People v. Ke “Jason” Wang et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2210

DATE: July 23, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, you must call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

9:00 A.M. LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING Line 1 20CV368215 People v. Ke “Jason” Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. Wang et al. Line 2 25CV474289 Wells Fargo Bank, Plaintiff’s motion to deem admitted requests for admission, set one. N.A. v. Adrian (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Notice is proper and the motion is Hoang unopposed. Defendant made no response to the requests for admission. On good cause shown, the motion is GRANTED and the requests for admission are deemed admitted. Plaintiff to submit proposed order listing verbatim the admissions to be admitted.

Line 3 25CV480696 Debbie Thompson v. Click LINE 3 or scroll down for ruling. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. e al. Line 4 25CV480696 Debbie Thompson v. Click LINE 3 or scroll down for ruling. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. e al. Line 5 25CV480696 Debbie Thompson v. Click LINE 3 or scroll down for ruling. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. e al.

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Calendar Line 1 Case Name: People v. Ke “Jason” Wang et al. Case No.: 20CV368215

At issue is a motion by plaintiffs the People of the State of California and the County of Santa Clara to enter judgment under the terms of a settlement agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a); unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) Notice is proper, and the motion is opposed by defendant Ke Jason Wang.

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (§ 664.6, subd. (a).) The trial court must determine whether the parties have entered into an enforceable settlement. (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) The trial court “acts as the trier of fact, determining whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.” (Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1454.)

Plaintiffs originally sued Ke Jason Wang, Chunyan “Cathy” Ge, Woodside Capital LLC, Walnut Venture LLC, Morgan Venture LLC, and Doe defendants in 2020. The complaint alleged causes of action for, among other things, public nuisance related to properties including two at issue here: 598 Palm Avenue and 0 Kalana Avenue in Morgan Hill (subject properties). (Original complaint, filed 7/9/2020.) The court issued a temporary restraining order requiring defendants to cease illegal uses of the subject properties. (TRO, 7/30/20.) The court then issued a preliminary injunction after a hearing. (Preliminary injunction, 9/25/20.)

The subject properties were subsequently sold to Farming All Industries, LLC (owned by Carmichael Jones). Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Farming All Industries, LLC and Carmichael Jones as defendants. (FAC 10/22/21.) The FAC alleged a new cause of action against defendant Ke Jason Wang and others under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Civ. Code, § 3439). (FAC, ¶ 157.) Default judgment was entered against Farming All Industries, LLC and Carmichael Jones after they failed to appear in the case. (Default judgment, 4/5/24.)

A permanent injunction was imposed against Farming All Industries, LLC and Carmichael Jones, enjoining them from illegal use of the subject properties. (Permanent injunction, 4/2/24.) A receiver was appointed in 2024 to remedy the public nuisance at the subject properties. (6/4/24 and 7/1/24 orders.) The July 2024 order found that defendant Ke Jason “Wang was the owner of the Subject Properties as of June 4, 2024.” (7/1/24 Order, p. 2:7-12.) The court takes judicial notice of the foregoing court records on its own motion. (Evid.

Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Plaintiffs’ counsel attaches to her declaration a “Stipulation and Agreement for Material Terms of Settlement,” apparently reached following a mediation in November 2024. (Brender dec. ISO motion, 6/3/26 (Brender dec.), ¶ 8; exh. 4.) The stipulation is signed by plaintiffs and defendant Ke Jason Wang (both in his individual capacity and “On behalf of the LLC Defendants.” (Exh. 4, p. 4.) The stipulation provides, “Defendants hereby agree to settle in full the claims brought by Plaintiff for a total of $1.7 million.” (Exh. 4, p. 1.) Defendants were to pay plaintiffs the following installments: $200,000 within 45 days after execution of a longform agreement; $500,000 no more than one year after the long-form agreement; and $1,000,000 no more than one year after the court dissolves the court-appointed receiver or 3

deems the receivership proceedings complete. (Exh. 4, p. 1.) The agreement indicated it did not “modify, replace, release, or offset the terms of the receivership.” (Ibid.) The parties agreed the agreement was “binding and enforceable on the Parties and their successors.” (Exh. 4, p. 3.) While the parties agreed to bear their own costs and attorney fees related to the proceedings leading to the agreement, the agreement provides: “In the event of any action or proceeding to enforce or set aside this Agreement, the prevailing party therein shall be entitled to recover all reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expenses with respect to such action or proceeding.” (Exh. 4, p. 3.)

The parties signed a “First Amendment to Stipulation and Agreement for Material Terms of Settlement” in March 2025, which stated there would be no long-form agreement. (Exh. 4, p. 6.) The installments payments would instead be based on an effective date of February 14, 2025. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that plaintiffs received $300,000 from defendants in January 2025, with plaintiffs crediting the extra $100,000 received toward the total balance owed. (Brender dec., ¶ 12.) Defendant Ke Jason Wang did not meet the February 2026 deadline to make the second payment. Defendant Ke Jason Wang informed plaintiffs via email that he believed there were “two paths forward”: either set aside the receivership, allow him to sell the subject properties, and he would agree to honor the settlement agreement; or “proceed to trial or negotiate a new settlement agreement.” (Brender dec., exh. 6, p. 3 [3/2026 email].)

The parties met and conferred. Defendant Ke Jason Wang made a $51,000 payment. And defendant Ke Jason Wang indicated he was planning to leave the United States. (Brender dec., ¶¶ 15, 16.) To date, defendant Ke Jason Wang has an overdue balance of $349,000, and will owe plaintiffs an additional $1,000,000 once the receivership proceedings are complete.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds the parties have entered into an enforceable settlement and that defendant Ke Jason Wang is in material breach of that settlement.

Defendant Ke Jason Wang does not contest the accuracy of the foregoing facts and procedural history. His opposition states, “Defendant does not dispute his obligation under the Settlement Agreement and remains fully committed to satisfying the remaining balance.” (Opposition, p. 1.) Instead, he contends reducing the settlement agreement to a judgment is “unnecessary because the County’s interests are already fully protected by the substantial real property equity, and Defendant has proposed an alternative that provides the County with adequate security while avoiding unnecessary litigation.” (Opposition, pp. 1-2.)

He proposes that plaintiffs be allowed to record a first-priority lien against the properties. But defendant already signed the stipulated agreement, which the parties agreed was “binding and enforceable on the Parties and their successors.” (Exh. 4, p. 3.) Plaintiffs are under no obligation to agree to change the terms of the agreement the parties already signed close to two years ago. Defendant’s proposal also does not take into account the receiver’s super-priority lien. The court acknowledges defendant’s argument that he has failed to make payments due to financial hardship.

But that does not provide any basis for the court to deny plaintiffs’ motion to enter judgment under the terms of the settlement agreement signed by the parties. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 [“nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon”].)

Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. The parties’ settlement agreement with first amendment (exh. 4 to the Bender dec.) contains the material terms of the judgment in this case. Defendant Ke Jason Wang is in material breach of that settlement agreement, with an overdue balance of 4

$349,000. He will also owe plaintiffs an additional $1,000,000 once the receivership proceedings are complete. And plaintiffs are the prevailing party under the attorney fee clause in the parties’ settlement agreement, meaning they will be entitled to all reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses related to this proceeding to enforce the agreement. The attorney fee issue will need to be addressed by separately noticed motion.

Plaintiffs are ordered to prepare a proposed order and proposed judgment consistent with this order. The judgment must include all terms of the parties’ settlement agreement (including the first amendment).

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