MUMAH vs THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

He then identified and marked the arresting officer's sworn statement, the chemical test results, the arrest report, and 26CV164749: MUMAH vs THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 07/23/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate CRS# A-164749-001 in Department 20 Petitioner's driving record. (AR 2 [p. 8:18 - p. 9:4].) Petitioner's counsel renewed her continuance objection "for lack of good cause," asserting it was "the DMV's burden to prove the hearing issue" and since "the DMV did not have evidence... therefore, at that time, should've dismissed the case." (AR 2 [p. 9:17 – 9:20].)

Officer Huang overruled the continuance objection as previously decided and admitted the exhibits over the remaining objections. (AR 2 [p. 14:20 - p. 15:8].) On December 20, 2025, the DMV issued its Notice of Findings and Decision sustaining the suspension of Petitioner's driver's license effective December 29, 2025. (AR 12.) Petitioner seeks review on two grounds: that (1) Hearing Officer Huang denied him a fair hearing by abandoning his role as adjudicator and acting as an advocate for the DMV; and (2) the continuance was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

STANDARD OF REVIEW Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 governs judicial review of the DMV's final decision suspending Petitioner's license. Because a driver's license is a fundamental vested right, the Court exercises its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence supporting that decision. (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456.) Under section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the “[i]nquiry ... shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Abuse of discretion is established if “the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Id.)

A fair hearing requires a decisionmaker who is not also an advocate for one side. But administrative due process is “more relaxed than in judicial proceedings,” and combining investigative and adjudicative functions in a single agency does not, by itself, create an unacceptable risk of bias. (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 220-221.) Whether a hearing officer crossed from adjudicator into advocate is a question of procedural fairness that the Court reviews de novo. (Knudsen v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 210.) The Court of Appeal has addressed the advocate-adjudicator question in Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 473, review granted May 13, 2026, and Romane v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1002, review granted August 13, 2025, both now pending before the California Supreme Court. The Court cites both only for their persuasive value and notes the grants of review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1).)

ANALYSIS

I. PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED A NEUTRAL ADJUDICATOR Petitioner contends Officer Huang crossed from adjudicator to advocate when he continued the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV164749: MUMAH vs THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 07/23/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate CRS# A-164749-001 in Department 20 November 25 hearing, on his own motion, to obtain the arresting officer's report the DMV had not yet produced. However, this theory is not supported by the governing case law or the record. An adjudicator is presumed capable of deciding a case fairly, and that presumption yields only to “specific circumstances that demonstrate a constitutionally intolerable possibility that [the decisionmaker] harbored an interest in the outcome of the case.” (Chi, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 486–487.)

The overlap of investigative and adjudicative functions within a single agency employee is not, by itself, enough to establish a due process violation. (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 221; see Romane v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1013, review granted.) The line is crossed only where the record shows the hearing officer “actually acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate,” as opposed to “merely act[ing] as an adjudicator and a collector and developer of evidence.” (Knudsen v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 193.) The Courts of Appeal applying that functional test are somewhat split — some finding the hearing officer acted as an advocate, others finding only the permissible collection and development of evidence — and two of those decisions are now pending review before the Supreme Court. That split does not affect the outcome here. Each decision applies the same test, and under it the record in this case shows no advocacy, as explained below.

The Court therefore need not resolve the conflict now pending before the Supreme Court; its ruling would be the same under either line of authority. In Romane, the Court of Appeal rejected a due process challenge similar to that presented here, holding that “where a hearing officer merely introduces the documents that law enforcement duly forwarded to the DMV, which are routinely admitted into evidence at APS hearings, the officer is merely collecting and developing evidence, not advocating for the DMV.” (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018, review granted; accord Chi, supra, at pp. 486-487, review granted [no due process violation found where the hearing officer admitted the DMV's evidence (the arresting officer's sworn statement, the arrest report, and body-camera footage) over the driver's objections, asked no cross-examining questions, and the driver testified only in response to his own counsel].)

