Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC v. California Energy Exchange Corporation

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

Rock Creek’s separately filed evidentiary objections are sustained on the basis of hearsay.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary adjudication the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary adjudication. (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694; FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Thus, all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary adjudication. (Roth v.

Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a defendant’s motion for summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v Advance, Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781).

Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, at 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see, generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, at 843.)

Discussion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

Business and Professions Code section 7031(a) states that “no person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action ... for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is required.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7031(a).) Section 7031(b) provides that “persons who utilize the services of an unlicensed contractor” may bring an action to recover “compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7031(b).)

“[A] contractor is any person who undertakes to or offers to undertake to, or purports to have the capacity to undertake to, or submits a bid to, or does himself or herself or by or through others, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck or demolish any building ... project, development or improvement, or to do any part thereof...” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7026.) “[B]oth the person who provides construction services himself and one who does so ‘through others’ qualifies as a ‘contractor.’” (Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 941.) A contractor who is unlicensed for any period of time during the provision of construction services generally forfeits all compensation for the work. (Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 882, 896-897.)

Class Protected by Section 7031

CEE first moves for summary adjudication on the basis that Rock Creek is not within the protected class because Rock Creek is not a subcontractor of CEE, did not supply construction material to CEE, is not an employee of CEE, and has no ownership interest in the pipeline or facilities of the PEP. (UMFs 2-5.) CEE relies upon Lewis & Queen v. NM Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, as support for its assertion that Rock Creek may only bring a reimbursement claim if it was CEE’s subcontractor, materialman, employee, or an owner with CEE because the Lewis & Queen court stated that “[w]hen the person required to have a license [under section 7031] is a general contractor, then the protected class includes subcontractors, materialmen, employees, and owners with the general contractor.” (Lewis & Queen v. NM Ball Sons, supra, at p. 153.)

Rock Creek first opposes on the basis that any judicial finding related to Rock Creek’s Section 7031(b) claim inherently implicates section 7031(a), which is one of Rock Creek’s affirmative defenses to CEE’s Cross-Complaint. Rock Creek asserts CEE’s attempt to summarily adjudicate Rock Creek’s reimbursement claim is inappropriate because “CEE has not presented this motion in a manner that allows for a full and fair adjudication of [CEE’s licensure] issue as it pertains to the affirmative defense of all cross-defendants under Bus. & Prof. Code § 7031.” (Opposition at 6:15-17.) Rock Creek asserts that summary adjudication must completely dispose of a cause of action,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1); Hood v. Super. Court (United Chambers Administrators, Inc.) (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 321.) While it is accurate that a motion for summary adjudication must completely dispose of an entire cause of action, CEE’s motion does seek such relief as it seeks to completely dispose of Rock Creek’s eighth cause of action for reimbursement under Section 7031(b). That Rock Creek may also be asserting an affirmative defense under section 7031(a) to CEE’s cross-claims does not prohibit this Court from adjudicating Rock Creek’s own eighth cause of action. There is no requirement that a motion for summary adjudication completely dispose of both a cause of action and a related affirmative defense.

Next, Rock Creek asserts CEE’s attempt to narrow the scope of the protected class under Section 7031(b) is without merit and inconsistent with the statute. This argument is well taken. As noted by Rock Creek, the Lewis & Queen decision predates the 2001 adoption of section 7031(b) and, importantly, the decision does not suggest that the enumerated list was by any means exclusive. In Lewis & Queen, the California Supreme Court was evaluating whether an unlicensed subcontractor could maintain an action against the general contractor for compensation.

The Court concluded that because the subcontractor was unlicensed, it could not and stated: “[t]he class protected by the statute includes those who deal with a person required by the statute to have a license. When the person required to have a license is a general contractor, then the protected class includes subcontractors, materialmen, employees, and owners dealing with the general contractor. However, when the person who was required to have a license but did not have one is himself a subcontractor, such as plaintiff in the present case, he of course is not to be protected from his own unlicensed activities.

To allow him to recover would in fact destroy the protection of those who dealt with him, and they are in the class the Legislature intended to protect whether they are owners or general contractors.” (Lewis & Queen, supra, at 153.)

CEE cites to no other case law supporting its argument that a reimbursement claim against a general contractor is limited to a finite protected class, rather than anyone who has utilized the services of an unlicensed contractor. Many years after the Lewis & Queen decision, “[i]n 2001, the Legislature complemented the shield created by subdivision (a) of section 7031 by adding a sword that allows persons who utilize unlicensed contractors to recover compensation paid to the contractor for performing unlicensed work.

