DOE v. CABRILLO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JULY 28, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

Plaintiff moves to vacate the order of dismissal on the grounds of faulty service, and in the alternative, for reconsideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order (extended for service) and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, a party may make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1008, 1013.)1

The legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered, and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) The burden under section 1008 “is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at [the hearing].” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) A party seeking reconsideration based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law must provide a satisfactory explanation for not presenting it earlier. (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.)

III. DISCUSSION

The vexatious litigant statute makes clear that dismissal is automatic unless the plaintiff within 10 days of the filing of the notice obtains an order from the presiding judge permitting the filing of the litigation. (§ 391.7, subd. (c).) Yakovlev failed to apply for such an order. (Dismissal Order, at p. 5.) Plaintiff concedes he did not file for such an order. (Motion, at p. 10.)

As for plaintiff’s argument that he was not properly served, this Court has already found that service was proper. To reiterate, plaintiff consented to electronic service. An unrepresented party may expressly consent to receive electronic service either by serving notice on all parties and filing the notice with the court or manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court’s electronic filing service provider and concurrently providing the party’s electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. (§ 1010.6; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251.) A party “may withdraw consent at any time by completing and filing with the court the appropriate Judicial Council form.” (§ 1010.6.)

Plaintiff gave affirmative consent to electronic service by expressly requesting Cabrillo send all service and communications to his email address. (Matsuhara Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Plaintiff also chose electronic service for his filings with this Court. Only after service of the Vexatious

1 All future statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise stated.

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JULY 28, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

Litigant Notice did plaintiff withdraw his consent to electronic service, despite continuing to serve defendant electronically, while simultaneously forcing defendant to effect service at an undeliverable address. (Matsuhara Decl., ¶¶ 5-7, Ex. D.)

As for reconsideration, plaintiff’s motion is based entirely on his argument that this Court failed to rule on his request for accommodation (“decide all pending motions on the written papers without oral hearing”), constituting a new fact and reversible error. The Court finds this argument collateral to the merits of the underlying motion, and therefore, not grounds for reconsideration. Further, plaintiff’s accommodation request was untimely, making any error harmless. (See Biscaro v. Stern (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 702, 708 [“[I]f the record before us led us to conclude that appellant had failed to satisfy the requirements of the rule and that his accommodation should have been denied as a matter of law, the trial court’s failure to rule might be considered harmless.”].)

Finally, plaintiff’s accommodation request, filed on April 20, 2026, was untimely per Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(c)(3), which requires that “[r]equests for accommodations must be made as far in advance as possible, and in any event must be made no fewer than 5 court days before the requested implementation date.” The hearing was set and held on April 24, 2026 and any accommodation request was due no later than April 17, 2026.

Plaintiff has presented no new facts, circumstances or law warranting any reconsideration of the motion.

Defendant’s requests for judicial notice are denied; the Court need not take judicial notice of records in its own file.

No. 23CV01708

SEASCAPE RESORT OWNERS’ ASSN. v. SEASCAPE RESORT, et al.

DEFENDANT SEASCAPE RESORT LTD’S DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION BY MARCIA WALLIS, MARCIA CAPORN, AND NEELU MANRAO

The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend and the motion to strike is granted. The first amended complaint in intervention by intervenors Wallis, Caporn, and Manrao is dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND AND COMPLAINT

Intervenors Marcia Wallis, Marcia Caporn, and Neelu Manrao (“Intervenors”) filed a first amended complaint in intervention (“FACI”) against Seascape Resort Ltd. (“SRL,” “Resort,” and “defendant”) which seeks seven causes of action: violation of Civil Code section 4600

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JULY 28, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

[exclusive use of common area]; breach of fiduciary duty; enforcement of governing documents (Civil Code section 5975); prescriptive easement; declaratory relief; unfair competition; and quiet title. (FACI, February 25, 2026.)

Intervenors’ substantive allegations all relate to the use of the Main and South Bluff pool recreational facilities and the prohibition of self-renting by owners. They generally allege improper self-dealing by SRL and failure to obtain the necessary votes of members for any change to the use of common areas. Essentially, Intervenors seek to unwind this Court’s Order on SRL’s motion for summary adjudication (“Order”), which resulted in the following specific declarations (relevant provisions only):

1. The Resort, as owner of Unit 85 has the exclusive right to use certain parts of the common area to the exclusion of others. The covenants and restrictions contained in the CC&Rs are enforceable equitable servitudes that bind all owners. Each owner, contract purchaser, lessee, tenant, guest, invitee or other occupant of a Unit or user of the Common Area must comply with the CC&Rs and the provisions of the Project Documents. [...] The Resort is the owner of Unit 85. Unit 85 is a commercial unit.

As the owner of Unit 85, the Resort has the exclusive use of Stair 1, Stair 2, Stair 3, the Loading Dock and all Deck and Patio Areas adjacent to the Conference Center, Unit 85, and the Pool. As owner of Unit 85, the Resort has the right to conduct general commercial activities including food and beverage service within its Exclusive Use Common Areas. The Plaintiff’s [“Association”] management of common area cannot usurp or control the exclusive use rights of the Resort over its Exclusive Use Common Area. “Exclusive Use Common Area” means that portion of the Common Area designated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the owners of the separate interests. “Commercial Unit” means Unit 85 and its Exclusive Use Common Area.

The management of Unit 85 is not vested in the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff and its Members have no authority over the operations of Unit 85.

2. The Resort, as the owner of Unit 534, has the exclusive right to use certain parts of the common area to the exclusion of others. The covenants and restrictions contained in the CC&Rs are enforceable equitable servitudes that bind all owners. Each owner, contract purchaser, lessee, tenant, guest, invitee or other occupant of a Unit or user of the Common Area must comply with the CC&Rs and the provisions of the Project Documents. [...] Properties annexed into the Project are subject to the CC&Rs and Project Documents.

Unit 534 was annexed into the Project. The Resort is the owner of Unit 534. Unit 534 is a commercial unit. As the owner of Unit 534, the Resort has the exclusive use Housekeeping Areas designated as “H-1 through H-15” in Buildings D-1 through D-15. As the owner of Unit 534, the Resort has the exclusive use of all Deck and Patio Areas adjacent to Unit 534 and the Pool and Spa for its general commercial