CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

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26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff/cross-defendant Craig’s special anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint filed by defendant/cross-complainant Simply Appliances, Inc. (“SAI”) is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing party of the specific causes of action that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Factual Background

Plaintiff Craig filed on 3/4/2026 a complaint against defendant SAI, alleging causes of action for breach of a commercial lease agreement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, waste and nuisance. Among other things, the complaint alleges that defendant SAI “caused hazardous substances and nuisances to be present on the premises, in violation of the lease;” failed to timely pay rent as required under the lease; and ultimately vacated the premises prior to the lease expiration date. (Compl., ¶¶21-36.)

On 4/13/2026, defendant SAI filed an answer to complaint along with a verified crosscomplaint against plaintiff Craig. The latter pleading asserts the following causes of action: Breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; constructive eviction; wrongful retention of security deposit; retaliatory eviction; and violation of Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq.

Moving Papers. Plaintiff/cross-defendant Craig now moves pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §425.16 to strike defendant SAI’s cross-complaint on the grounds its causes of action “fall squarely within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivisions (b) and (e)(4)” because SAI “relies on Craig’s service of three-day notices to quit and service of pre-litigation letters as a basis for each of these claims and thus constitute protected activity.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:7-13.) Plaintiff Craig further insists that defendant SAI cannot “prove a probability of success on the merits of their [sic]

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

claims because the litigation privilege bars the claims at issue and [SAI] cannot make the requisite showing that it can prove all elements of its claims.” (Id., at p.2:13-17.) Although the Notice of Motion opens with a statement that plaintiff Craig is here seeking an order striking the cross-complaint of defendant SAI, footnotes in both the Notice of Motion and moving Points & Authorities indicate this motion is actually not directed at one of the cross-complaint’s causes of action, the fifth for wrongful retention of security deposit.

Filed in support of the moving papers is a declaration by plaintiff Craig and another by his counsel.

Opposition. Defendant SAI opposes, arguing that this “special motion to strike turns the anti-SLAPP statute upside down” because the cross-complaint “does not seek to punish Mr. Craig for going to court” but rather merely “seeks redress for what he did before he served any notice or filed any lawsuit,” including “a two-day parking-lot renovation that locked [SAI’s] employees out of the leased Premises without the prior notice Section 32 of the Lease required; he refused to account for or return the $6,378.84 security deposit; he extracted an additional deposit under economic duress; and ignored repeated requests for common-area (CAM) reconciliations.” (Opp., p.2:3- 10.)

The opposition maintains that such conduct amounts to “ordinary breaches of a commercial lease, not acts of petition or free speech” and plaintiff Craig’s subsequent three-day notices, prelitigation communications, and filing this lawsuit “do[] not convert [SAI’s] contract, quiet-enjoyment, good-faith, constructive-eviction, security-deposit, and unfair-competition claims into a SLAPP.” (Id., at p.2:10-15.) Citing Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, defendant SAI asserts that a claim may be struck under the anti-SLAPP statute “only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted” and because plaintiff Craig cannot carry his threshold burden as to even one cause of action, this motion must be denied in its entirety without reaching the second step relating to the “minimal merit” of the causes of action. (Id., at p.2:15-24.)

Although the opposing memorandum of points & authorities references at Page 8:10-11 a declaration by Rachel Mozingo, the Court finds no such declaration on file and no such declaration is referenced in the proof of service filed by defendant SAI on 7/8/2026.

Anti-SLAPP Statute

Code of Civil Procedure §425.16(a) states in its entirety:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Subdivision (b)(1) then provides that “[a] cause of action arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Importantly, subdivision (e) clarifies the preceding provision with the following definitions:

As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

Anti-SLAPP motions are analyzed in two steps. First, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘arise from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) The court must determine whether the moving party has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity: An act or acts taken ‘in furtherance of the [party’s] right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute. [Citation omitted.]” (Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 506, 517-518.)

The moving party’s burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis of showing that a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

claim arises from protected activity is “not always easily met.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) To satisfy this burden, a moving party must identify allegations of an activity that is in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech as expansively defined by the anti-SLAPP statute and thus, a “‘protected activity’” under the statute. (Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 760 & fn. 11.) The moving party also must show that the claim at issue ‘arises from’ such protected activity but a claim does not arise from protected activity “simply because it was filed after, or because of, protected activity, much less because protected activity provides evidentiary support or context for the claim. (Rand Resources, LLC v.

City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621.) Instead, the protected activity “must ‘supply elements of the challenged claim[s].’” (Id.; see also, Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 [“To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’”].) If a plaintiff combines multiple claims into a count, each claim is analyzed separately. (Baral v.

Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393, 396.)

California courts of appeal have added clarity on how to determine whether a cause of action actually “arises from” activity which is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. In Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, the Court of Appeal stated that a claim “arises from” an act when that act “forms the basis for the cause of action.” (Id. at 1537.) In PrediWave Corp. v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, the Court of Appeal explained that even when a pleading contains allegations relating to both protected and unprotected activity, “it is the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies.” (Id., at 1219 (italics in original).)

According to Kenne v. Stennis, when cause of action is based on both protected and unprotected activity, it is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute unless the protected activity is “merely incidental” or “collateral” to the unprotected conduct. (See, e.g., Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 967; Baral, supra, at 394 [assertions that are “merely incidental” or “collateral” are not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute].)

Where the moving party makes the initial showing required by the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate “there is a probability that [s/he] will prevail on the claim. [Citations omitted.]” (Falcon Brands, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at 518.) This requirement has been interpreted to demand only a showing of “minimal merit.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 1061.) In determining whether a claim has “minimal merit,” a court “does not weigh the evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) Instead, a court merely determines whether the claim is both “legally sufficient” (i.e., “adequately pled”)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

but also “factually substantiated” with evidence sufficient to establish the prima facie elements of the claim at issue. (See, e.g., Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 379-380, 396.) In other words, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must show not only that it has pleaded a valid claim, but also that such claim is supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment for the opposing party. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 88-89.)

In ruling on the special motion to strike, the trial court considers the pleadings and the evidence submitted but it must not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, the court’s responsibility is merely to accept as true the evidence presented by the opposing party favorable to him/her (see, e.g., Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45-46) and to evaluate the moving party’s evidence only to determine if it defeats as matter of law the evidence offered by the opposing party (see, e.g., Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 906).

With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to the specific arguments advanced in support of and opposition to the present special motion to strike.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff Craig’s request for judicial notice of his own complaint and defendant SAI’s cross-complaint is granted but only for those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, subds. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Plaintiff Craig’s request for judicial notice of the fact that 5/31/2025 and 6/1/2025 were a Saturday and Sunday, respectively, is also granted.

Written Objections to Evidence

The Court finds no written objections to evidence.

Discussion

Moving Party’s Initial Burden. According to the moving papers, defendant SAI’s cross-complaint and the causes of action alleged therein “fall squarely within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivisions (b) and (e)(4)” because SAI “relies on Craig’s service of three-day notices to quit and service of pre-litigation letters

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

as a basis for each of these claims and thus constitute protected activity.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:7-13.) Although the cross-complaint certainly does include allegations relating to plaintiff Craig’s service of three-day notices and other prelitigation communications, such allegations do not in and of themselves establish that the entirety of the crosscomplaint is necessarily subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute insofar as the cross-complaint relies on other additional allegations unrelated to the three-day notices and other prelitigation communications claimed to be “protected” under §425.16.

Where a pleading contains what is sometimes referred to as a “mixed cause of action” (i.e., one which rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute “protected” activity and some of which do not), “courts should analyze each claim for relief -- each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action -- to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 382, 393–395.) With respect to so-called mixed causes of action, the California Supreme Court explained in pertinent part:

[T]he moving defendant must identify the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are protected and what claims for relief are predicated on them. In turn, a court should examine whether those acts are protected and supply the basis for any claims. It does not matter that other unprotected acts may also have been alleged within what has been labeled a single cause of action; these are “disregarded at this stage.” So long as a “court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached” with respect to these claims. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (citing Baral, at 396.)

Additionally, Bonni clarified that allegations of “protected” conduct “merely incidental” or “collateral” to a cause of action which merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, are not subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Bonni, at 1012 (citing Baral, at 394.)

In light of the foregoing, a more focused analysis of each of the cross-complaint’s individual causes of action is necessary. As noted above, SAI’s cross-complaint purports to allege seven (7) separate causes of action, each of which will now be addressed in the order alleged.