By contrast, a due process violation was found where the hearing officer personally offered the DMV's exhibits into evidence, overruled the driver's objections to them, and then "rigorously cross-examin[ed]" him — pressing the same disputed point and interrupting his answers, conduct that drew his own counsel's objection that she was advocating. (Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1277.) A decision not under review has applied the same test and found no violation on facts materially like these, where the hearing officer did no more than admit the routine documents. (Kazelka v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1255-1256.) Under these authorities, Hearing Officer Huang did not cross the line from adjudicator to advocate on the record before the Court. He opened the December 17 session by reaffirming that he was a “neutral fact finder” who was “prohibited from and will not act as an advocate for the DMV or law enforcement.” (AR 2 [p. 7].) The exhibits he then admitted — the arresting officer's

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV164749: MUMAH vs THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 07/23/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate CRS# A-164749-001 in Department 20 sworn statement, the chemical test results, the arrest report, and Petitioner's driving record — are the documents routinely admitted into evidence at APS hearings. (AR 2 [p. 8:18 - 9:4].) The hearing officer did not examine Petitioner and he did not argue with counsel. Nothing in the record resembles the cross-examination found problematic in Clarke.

Petitioner's arguments to the contrary appear to depend in part on a truncated quotation of the hearing officer’s comments. Petitioner emphasizes the hearing officer’s statement, overruling Petitioner’s objection to the continuance, as follows: “overruled because I don't have enough evidence.” (Reply at p. 2:16–2:17, quoting AR 1) However, Officer Huang stated that he did not “have enough evidence that this so to conduct -- and so the hearing yet.” (AR 1 [p. 2:9 – 2:12].) The full statement shows Hearing Officer Huang explaining that he lacked the arresting officer’s report he needed to proceed.

Such language is that of a “collector and developer of evidence,” not of an advocate. (Knudsen, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at 193.) The Legislature has expressly contemplated that evidence may be gathered after an APS hearing is underway: “After the hearing has commenced, the department, if it is hearing the case, or the hearing officer sitting alone, or the hearing board, may issue subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum, or both.” (Veh. Code, § 14104.5(a).) The authority to compel evidence after commencement “logically includes the ability to grant continuances to accomplish that objective.” (Bussard v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 858, 866.)

II. The Continuance Was Not a Prejudicial Abuse of Discretion Petitioner contends that the hearing officer’s decision to grant a continuance outside the parameters of Government Code section 11524, subdivision (b), which governs party requests for continuances, was an abuse of discretion. But subdivision (a) authorizes the agency to grant continuances for good cause, and a continuance may be granted on the hearing officer’s own motion. (Gov. Code, § 11524, subd. (a); Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.)

Petitioner’s reliance on subdivision (b)’s ten-working-day window, which by its terms governs a party’s application, is therefore misplaced. A hearing officer's decision to grant a continuance is committed to broad discretion, and “such decisions will be upheld unless a clear abuse is shown, amounting to a miscarriage of justice.” (Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.) Procedural error alone is not a ground for relief; the abuse must be prejudicial. (Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 865.)

The DMV knew before November 25 that its evidence was incomplete: its records requests to the CHP, dated November 4 and November 24, 2025, sought the Officer's Statement, the test results, and the Arrest/Supplemental Report. (AR 10; AR 11.) However, the Court need not decide whether that sequence reflects a lack of diligence under section 11524(b), because a lack of diligence alone is not prejudice. (Id.) Petitioner has identified no prejudice, and none appears in this record. His license suspension was stayed throughout the one-month continuance (AR 1 [p. 3:19 – 3:22].) and, like the driver in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV164749: MUMAH vs THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 07/23/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate CRS# A-164749-001 in Department 20 Bussard, Petitioner “ultimately received a fair hearing.” (Id.) Accordingly, the continuance was not a prejudicial abuse of discretion and thus provides no ground for relief.

ORDER The Petition for Writ of Mandate is DENIED.

Respondent shall file a proposed form of judgment on or before July 30, 2026. A compliance hearing is set for the date and time below to confirm receipt and execution of the judgment.

Case Management Conference re submission of judgment is scheduled for 08/06/2026 at 03:00 PM in Department 20 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse.