BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al.

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

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CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Hilton and McCullah’s motion to compel the arbitration of plaintiff Bibbs’ causes of action asserted against them and to stay these judicial proceedings against them is ruled on as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the specific issues identified below that will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Factual Background

Plaintiff Bibbs filed this action on 4/18/2025 action against his former employer, Raising Cane’s USA, LLC, and two of the latter’s employees, defendants Hilton and McCullah, with the former alleged to be a “Regional Human Resources Manager” and the latter alleged to be a “Human Resources employee.” (Compl., ¶¶3-4.) Plaintiff’s complaint asserts multiple causes of action including wrongful termination, retaliation, violation of various Labor Code provisions, and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Notably, these last two tort claims are alleged against “all defendants,” while each of the preceding causes of action is alleged only against Raising Cane’s. (See Compl., p.17:13; p.18:22.)

In September 2025, defendant Raising Cane’s filed a motion to compel arbitration of all causes of action alleged by plaintiff Bibbs based on the latter’s agreements to arbitrate employment-related claims, and on 12/2/2025, that motion to compel was granted. However, the Court denied the motion without prejudice as to defendants Hilton and McCullah for several reasons, including that the Notice of Motion stated the motion was brought solely by defendant Raising Cane’s and the individual defendants had not yet appeared in this action, did not satisfy the requirements of Local Rule 2.09, and did not file any supporting declarations indicating their desire to arbitrate the claims against them.

Moving Papers. Defendants Hilton and McCullah now move to compel to arbitration of those causes of action alleged against them on the grounds that plaintiff Bibbs agreed to arbitrate all employment-related disputes with his former employer, Raising Cane’s, as well as these “Individual Defendants on three separate occasions” (i.e., 2022, 2023, 2025), as confirmed by the Court’s 12/2/2025 ruling and plaintiff filed this civil action

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

against them for employment-related claims in contravention of his agreements which are “valid, binding, and legally enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act” (“FAA”). (See generally, Not. of Mot., p.2:10-25.) Among other things, the moving points & authorities indicate that this motion is primarily based on the most recent of the three arbitration agreements (i.e., 2025) (Mov. MPA, p.7, Fn. 2) and contend (1) this 2025 arbitration agreement contains a “delegation” clause which vests in the arbitrator “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or waiver” of the agreements; (2) the FAA requires enforcement of this “delegation” clause; (3) the moving parties here may enforce the 2025 arbitration agreement as third-party beneficiaries and on principles of equitable estoppel; and (4) the 2025 arbitration agreement is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that the moving defendants “are nonsignatories to the Arbitration Agreement” and they cannot compel arbitration of the two tort claims against them pursuant to the “delegation” clause, a third-party beneficiary theory or equitable estoppel. First, a delegation clause “binds only the parties who agreed to it” (i.e., plaintiff and defendant Raising Cane’s) and the question of whether a nonsignatory may invoke a delegation clause is in the “absen[ce of] clear and unmistakable evidence that the signatory agreed to arbitrate arbitrability with that nonsignatory,” for the Court to decide but defendants failed to present such evidence.

Second, moving defendants are not third-party beneficiaries because “a boilerplate list naming every conceivable category of agent and employee does not establish that benefiting [sic] the Individual Defendants was a motivating purpose of the Agreement” and “any ambiguity is construed against the drafter, Defendant Raising Cane’s.” Finally, “equitable estoppel does not apply” because plaintiff’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress “arise from tort duties that exist independently of the Arbitration Agreement, and Plaintiff does not rely on the Agreement’s terms to bring those claims.”

Relevant Legal Principles

Under California law, arbitration must be compelled where there is a valid, binding arbitration agreement unless the opposing party proves the agreement is unenforceable on unconscionability or other grounds. (See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 96-100, 114; Gatton v. T-Mobile USA (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579.) In fact, Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2 specifically provides in pertinent part:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or

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25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Section 2 of the FAA is essentially the same:

A written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Underline added for emphasis.)

