Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
Plaintiff shall conduct new, limited discovery as delineated above.
The Court continues the hearing on the Anti-SLAPP and the Motion to expunge lis pendens until January 20, 2027. Opposition and reply deadlines will be per code tracking the new hearing date.
Plaintiff shall serve notice of this Order.
5. 2024-1404974 Plaintiff Daisy Singson’s motion for attorney fees and costs against SINGSON vs. Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC is granted in JAGUAR part as set forth below. LAND ROVER NORTH Plaintiff is awarded fees in the total amount of $42,134.18. AMERICA, LLC Plaintiff obtained a settlement against Defendant for the repurchase of her vehicle.
Based on this, Plaintiff seeks attorney fees in the amount of $52,567.86 plus a 1.2 multiplier for a total of $62,130.08.
It is within the court’s discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were “reasonably spent” on the litigation. (Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) Additionally, a trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees, as an experienced trial judge is in the best position to decide [the] value of professional services rendered in court. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Med.
Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal.Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing rates ranged from $430-$625. (Diamse Decl., ¶ 76.) Based on the billing records (Ex. A), there were very few entries reflecting rates of over $500.
The Court thus finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates are reasonable, especially given the allocation of work noted above. In determining this, the Court took into account the relative experience of counsel, the legal questions presented, nature of Plaintiff’s claims, and skill of representation.
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Based on counsel’s billing statements, the Court finds that $42,134.18 is a reasonable amount of attorney fees in this matter and awards this amount.
In reaching this number, the Court deducted the time spent on prelitigation tasks, some duplicative tasks, research on law that should already be known, and a motion that was never filed.
The Court declines to award a multiplier, as it does not find that the issues in this matter were novel or difficult at all. (See Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 819.) A fee enhancement is entirely discretionary. (See Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247-48.)
Plaintiff is additionally awarded her costs in the amount of $4,755.68, as these are not challenged by Defendant.
Plaintiff shall give notice of the ruling.
6. 2025-1536771 Petitioner Mary Nguyen’s motion for or preliminary injunction is Nguyen vs. denied. [ROA #72.] Coast Community Legal Standard College District Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a)(3) provides that an injunction may be granted: “When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.” See San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442, and Rutter, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Section 9:528. The purpose of Section 526(a)(3) is to preserve the status quo pending litigation. See, Stockton v. Newman (1957) 148 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563.
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and (2) the threat of irreparable injury. See Jessen v. Keystone Savings and Loan Assoc. (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 454, 459. If plaintiff fails to establish either element, a preliminary injunction should be denied. Id.
To establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the moving party must present evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the merits. This is customarily done by affidavits or declarations, although a verified complaint and other discovery can be considered. See Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 512, 527, and Rutter, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Section 9:574 to 9:581.
In addition, the moving party also has the burden of showing that irreparable harm will be suffered if the injunction is not issued. See,