A. Breach of Contract. The first cause of action for breach of the subject lease agreement specifically alleges the following in Paragraphs 39:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

Cross-Defendant breached the Lease in the following material respects, among others: a. Cross-Defendant breached Section 32 of the Lease by causing or authorizing parking lot renovations to be performed at the Premises on May 31 - June 1, 2025, without providing any prior notice to Cross-Complainant, rendering the Premises inaccessible for two full business days; b. Cross-Defendant breached Section 53 of the Lease (“Lessor’s Work”) by failing to timely and properly complete the required bathroom improvements prior to lease commencement; c.

Cross-Defendant breached Section 38 of the Lease (Quiet Possession) by substantially interfering with Cross-Complainant’s use and enjoyment of the Premises through unannounced construction activity that blocked access to the Premises; d. Cross-Defendant breached the Lease by serving retaliatory Three-Day Notices in response to Cross-Complainant’s lawful assertion of its rights under the Lease; [and] e. Cross-Defendant breached Section 5 of the Lease by failing to return the full security deposit of $6,378.84 following termination of the tenancy.

Based on these express allegations, this first cause of action is at least in part predicated on plaintiff Craig’s service of “Three-Day Notices” which the opposition unequivocally concedes is “protected” activity under the anti-SLAPP statute (see Opp., p.5:24-27) and accordingly, subparagraph (d) of Paragraph 39 asserting that plaintiff Craig breached the lease agreement by serving three-day notices are subject to being stricken unless defendant SAI can show it has “minimal merit.”

However, according to the authorities cited above, the remainder of the conduct alleged in Paragraph 39 may not be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute as the conduct described in subparagraphs (a)-(c) and (e) do not implicate plaintiff Craig’s valid exercise of his constitutional rights of free speech and/or petition so as to fall within the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections. Consequently, this remaining portion of the breach of contract claim (i.e., excluding subparagraph (d)’s protected activity relating to the threeday notices discussed in the preceding paragraph above) is beyond the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute.

B. Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment. This second cause of action is similar to the first in that it alleges in pertinent part:

43. Cross-Defendant substantially interfered with Cross-Complainant’s quiet enjoyment of the Premises by, among other things: (a) causing unannounced

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

parking lot renovations that blocked access to the Premises for two full business days, forcing Cross-Complainant to close its business and send employees home; (b) serving multiple retaliatory Three-Day Notices designed to harass and intimidate Cross-Complainant after it asserted its legal rights; and (c) engaging in a pattern of conduct that rendered Cross-Complainant’s continued occupancy of the Premises untenable.

Based on this explicit language, the second cause of action is also partly premised on plaintiff Craig’s “protected” conduct of serving three-day notices (see Opp., p.5:24-27) and as such, subparagraph (b) of Paragraph 43 which contends that plaintiff Craig interfered with SAI’s right of quiet enjoyment by serving three-day notices must under the anti-SLAPP statute be stricken unless defendant SAI can show it has “minimal merit.” However, because the remainder of Paragraph 43 does not clearly or necessarily implicate any First Amendment conduct by plaintiff Craig which is “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute, this remaining portion of this cause of action is not subject to this special motion to strike.

C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith. The third cause of action of the crosscomplaint is similar to the first and second, being predicated on a variety of conduct identified in Paragraph 48, which paragraph alleges the following:

Cross-Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by engaging in the following conduct, among others: a. Failing to provide notice as required by the Lease before conducting disruptive renovations at the Premises; b. Attempting to shift responsibility to a third-party contractor rather than accepting his own contractual obligations; c. Initially refusing to compensate Cross-Complainant for losses caused by his breach, and thereafter offering only inadequate compensation; d.

Demanding an additional security deposit of $2,600.00 from Cross- Complainant while simultaneously breaching the Lease and refusing to compensate Cross-Complainant for its losses; e. Serving retaliatory Three-Day Notices within weeks of receiving Cross- Complainant’s November 19, 2025 demand letter, in an effort to punish Cross- Complainant for asserting its rights; [and] f. Making false or misleading claims about Cross-Complainant’s payment history and property maintenance in an effort to justify retaliatory action.