California has a public policy that encourages arbitrations, and arbitration clauses have been repeatedly enforced. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [the California Supreme Court stated this state has a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 707 [California’s statutory scheme “evidence[s] a strong public policy in favor of arbitrations [as a] favored method of resolving disputes”]; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 771, 775; Berman v. Dean Witter Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003; Greenfield v. Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “In a petition to compel arbitration, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] The party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense, including that an arbitration provision is invalid or otherwise not enforceable.” (Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 325.)

Nonsignatories generally may not compel contractual arbitration. (See, e.g., JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-1237.) However, there are clear exceptions where arbitration agreements may be enforced by a nonsignatory, but a non-party must show some basis for extending the agreement to them. (See, e.g., Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1728.) Further, according to binding precedent from the Third District Court of Appeal, there are at least six (6) different theories by which a non-signatory may be bound to arbitrate: (1) Incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing or alter ego; (5) estoppel; and (6) third-party beneficiary. (Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 834, 840-841 (citing Suh v. Superior Court (2010)

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25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

181 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1513).) A “third party” non-signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement through the grounds available under state law, such as agency, alter ego, or intended benefit. (See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle (2009) 556 U.S. 624, 631.) Under California law, a nonsignatory may seek to enforce an arbitration agreement based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (See, e.g., Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696 [claims asserted against nonsignatory “intimately intertwined” with contract containing arbitration clause].) Whether a nonsignatory may ultimately be entitled to enforce an arbitration agreement “is a question of state law.” (Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1332 (aff’d in Ford Motor Company Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122.)

Discussion

Unlike the typical motion to compel, there is in this instance no genuine dispute over the existence of an agreement by plaintiff in 2025 to arbitrate, its enforceability, whether it encompasses the causes of action alleged by plaintiff and/or the application of the FAA given that each of these issues was previously determined by the Court in its 12/2/2025 ruling on defendant Raising Cane’s own motion to compel arbitration. That 2025 agreement to arbitrate provides in pertinent part:

COVERED CLAIMS/DISPUTES Except as otherwise provided, this Agreement applies to any and all disputes, past, present or future, that arise from or relate to your employment and/or separation of employment with Employer. This Agreement applies to a covered dispute that arises from or relates to your employment and/or separation of employment that Employer may have against you or that you may have against Employer or its officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, managers, agents, successors, assigns, and future affiliates; each and all of which or whom may enforce this Agreement as a direct or third-party beneficiary.

Additionally, the arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or waiver of this Agreement. However, the preceding sentence does not apply to any disputes concerning the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, and it does not apply to the Class Action Waiver, California PAGA Individual Action Requirement, or MAD Procedures (Wynn Decl., Ex. C, p.1 (underline added for emphasis).)

As noted above, defendants Hilton and McCullah are moving to compel arbitration pursuant to the plaintiff’s 2025 agreement based on the “delegation” clause, a third-party

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

beneficiary theory and equitable estoppel, with the opposition disputing all three grounds. Each will now be addressed.

“Delegation” Clause. According to the defendants, the subject arbitration agreement expressly covers any dispute arising from or related to plaintiff’s employment with Raising Cane’s and/or separation from such employment and includes all such claims plaintiff may have against Raising Cane’s “or its officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, managers, agents ” Defendants Hilton and McCullah clearly fall within the scope of this latter provision insofar as plaintiff’s own complaint expressly alleges the former is a “Regional Human Resources Manager” of Raising Cane’s and the latter is a “Human Resources employee” of Raising Cane’s (Compl., ¶¶3-4) and the allegations of the complaint likewise leave no reasonable doubt that the final two causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress alleged against these two defendants arise from and relate to plaintiff’s employment with Raising Cane’s and his separation therefrom.

