Paul Beckett et al vs Ford Motor Company et al

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 1 Honorable Eunice Lee, Presiding TBD, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113

DATE: July 23, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. and 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call the Court at (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to also let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling, in accordance with California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) and Local Rule 8D.

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS 9:00 A.M. LINE 1 22CV392899 Sierra Lumber & Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs Fence Co., Inc. vs Scroll down to Line 1 for Tentative Ruling. Aldofina Gonzalez LINE 2 24CV452583 Christopher Motion for Summary Judgment/ Adjudication Newman vs City of OFF CALENDAR. On July 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a request to dismiss San Jose California Defendant City of San Jose only. Defendant City filed this motion on et al April 30, 2026. No opposition was filed. The motion is rendered moot.

LINE 3 25CV458778 Community Demurrer Michelle Harper vs Scroll down to Line 3 for Tentative Ruling. The Salvation Army LINE 4 25CV460160 Paul Beckett et al vs Petition to Compel Arbitration Ford Motor Scroll down to Line 4 for Tentative Ruling. Company et al LINE 5 25CV464797 Rena Roman vs Petition to Compel Arbitration Hyundai Motor OFF CALENDAR. On July 17, 2026, the moving party/Hyundai Motor America, a America filed a notice to withdraw the motion as the issue is MOOT. California Corp. et al LINE 6 25CV468980 Staci Santoro vs Motion for Judgment on Pleadings Ford Motor Co. et al Scroll down to Line 6 for Tentative Ruling.

LINE 7 25CV471472 American Express Motion to Enter Judgment National Bank vs Scroll down to Line 7 for Tentative Ruling. Rizalino Leon LINE 8 25CV473890 Alpha Omega House Demurrer Corp. vs The Board Scroll down to Line 8 for Tentative Ruling. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

from FEHA as a religious organization; see also Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 135–136—“It would be unreasonable to expect employers who are expressly exempted from the FEHA ban on age discrimination to nonetheless realize that they must comply with the law from which they are exempted under pain of possible tort liability.”)

In opposition, plaintiff Harper suggests disability discrimination can be tethered to other legislative enactments apart from FEHA, but no such constitutional or statutory provisions have been alleged to be applicable or otherwise identified as being applicable in her SAC. That defendant can theoretically be liable is not the standard on a demurrer.

Plaintiff has the burden to show in what manner she can amend its complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349). In her opposition, plaintiff Harper contends she has established non-FEHA bases for her wrongful termination claim, but the court is not persuaded that plaintiff Harper has met her burden.

IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, defendant Salvation Army’s demurrer to plaintiff Harper’s SAC on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10, subd. (e)] for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

The Court will prepare the formal Order.

Calendar Line # 4 Case Name Paul Beckett et al vs Ford Motor Company et al Case No. 25CV460160 Petition to Compel Arbitration

I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Paul T. Beckett and Ann K. Beckett purchased a 2022 Ford Mustang, Vehicle Identification Number 3FMTK2R71NMA02648 (“Subject Vehicle”) in May 2022 from Cypress Coast Ford Lincoln Mercury (“Dealership”). (Complaint at ¶ 7). Plaintiffs delivered the Subject Vehicle to Dealership for substantial repair on at least one occasion. (Id. at ¶ 59). Plaintiffs allege that Dealership “breached its duty to Plaintiffs to use ordinary care and skill by failing to properly store, prepare, and repair the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.” (Id. at ¶ 61). Plaintiffs sued Dealership and Ford Motor Company in March 2025. The sole cause of action alleged against Dealership is for negligent repair.

At issue is Dealership’s petition to compel arbitration, based on the Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”) signed by Plaintiffs and Dealership when Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle. Having reviewed the language of the RISC’s arbitration provision and the circumstances of its execution, the court will grant the petition and stay the action.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Dealership maintains that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the arbitration provision based on the language itself and because the agreement affects interstate commerce. (Motion to Compel Arbitration at p. 6:24- 7:1). The arbitration provision states “[a]ny arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.” (Declaration of Trina Clayton [“Clayton Decl.”], Exh. A at p. 7). Under the FAA, the court’s role is limited to determining “(1)

whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and if it does (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” (Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130). To determine “whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists,” courts apply “ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation.” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1093 [citations omitted]; Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 1165, 1170).