As with the preceding causes of action, this Court holds that the allegations of subparagraph (a) relating to plaintiff Craig’s alleged failure “to provide notice before conducting disruptive renovations” are not subject to being stricken under the anti-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

SLAPP statute because such alleged failure does not constitute “protected” First Amendment activity. However, the allegations about the three-day notices in subparagraph (e) are subject to being stricken because it constitutes “protected” conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute, as explained above. (See also, Opp., p.5:24-27 [conceding such activity is “protected”].)

The Court also finds that the allegations found in subparagraphs (b)-(d) and (f) are primarily, if not exclusively, based on prelitigation communications between the litigants here, or more particularly, their attorneys. (See, e.g., Cr.-Compl., Ex. C-E, H-J.) Notably, the moving papers specifically assert that such prelitigation communications are “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute for the reasons explained in Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1005-1006.

Curiously, the opposition does not address this binding appellate authority, nor does the opposition otherwise attempt to demonstrate why such prelitigation communications should not be deemed “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute. Given the Second District Court of Appeal’s express finding that the various prelitigation activity at issue in Trinity Risk Management was indeed “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute as “acts in furtherance of its constitutional right of petition” (Trinity Risk Management, at 1005-1006) and the Legislature’s own explicit language mandating that the anti-SLAPP statute “shall be construed broadly” (see, Code Civ.

Proc. §425.16(a)), this Court concludes that the express allegations in subparagraphs (b)-(d) and (f) of Paragraph 48 relate to plaintiff Craig’s exercise of First Amendment rights which is “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute and as a result, these allegations too are subject to being stricken unless defendant SAI can demonstrate “minimal merit.”

D. Constructive Eviction. Defendant SAI’s fourth cause of action alleges the following in Paragraph 52:

Cross-Defendant’s conduct, taken as a whole, constituted a constructive eviction of Cross-Complainant from the Premises. Specifically, Cross-Defendant: (a) substantially interfered with Cross-Complainant’s use and enjoyment of the Premises by conducting unannounced renovations that blocked access; (b) refused to compensate Cross-Complainant for the resulting business losses; (c) served multiple retaliatory Three-Day Notices in rapid succession after Cross- Complainant asserted its legal rights; (d) falsely accused Cross-Complainant of creating waste and nuisance conditions when Cross-Complainant’s operations were consistent with the agreed use as an appliance recycler; and (e) made the continued occupancy of the Premises untenable.

Like the preceding causes of action, the fourth is “mixed” in that it is based on multiple

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

acts attributed to plaintiff Craig, some of which constitute “protected” activity and some of which do not. The Court finds that the conduct alleged in subparts (c) and (d) relating to three-day notices and false claims of waste and nuisance in prelitigation communications, respectively, are “protected” for the same reasons explained above, making the allegations of subparts (c) and (d) subject to being stricken under the anti- SLAPP statute. However, the moving papers have failed to adequately demonstrate that the remaining allegations found in subparts (a), (b) and (e) implicate any valid exercise of plaintiff Craig’s First Amendment rights so as make them a proper target of the present special motion to strike.

E. Wrongful Retention of Security Deposit. As noted above, footnotes in both the Notice of Motion and moving Points & Authorities indicate that this special motion to strike is not actually directed at this fifth cause of action for wrongful retention of security deposit. Thus, no further discussion of this cause of action is warranted here.

F. Retaliatory Eviction. Defendant SAI’s sixth cause of action is labeled as one for retaliatory eviction and in it, SAI asserts the following:

64. Cross-Defendant’s service of the Three-Day Notices in December 2025 and January 2026 was retaliatory in nature and directly motivated by Cross- Complainant’s November 19, 2025 demand letter, in which Cross-Complainant asserted its rights under the Lease, demanded return of the security deposit, and sought compensation for damages caused by Cross-Defendant’s breaches.

65. The retaliatory nature of Cross-Defendant’s conduct is demonstrated by the timing and sequence of events: (a) Cross-Complainant sent its demand letter on November 19, 2025; (b) Cross-Defendant’s counsel responded on December 5, 2025, offering to negotiate a termination; (c) one week later, on December 12, 2025, Cross-Defendant served a Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent; (d) three days after that, on December 15, 2025, Cross-Defendant served a Three-Day Notice to Perform Covenant (hazardous substances); and (e) on January 2, 2026, Cross-Defendant served yet another Three-Day Notice to Perform Covenant (unapproved uses).