Indeed, these two tort causes of action actually allege that the conduct on which they are based is attributable equally to all three defendants without any differentiation between or among them. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶113 [“the acts described above constitute extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendants and each of them”]; 115 [“Through the outrageous conduct described above, Defendants intended to cause or with reckless disregard cause[d] Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress”]; 118 [“As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ intentional acts and conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer ”]; 123 [Defendants conducted themselves negligently in violation of public policy and applicable law and Defendants failure to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation constitute extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendants, and each of them”]; 124 [“As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligent acts and conduct, and Defendants’ negligent failure to act, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer ’]; 125 [“The acts of Defendants as alleged herein, were done with oppression and malice ”].)

Thus, plaintiff’s claims directed at the individuals moving to compel arbitration here are on their face encompassed by the plain language of the subject arbitration agreement which plaintiff was previously found to have entered into in 2025.

Additionally, aside from arbitration agreement expressly stating that its provisions may be enforced by Raising Cane’s “officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, managers, agents, successors, assigns, and future affiliates” against whom plaintiff has an employment-related claim, the subject agreement does vest “the arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency,” with “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or waiver of this Agreement.” This “delegation” clause was specifically addressed by the Court in its 12/2/2025 ruling on defendant Raising Cane’s own motion to compel in connection with the latter’s assertion that “the Court may not consider Plaintiff’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

argument that the agreement is unconscionable because the arbitration agreements gives [sic] the arbitrator exclusive authority to determine whether the agreements are unconscionable.” There, the Court explained:

The “question of who would decide the unconscionability of an arbitration provision is not one that the parties would likely focus upon in contracting[.]” (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 213 Cal.App.4th 771, 782.) Thus, “the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is ordinarily to be determined by the court.” (Id. at p. 781.) However, the parties may delegate issues of enforceability, including unconscionability, to the arbitrator. (Ibid.) To be effective, a delegation must be clear and unmistakable. (Ibid; Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v.

Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 79.) “‘There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be effective. First, the language of the clause must be clear and unmistakable. [Citation.] Second, the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’” (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 892.) Absent a challenge specifically to a delegation clause, a clear and unmistakable delegation clause must be enforced. (Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 888; Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 72.)

Subject to exceptions for certain types of disputes not at issue here, the arbitration agreement states: “Additionally, the arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or waiver of this Agreement.” (Wynne [sic] Decl., Exh. C.) (12/2/2025 Ruling, p.4.)

The Court thereafter determined the aforementioned “delegation” clause was not only sufficiently “clear and unmistakable” (citing inter alia Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at 71; Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 888; Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at 892) but also was not unenforceable on grounds of unconscionability. (See, 12/2/2025 Ruling, pp.4-5.) Having concluded the 2025 agreement’s “delegation” clause was enforceable, the Court declined to rule on the opposition’s generalized arguments that the 2025 arbitration agreement was as a whole unenforceable due to unconscionability and instead left this for determination by the arbitrator.

This Court finds no sufficient legal or factual justification for reaching a different conclusion here. First, as before, the opposition proffers no evidence or other legal argument that tends to show the aforementioned “delegation” clause either is not “clear and unmistakable” or is unenforceable due to unconscionability. As noted in the 12/2/2025 Ruling, plaintiff’s failure to address or oppose a particular point raised by the moving papers is construed as a concession on the merits of such point. (See, e.g., D.I.

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25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, n.4.) Thus, as before, the “delegation” clause vests the arbitrator with “the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or waiver” and thereby limiting this Court’s consideration with respect to such issues.

Accordingly, the above-cited “delegation” clause remains enforceable here and because the individual moving defendants are on their face either “employees” or “agents” (if not “managers”) of Raising Cane’s within the meaning of the subject arbitration agreement who are expressly vested with the right to enforce such agreement (see, Wynn Decl., Ex. C, p.1, “Covered Claims/Disputes,” ¶1, last sentence), moving defendants are entitled to have any further dispute over enforceability, interpretation, applicability, etc. of the agreement resolved by the arbitrator rather than by this Court.