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides: “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or [¶] (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.”

In determining the threshold question of whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the court employs a three-step burden shifting analysis. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere); Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060). The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the initial burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate. If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show a factual dispute regarding the agreement’s existence. If the opposing party does so, then the burden shifts back to the proponent of arbitration to show the existence of a valid agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755).

III. ANALYSIS A. A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT EXISTS

The arbitration provision in the RISC provides, in relevant part:

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, any allegation of waiver of rights under this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

(Declaration of Clayton, Exh. A at p. 7). Plaintiffs do not dispute that they signed the RISC when they purchased the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiffs signed and acknowledged the following notice of the arbitration provision: “Agreement to Arbitrate. By signing below, you agree that pursuant to the Arbitration Provision on page 7 of this contract, you or we may elect to resolve any dispute by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. See the Arbitration Provision for additional information concerning the agreement to arbitrate.” (Id. at p. 1).

The RISC further drew the arbitration provision to Plaintiffs’ attention through the following disclaimer: “. . . YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONTRACT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION PROVISION ON PAGE 7 OF THIS CONTRACT, BEFORE SIGNING BELOW.” (Id. at p. 6). Plaintiffs’ signatures on those sections of the RISC indicates express assent to the arbitration provision. (See Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 777 [“ ‘ “A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.” ’ ”]).

Plaintiffs argue Dealership failed to properly authenticate the RISC and thus failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. “The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden by attaching to the

[motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature. Alternatively, the moving party can meet is burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion.’ ” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165, internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, Dealership attached a copy of the RISC signed by Plaintiffs as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Trina Clayton. Dealership has also set forth the terms of the arbitration provision in the motion itself. (Motion to Compel Arbitration at pp. 3:18-4:11). In any event, “[f]or purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of authentication.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165-166). Dealership has shown a valid agreement to arbitrate.

B. THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT COVERS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS Here, the arbitration provision broadly applies to “[a]ny claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise. . ., between you and us. . ., which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship.” (Declaration of Clayton, Exh. A at p. 7). Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action against Dealership is a tort action for negligent repair.

Plaintiffs and Dealership are the parties to the transaction. Plaintiffs’ action relates to the condition of the vehicle, namely the condition of the vehicle following repair by Dealership. That the allegedly negligent repair occurred after the parties signed the RISC is ultimately irrelevant because the arbitration provision states it applies to both “this contract” and “any resulting transaction or relationship” between the parties. Plaintiffs’ claim against Dealership is covered by the arbitration provision.

Plaintiffs rely on Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122 to argue “warranty performance is not arbitrable through the form Sales Contract proffered by [Dealership].” (Opposition at p. 2:8-10). That opinion is distinguishable. Ford Motor Warranty Cases involved an attempt by an automobile manufacturer to compel arbitration based on a sales contract between a buyer and a dealership to which the manufacturer was not a party. The Supreme Court rejected the manufacturer’s attempt to compel arbitration on a third party equitable estoppel theory. (Id. at p. 1126). By contrast, here the entity petitioning to compel arbitration is a party to the contract containing the arbitration provision. The RISC is an agreement Plaintiffs entered into with Dealership. As the dealership and a party to the agreement, Dealership may compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims.

The court does not reach Dealership’s arguments about lack of waiver and lack of unconscionability. Plaintiffs forfeited any argument about waiver and unconscionability by not addressing Dealership’s arguments on those points.

C. THE ACTION IS STAYED IN ITS ENTIRETY Dealership requests a stay of the entire action. As Dealership notes, Plaintiffs have sued two entities, Ford Motor Company and Dealership, for different causes of action. Dealership argues “[p]roceeding against both defendants in separate forums carries an extremely high risk of rendering inconsistent rulings and rendering arbitration as to [Dealership] ineffective.” (Reply at pp. 8:28-9:1). Plaintiffs have not offered any arguments opposing a stay to the entire action. A stay of these proceedings is proper under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4 and 9 U.S.C. § 3. The court STAYS this action in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.

IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the petition to compel arbitration is GRANTED. This action is STAYED in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.

The Court will prepare the formal Order.

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