Based on these allegations, the Court holds that the sixth cause of action for retaliatory eviction not only “arises from” but also is explicitly “based on” conduct by plaintiff Craig which is “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute. First, as mentioned above in connection with the first cause of action for breach of contract, defendant SAI’s opposition unequivocally concedes that plaintiff Craig’s service of the three-day notices constitutes “protected” activity. (See, Opp., p.5:24-27.) Second, as explained above in connection with the third cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

faith, the prelitigation communications made by plaintiff Craig and/or his counsel are considered “protected” activity under the anti-SLAPP statute for the reasons explained in Trinity Risk Management, supra and defendant SAI’s opposition offers no argument or authority to the contrary. Consequently, the entirety of the sixth cause of action is subject to being stricken unless defendant SAI can demonstrate this cause of action has “minimal merit.”

G. Business & Professions Code §17200. In the seventh and final cause of action of the cross-complaint, defendant SAI alleges in pertinent part:

69. Cross-Complainant is informed and believes and therefore allege [sic] that Cross-Defendant has committed acts of unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices, as defined by California Business and Professions Code, §§ 17200 et seq.

70. Cross-Defendant’s conduct violates multiple underlying laws: (1) Breach of Cal. Civ. Code §1927 [tenant’s right to “quiet possession”]; (2) Serving multiple retaliatory Three-Day Notices designed to harass and intimidate Cross- Complainant after it asserted its legal rights; and (3) Engaged in a pattern of conduct that rendered Cross-Complainant’s continued occupancy of the Premises untenable.

Similar to many of the preceding causes of action, the seventh cause of action is “mixed” insofar as it is expressly based on multiple acts attributed to plaintiff Craig, some of which constitute “protected” activity and some of which do not. Plaintiff Craig’s service of the three-day notices referenced in subpart (2) of Paragraph 70 has already been determined to be “protected” activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and the opposition concedes as much. (See Opp., p.5:24-27.) Thus, this specific allegation is subject to being stricken unless defendant SAI can demonstrate it has at least “minimal merit.”

However, the moving papers have failed to adequately demonstrate that the remaining allegations found in subparts (1) and (3) of Paragraph 70 necessarily implicate any valid exercise of plaintiff Craig’s First Amendment rights so as make them a proper target of the present special motion to strike. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that these two remaining subparts either fundamentally “arise from” or are actually “based on” any prelitigation communications by plaintiff Craig and/or his counsel which the moving papers insist are “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute by virtue of Trinity Risk Management, supra. Because the moving papers do not identify any other activity by plaintiff Craig which is claimed to be “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute, this Court holds that these remaining portions of Paragraph 70 are not subject to being

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.

H. Summary. As explained above, the Court finds that plaintiff Craig has satisfied his initial burden of showing the cross-complaint’s causes of action (other than the fifth for wrongful retention of security deposit) are either partly or entirely premised on First Amendment activity which is “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute. As a result, this Court must now proceed to the second prong of determining whether defendant SAI has shown that any of these causes of action or the allegations therein have “minimal merit” or a “probability of prevailing” on them based upon the allegations of protected activity.

Defendant SAI’s Burden of Showing “Minimal Merit.” For the reasons explained above, this Court has concluded plaintiff Craig has satisfied his initial burden with respect to all or parts of the causes of action (other than the fifth for wrongful retention of security deposit) and thus, these causes of action and/or allegations therein are subject to being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute unless defendant SAI is able to establish they have “minimal merit” so as to show a “probability of prevailing” on them.

To meet this burden, defendant SAI must show not only that these remaining causes of action and allegations are adequately pled (“legally sufficient”) but also produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish the prima facie elements of these causes of action at issue. (See, e.g., Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 384-385; Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 379-380.) With respect to the latter component, evidence must be presented and it must be sufficient to make a prima facie showing of facts which, if credited by the trier of fact, would sustain a favorable judgment for the party opposing the special motion to strike. (See, e.g., Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 61; Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 88.)

The trial court shall consider the pleadings and the evidence submitted but it does not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, the court merely accepts as true the evidence favorable to the party opposing the motion (Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45- 46) and evaluates the moving party’s evidence only to determine if it defeats as matter of law the evidence offered by the opposing party (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 906).