In an attempt to escape the effect of the “delegation” clause, the Court has previously found to be enforceable in this case, plaintiff cites here Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp. (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3d 1122, but his reliance on Kramer is unavailing. First, this decision by the Ninth Circuit is not binding on this Court and thus, Kramer does not compel the result plaintiff seeks. Secondly, plaintiff has misconstrued the pertinent aspects Kramer. While the opposition suggests the Ninth Circuit held that a nonsignatory may not invoke a “delegation” clause against a signatory who never agreed to arbitrate anything with such nonsignatory (Opp., p.3:21-p.4:7), Kramer merely considered whether the district court had authority to decide if a nonsignatory (Toyota) to the underlying Purchase Agreements which contained an arbitration provision can compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims and on appeal, Toyota argued that because the Purchase Agreements expressly provide that the arbitrator shall decide issues of interpretation, scope, and applicability of the arbitration provision, the arbitrator should decide the issue of whether a nonsignatory may compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate. (Kramer, at 1126-1127.)

The Court of Appeal ultimately rejected this contention because “the arbitration agreements do not contain clear and unmistakable evidence that Plaintiffs and Toyota agreed to arbitrate arbitrability” and “[w]hile Plaintiffs may have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability in a dispute with the Dealerships, the terms of the arbitration clauses are expressly limited to Plaintiffs and the Dealerships.” (Id., at 1127.) “Given the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence that Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate arbitrability with nonsignatories, the district court had the authority to decide whether the instant dispute is arbitrable.” (Id.)

The foregoing analysis is inapposite to the case at bar since, as explained above, plaintiff has already been found to have agreed to arbitrate his employment-related claims as against not only Raising Cane’s itself but also “its officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, managers, agents ” and vests this latter array of individuals with the express right to enforce the 2025 arbitration agreement as either “a direct or third-party beneficiary.” Thus, coupled with the Court’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

finding in the 12/2/2025 Ruling and above that the 2025 agreement contains an enforceable “clear and unmistakable” delegation clause, the passage from Kramer on which plaintiff relies ultimately has no bearing on the disposition of the present motion. For these reasons, moving defendants are entitled to an order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against them (although plaintiff remains free to argue during the course of that arbitration that his claims against moving defendants are not subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to any agreement).

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further, but it does so in order to identify an additional separate and distinct ground for granting this motion.

Third-Party Beneficiary. Moving defendants also insist they are entitled to invoke the arbitration provision found in the subject 2025 agreement (as well as the predecessor agreements in 2022 and 2023) on a third-party beneficiary theory. The opposition counters, claiming that a third-party beneficiary must three specific elements (s/he would benefit from the contract; a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party; and permitting enforcement by the third party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties (citing Goonewardene v.

ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830)), but the moving defendants “fail to establish the second and third elements.” (Opp., p.4:8- p.5:7.) More specifically, according to plaintiff, “[a] boilerplate list encompassing every conceivable person connected to Defendant Raising Cane’s does not establish that benefiting [sic] the Individual Defendants was a motivating purpose of the contracting parties, nor does it show that compelling arbitration of independent tort claims by individual employees falls within the parties’ reasonable expectations or serves the contract’s objectives.” (Id., at p.4:26-p.5:4.)

The Court disagrees with the opposition’s contentions relating to the second and third prerequisites for finding a third-party beneficiary. The California Supreme Court explained in Goonewardene that the second element requires the contracting parties to have a “motivating purpose to benefit the third party, and not simply knowledge that a benefit to the third party may follow from the contract.” (Goonewardene, at 830.) The 2025 arbitration agreement at issue here meets this standard insofar its express language clarifies not only that it requires arbitration of plaintiff’s employment-related claims against Raising Cane’s itself as well as “its officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, managers, agents ” but also identifies this latter array of individuals as “a direct or third-party beneficiary” with an explicit right to enforce this agreement.

Based on this plain language, it cannot be reasonably disputed that the signatories thereto manifested an objective intent to benefit such “officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, managers, agents,” going well beyond mere knowledge that some benefit might “follow from the contract.” Consequently, coupled with the fact that the opposition includes neither

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

reasoned, substantial argument nor pertinent legal authorities tending to show why the second element is lacking (see, e.g., Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1008 [“failure to offer reasoned analysis of the issue constitutes a waiver”]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [when party fails to support assertion with reasoned argument and citations to authority, point is treated as waived]), the Court finds that the second element needed by a third-party beneficiary has been satisfied.

The same is true for the third element. Plaintiff’s suggestion that there has been no showing that compelling arbitration of his two tort causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress falls within the parties’ reasonable expectations or serves the contract’s objectives (Opp., p.5:1-3) defies logic. As already cited, the subject agreement expressly and fundamentally provides for arbitration of plaintiff’s employment-related claims which are brought against Raising Cane’s itself and/or against “its officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, managers, agents ” and especially relevant here, where all of the causes of action currently alleged against Raising Cane’s itself have already been ordered to arbitration, it stands to reason that an order compelling arbitration of two of those causes of action which are also directed against the two moving defendants would likewise not only be within the parties’ reasonable expectations but also serve the contract’s objectives.

Reinforcing this conclusion is the fact that the two tort causes of action alleged against moving defendants are also alleged against Raising Cane’s itself and the conduct on which these causes of action are based are attributable indivisibly to all three defendants without any differentiation between or among them. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶113 [“the acts described above constitute extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendants and each of them”]; 115 [“Through the outrageous conduct described above, Defendants intended to cause or with reckless disregard cause[d] Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress”]; 118 [“As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ intentional acts and conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer ”]; 123 [Defendants conducted themselves negligently in violation of public policy and applicable law and Defendants failure to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation constitute extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendants, and each of them”]; 124 [“As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligent acts and conduct, and Defendants’ negligent failure to act, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer ’]; 125 [“The acts of Defendants as alleged herein, were done with oppression and malice ”].) Because the Court has already ordered plaintiff to pursue these intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action against defendant Raising Cane’s via arbitration, requiring plaintiff to pursue the same claims as against defendants Hilton and McCullah would be consistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations and also serve the arbitration agreement’s stated objectives.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009408: BIBBS vs RAISING CANES USA LLC, et al. 07/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16D

Consequently, moving defendants are entitled to an order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against them and the Court need not proceed to consider the parties’ remaining arguments pertaining to equitable estoppel.

However, it is worth adding here that defendants Hilton and McCullah are also independently entitled to enforce the subject arbitration agreement executed by plaintiff and Raising Cane’s under an agency theory since these two individual defendants are in the complaint expressly alleged to be a manager and an employee of Raising Cane’s and since the current allegations of the two emotional distress causes of action make clear they could not have engaged in such allegedly tortious conduct without actually being an agent and/or employee of plaintiff’s employer, Raising Cane’s. (See, e.g., RN Solution, Inc. v.

Catholic Healthcare West (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1520 [nonsignatory alleged to be “managing agent and vice-president of human resources within the company is also bound by the arbitration agreement and entitled to enforce it]; Harris v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 475, 478 [employee of corporation that is party to arbitration agreement is bound by agreement]; Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418 [“[i]f, as the complaint alleges, the individual defendants, though not signatories, were acting as agents for the Rams, then they are entitled to the benefit of the arbitration provisions”].)

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendants Hilton and McCullah’s current motion to compel arbitration of all claims now alleged against them in plaintiff Bibbs’ complaint in this action is GRANTED and accordingly, all judicial proceedings in this action are hereby STAYED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1281.4 pending completion of arbitration.

Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312, moving defendants to prepare a revised proposed order for the Court’s consideration.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)