintiff, here, the Court finds that Plaintiff reasonably incurred $40,231.00, in attorneys’ fees. The Court made reductions where entries appeared to be padded, overbilled, or the result of duplication and other inefficiencies, (Donahue v. Donahue, (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) However, the Court finds the billable rates to be reasonable and within the prevailing rate in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Thus, the Court declined to reduce the hourly rates as proposed by Defendant.

The Court declines to tax the costs. Defendant did not file a timely motion to strike or tax costs. (Cal. R. Ct. Rule 3.1700(b)(1).) And, the cost items at issue are recoverable as reasonable costs and expenses. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the ruling.

104 2026-01553833 Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction

Advanced Plaintiff Advanced Marketing and Distribution, Inc.’s application for a preliminary Marketing and injunction is denied. Distribution, Inc. Defendant’s objections are overruled. vs. Robert Kaskie, Trustee Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted. to The Lucille MacDonald Trust Plaintiff filed numerous documents on May 7, 2026 which are untimely. Per CCP §1005(b), Dated October all reply papers are required to be filed at least five court days before the hearing. Thus 17, 2001, as Plaintiff’s reply papers were due on or before May 4, 2026.

The Court does not consider amended and any documents filed by either party after May 4, 2026. restated Code Civ. Proc., § 526(a)(3) provides that an injunction may be granted “[w]hen it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.” The purpose of CCP § 526(a)(3) is to preserve the status quo pending litigation. (See, Stockton v.

Newman (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 563.)

First, for an injunction to issue, the moving party must establish a likelihood of prevailing