Rodriguez vs. Aguirre Cardenas

TENTATIVE RULINGS May 11, 2026

# Case Name Tentative

101 2021-01214563 Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication

Rodriguez vs. The motion by Defendants Hyundai Motor Company, Hyundai Motor America, and Hyundai Aguirre Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (“Hyundai Alabama”) (collectively, the “Hyundai Defendants”) seeking summary judgment in their favor and against Plaintiffs Victor Manuel Cardenas Rodriguez, Jayden Martinez (“Jayden”), and Janelle Martinez (“Janelle”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) as successors in interest to the estate of Stephanie Rodriguez (“Stephanie”) as to the survival action and all underlying causes of action pursued thereby alleged by Plaintiffs against the Hyundai Defendants in their operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) is DENIED.

Hyundai Defendants also seeks summary judgment in their favor against Victor Manuel Rodriguez, in his individual capacity, as to his wrongful death claim and all underlying causes of action pursued thereby alleged by Victor Manuel Rodriguez against the Hyundai Defendants in his operative SAC is DENIED.

Hyundai Defendants motion for summary adjudication of four issues is DENIED PART AND GRANTED IN PART.

General legal authority In both summary judgment and summary adjudication proceedings, the pleadings determine the scope of the relevant issues. (Port Medical Wellness, Inc. v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 153, 169.)

The standard governing motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication is settled. “[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. . . .” (Ibid.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.)

“A court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings, determines whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in the moving party’s favor, and if the summary judgment motion is meritorious on its face, the court will look to whether the opposition demonstrates there are triable, material factual issues.” (Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1054.)

The opposing party must show by reference to specific facts the existence of a triable issue as to that cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

A cause of action cannot be established if the undisputed facts presented by the defendant prove the contrary of the plaintiff’s allegations as a matter of law. (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1597.)

Alternatively, a moving defendant can show that a cause of action cannot be established by submitting evidence, such as discovery admissions and responses, that plaintiff does not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence to establish an essential element of his cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590 [finding moving defendant may show plaintiff's lack of evidence by factually devoid discovery responses after plaintiff has had adequate opportunity for discovery]; see Sheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 80-81 [finding Union Bank rule only applies where discovery requests are broad enough to elicit all such information].)

Once a defendant meets its prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show by reference to specific facts the existence of a triable issue as to that affirmative defense or cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

To meet this burden, the plaintiff must present substantial and admissible evidence creating a triable issue. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.)

Theoretical, imaginative, or speculative submissions are insufficient to stave off summary judgment. (Doe v. Salesian Society (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 474, 481; Bushling v. Fremont Med. Center (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 493, 510.)

Summary judgment Hyundai Defendants contend Victor Manuel Rodriguez, Jayden, and Janelle jointly assert a survival action on behalf of Stephanie Rodriguez’s estate and a wrongful death action in his or her individual capacity.

Hyundai Defendants also seek summary judgment as to the SAC filed by Victor Manual Rodriguez.

Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges a cause of action for negligence against Hyundai Defendants. (SAC, 6:4-39.)

Hyundai Defendants did not address this cause of action in their motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, Hyundai Defendants have not shown they are entitled to summary judgment on the SAC against Victor, Jayden, and Janelle, or against Victor Manual Rodriguez. (Lopez v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 705, 717 [A moving defendant has the burden to show it is entitled to judgment with respect to all theories of liability asserted by the plaintiff.].)

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Summary adjudication Issue 1: The Hyundai Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ survival action (and all underlying causes of action pursued thereby) because it lacks merit.

It lacks merit because Plaintiffs do not have, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence establishing each of the essential elements of the claim against the Hyundai Defendants—namely the existence of any recoverable damages.

Plaintiffs do not oppose this issue. (Opposition, 3:18-20.)

However, even if Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, Hyundai Defendants are not entitled to summary adjudication unless they meet their initial burden. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 469.)

Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show Plaintiffs do not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence to establish an essential element of his cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590 [finding moving defendant may show plaintiff’s lack of evidence by factually devoid discovery responses after plaintiff has had adequate opportunity for discovery]; see Sheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 80-81 [finding Union Bank rule only applies where discovery requests are broad enough to elicit all such information].)

Hyundai Defendants rely on Hyundai Defendants’ undisputed material fact (“HDMF”) numbers 1-4.

These material facts do not establish Plaintiffs cannot reasonably obtain evidence to show recoverable damages.

There is no discussion as to Jayden’s or Janelle’s damages.

Accordingly, the motion is as to this issue is denied.

Issue 2: HMMA is entitled to summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ survival action because it lacks merit.

It lacks merit because it is barred by an affirmative defense—namely the running of the statute of limitations.

Hyundai Defendants contend the survival causes of action against Hyundai Alabama are time barred.

The parties do not dispute the 2-year statute of limitations applies to these causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 335.1 and 366.1.)

“The prevailing rule with respect to actions involving parties designated by their true names in the original complaint is that, if an amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has run, the amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint provided recovery is sought in both pleadings on the same general set of facts...Cases applying this relation back rule have made it clear that ‘it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative. [Citation.]’...Thus, amendments alleging a new theory of liability against the defendant have been found to relate back to the original complaint, so long as the new cause of action is based on the same set facts previously alleged...Likewise, an amendment seeking new damages relates back to the original complaint if such damages resulted from the same operative facts—i.e., the same misconduct and the same injury—previously complained of.” (Amaral v.

Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1199-1200, disapproved of on other grounds [internal citations omitted]; see, Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 601 [“The rule which makes relation back of an amendment dependent upon whether recovery is sought on the same general set of facts as those alleged in the original complaint is in accordance with the basic principle of code pleading that a litigant need only allege the facts warranting recovery.”]; see also, Eghtesad v.

State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 415 [The “relationback doctrine can save an amended complaint that identifies a fictitiously-named defendant and asserts a cause of action against that defendant only if: (1) the amended complaint is based on the same general state of facts as the original; (2) the original complaint stated a valid cause of action against the now-identified defendant; and (3) the plaintiff was ‘genuinely ignorant’ of the defendant’s identity or the facts rendering defendant liable when the original complaint was filed.].)

A Doe amendment does not relate back if defendant can prove plaintiff’s earlier awareness of the newly added defendant’s identity and facts creating its liability. (Miller v. Thomas (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 440, 446; Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167, 179.)

“The ‘phrase ignorant of the name of a defendant’ is broadly interpreted to mean not only ignorant of the defendant’s identity, but also ignorant of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against that defendant.” (San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 563, 579, citing Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170.)

The relevant inquiry when the plaintiff seeks to substitute a real defendant for one sued fictitiously is what facts the plaintiff actually knew at the time the original complaint was filed. (Id.)

Hyundai Defendants contend the relation back doctrine does not apply because Plaintiffs were aware of the Hyundai Alabama manufacturer before they filed their initial complaint. (Motion, ROA No. 677, 10:24-13:12.)

The Court finds that Hyundai Defendants have met their initial burden to show the relation back doctrine does not apply. (HDMF No. 1, 3, and 6-8; SAC, ¶¶ 47 and 53.)

In Plaintiffs’ opposition, Plaintiffs contend Judge Larsh already ruled on this issue when he ruled on Hyundai Alabama’s motion to quash service of summons.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, this motion for summary adjudication is not a disguised motion for reconsideration of Hyundai Alabama’s motion to quash.

To the extent Judge Larsh made any factual finding, that does not establish that fact as conclusive in this motion.

Although Plaintiffs don’t expressly raise the law of the case doctrine, that is essentially what Plaintiffs are attempting to do in their opposition. (See, People v. Sons (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 90, 100.)

The law of the case doctrine does not apply to trial court rulings. (Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 788.)

Trial court judges “are not bound by rulings made at trial by a previous trial court judge. Trial court judges are independent judicial officers. They have both the right and the duty, consistent with their oaths of office, to exercise their best judgment, not to abandon it to previous trial court rulings.” (People v. Sons, 164 Cal.App.4th at 100; see, Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1568 [“neither a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing nor a finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to have been a correct finding.” Taking judicial notice of a judge’s factual findings would “be tantamount to taking judicial notice that the judge’s factual finding must necessarily have been correct and that the judge is therefore infallible.”].)

Plaintiffs do not include any evidence in support of their material facts to raise a triable issue other than the Court’s prior ruling on Hyundai Alabama’s motion to quash.

Plaintiffs did not meet their shifted burden to present evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication on this issue is granted.

Issue 3: The Hyundai Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication of Victor’s wrongful death action (and all underlying causes of action pursued thereby) because it lacks merit.

It lacks merit because Victor does not have, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence establishing each of the essential elements of the claim against the Hyundai Defendants—namely financial dependency on Stephanie prior to her death.

Like issue 1 above, Plaintiffs do not oppose this issue. (Opposition, 3:18-20.)

However, even if Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, Hyundai Defendants are not entitled to summary adjudication unless they meet their initial burden. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 469.)

A cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted by a parent of the decedent if the parent was dependent on the decedent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (b)(1).)

“For purposes of this subdivision, dependence refers to financial support.” (Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445.)

Hyundai Defendants met their initial burden to show Victor Manuel Rodriguez did not rely financially on Stephanie prior to her death. (HDMF No. 5.)

Plaintiffs did not oppose this motion, did not dispute HDMF number 5, and did not submit any evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Victor Manuel Rodriguez relied financially on Stephanie prior to her death.

Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication on this issue is granted.

Issue 4: HMMA is entitled to summary adjudication of Victor’s wrongful death action because it lacks merit.

It lacks merit because it is barred by an affirmative defense— namely the running of the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs did not dispute the two-year statute of limitations also applies to this cause of action.

For the same reasons set forth above, Hyundai Defendants met their initial burden to show the relation back doctrine does not apply to Hyundai Alabama and the cause of action is time barred. (HDMF No. 1, 3, and 6-8.)

Plaintiffs did not meet their shifted burden to raise a triable issue of material fact.

The motion for summary adjudication on this issue is granted.

Hyundai Defendants are directed to give notice.

102 2024-01413907 Motion for Attorney Fees

Veeragoudar vs. Plaintiff Gina Veeragoudar’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in part.

Plaintiff is Ford Motor awarded total attorneys’ fees of $19.401.05.

The Court reduced certain fee amounts to account for inefficiencies from overstaffing.

No multiplier was applied.

Company Merits Civil Code section 1794(d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the court should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and employed in handling the matter, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.)

As to the reasonableness of the hours, “trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

“In determining a fee's reasonableness, the court may also consider whether the motion itself is reasonable, both in terms of (1) the amount of fees requested and (2) the credibility of the supporting evidence.” (Guillory v. Hill (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 802, 811.)

The court may make a downward adjustment if the billing entries are vague, “blockbilled,” or unnecessary. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 441.)

It is within the court’s discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were “reasonably spent” on the litigation. (Meister v. Regents of Univ. of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.)

A trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees, as an experienced trial judge is in the best position to decide the value of professional services rendered in court. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)