As indicated above, defendant SAI’s opposing points & authorities references at Page 8:10-11 a declaration by Rachel Mozingo but no such declaration currently appears in the Court’s Register of Actions and perhaps more critically, the proof of service filed by defendant SAI on 7/8/2026 makes no mention of any declaration. Thus, this Court cannot now consider the contents of any purported declaration by Ms. Mozingo (or anyone else) in connection with its determination of whether defendant SAI has met its own burden of showing “minimal merit” or a “probability of prevailing.” Regardless of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

defendant SAI’s failure to timely file and serve any “evidence” in an attempt to satisfy its burden of demonstrating “minimal merit” or a “probability of prevailing” on the remaining causes of action and/or allegations predicated on activity by plaintiff Craig which is “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute, this Court holds that defendant SAI cannot as a matter of law meet its burden in this regard.

As detailed above, the only allegations in defendant SAI’s cross-complaint which this Court has found to be subject to this special motion to strike relate to essentially two “protected” activities by plaintiff Craig: (1) His service of three-day notices and (2) his prelitigation communications. However, neither of these activities is actionable as a matter of law and thus, defendant SAI cannot as a matter of law establish that such allegations have “minimal merit” or there is “probability of prevailing” on them.

First, plaintiff Craig’s service of three-day notices is absolutely protected under the litigation privilege found in Civil Code §47(b) regardless of malice or other allegedly improper intent. (See, e.g., Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1480 [service of three-day notice legal prerequisite to unlawful detainer action and “communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding” are protected under litigation privilege in Civil Code §47(b)], 1485-1486 [litigation privilege “is absolute in nature, applying to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness” and may extend to steps taken prior to litigation or afterwards].)

While the litigation privilege was originally enacted to preclude defamation claims, it is “now held applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to a publication [citations], and all torts except malicious prosecution. [Citations.]” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 211-212.)

Further, “The breadth of the litigation privilege cannot be understated” as it “immunizes defendants from virtually any tort liability (including claims for fraud), with the sole exception of causes of action for malicious prosecution” and “[a]ny doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” (Id., at 212 (citing Olsen v. Harbison (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 325, 333; Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913).) Indeed, a broad range of conduct has been determined by courts to be within the scope of the privilege, including activity preparatory to litigation. (Id. (citing Gootee v.

Lightner (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 587, 589 [administering of psychological testing and destroying raw data within scope of privilege]; Scalzo v. Baker (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 91, 102 [materials obtained illegally by litigants and turned over to attorneys deemed subject to privilege].) Finally, the litigation privilege is clearly not limited to statements made inside a courtroom but rather applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005385: CRAIG vs SIMPLY APPLIANCES, INC. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) in Department 16D

the court or its officers is involved. (Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 531, 543.) In the light of the preceding authorities, the litigation privilege applicable to plaintiff Craig’s service of the three-day notices is absolutely protected under the litigation privilege regardless of malice or retaliatory intent and thus, defendant SAI cannot as a matter of law establish that it has “probability of prevailing” on such allegations.

Defendant SAI is likewise unable to show the other allegations relating to plaintiff Craig’s “protected” prelitigation communications, including letters sent by his counsel, have even “minimal merit” given that such prelitigation communication also fall within the broad, unqualified protections of the litigation privilege pursuant to the authorities cited in the preceding paragraph, regardless of malice or other allegedly improper intent. Consequently, the Court finds that defendant SAI has as a matter of law no “probability of prevailing” on any of its allegations “arising from” or “based on” to plaintiff Craig’s prelitigation communications which are “protected” under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff Craig’s special anti-SLAPP motion to strike (which is not directed to the fifth cause of action for wrongful retention of security deposit) is GRANTED only as to the entirety of the sixth cause of action for retaliatory eviction as well as those allegations found in Paragraphs 39(d); 43(b); 48(b)-(d) and (f); 52(c)-(d); and 70(2) of the remaining causes of action.

Although leave to amend a pleading is typically granted with great liberality, leave to amend is generally not granted when a special anti-SLAPP motion to strike is granted because that would be inconsistent with the remedy otherwise provided by Code of Civil Procedure §425.16. (See, e.g., Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073-1074; Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055.) Accordingly, leave to amend is not granted here.

Plaintiff Craig may by noticed motion seek recovery of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §425.16(c).

Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312, plaintiff Craig to prepare for the Court’s consideration a proposed order consistent with the foregoing.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)