Section 7031(b) provides that ‘a person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract’ unless the substantial compliance doctrine applies.” (White v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, 519.) The statutory language on its face does

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

not present the limitations as argued by CEE and, instead, refers more generally to “[a] person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7031(b).)

In addition, California Jury Instructions, CACI 4560 (Recovery of Payments to an Unlicensed Contractor) provides that to establish a claim and recover compensation paid for unlicensed services, Rock Creek must prove:

1. That Rock Creek engaged, hired, or contracted with CEE to perform services for Rock Creek; 2.That a valid contractor’s license was required to perform these services; and 3.That Rock Creek paid CEE for services that CEE performed.

While Rock Creek cites to Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., supra, as support for the contention that ownership is not required to bring a reimbursement claim, there is no discussion in that case about whether the Judicial Council of California had an ownership interest in the Court facilities that were the subject of the lawsuit. Nonetheless, the case is not necessary for the Court’s evaluation. The limitations suggested by CEE are simply not supported by the clear statutory language.

Accordingly, the Court finds CEE has failed to meet its initial burden to demonstrate Rock Creek’s claim fails as a matter of law because Rock Creek is “not within the protected class” and the motion on this ground is, therefore, DENIED.

Statute of Limitations

CEE next moves for summary adjudication on the ground that Rock Creek’s reimbursement claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

While Section 7031(b) reimbursement claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, CEE also contends Emergency Rule 9(a) provides an additional six month extension, providing a total of 18 months for Rock Creek to file its claims. (Eisenberg Village of Los Angeles Jewish Home for the Aging v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1203.) Moreover, “a section 7031(b) claim accrues upon the completion or cessation of the performance of the act or contract at issue.” (Eisenberg Village, supra, at p. 1203.)

CEE argues it is undisputed that Rock Creek filed its Cross-Complaint more than 18 months from the time construction was completed and performance under the Purchase

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

and Sale Agreement (“PSA”) ceased. CEE presents 21 material facts in support, including the following:

- Temblor stated that construction of the pipeline and processing plant was completed in May 2018. (UMF 8.) - Temblor stated that the completed gas pipeline and gas processing plant began full operation in August of 2018. (UMF 10.) - Temblor shut-in Plaintiffs’ wells on March 29, 2019. (UMF 11.) - Plaintiffs, SPC, and Rock Creek sold no gas to CEE after April 2019. (UMF 12.) - CEE bought no gas from Plaintiffs, SPC, and Rock Creek after April 2019. (UMF 13.) - Plaintiffs, SPC, and Rock Creek provided no money to CEE under the PSA in 2019 or thereafter. (UMF 14.) - Rock Creek stated that construction of the pipeline and processing plant occurred up to July 31, 2020. (UMF 9.) - Rock Creek filed its cross-complaint on January 16, 2024. (UMF 25.)

Based on the foregoing, CEE asserts that construction was completed and cessation of performance of the PSA occurred on July 31, 2020, at the latest. (UMF 9.) Yet, Rock Creek filed its Cross-Complaint on January 16, 2024, more than three years thereafter. Further, CEE contends the delayed discovery rule does not apply to section 7031(b) claims. (See San Francisco CDC LLC v. Webcor Construction L.P. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 266, 280; see Eisenberg Village, supra, at p. 1203.)

Rock Creek raises a number of arguments in opposition, but the Court concludes one is dispositive to this issue. Specifically, Rock Creek argues the filing of CEE’s Cross- Complaint on July 31, 2020, tolled the statute of limitations during the pendency of the action for any claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Cross- Complaint. (Trindade v. Superior Court (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 857, 859-860.)

Although “[ordinarily] the statute of limitations will bar a cross-complaint in the same fashion as if the defendant had brought an independent action,” the rule is different when “the original complaint was filed before the statute of limitations on the crosscomplaint had elapsed.” (Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712, 715, fn. 4; Sidney v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 710, 714-715.) Such a cross-complaint need only be subject-matter related to the plaintiff’s complaint -- i.e., arise out of the same occurrence (see Code Civ. Proc. sections 426.10, 428.10) -- to relate back to the date of filing the complaint for statute of limitation purposes. (Id.) “[The] courts have fashioned a rule that a statute of limitations is suspended or tolled as to a defendant’s then unbarred causes of action against the plaintiff arising out of the same transaction

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

by the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint.” (Sidney, supra, at p. 714-715; Electronic Equipment Express, Inc. v. Donald H. Seiler & Co. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 834, 844.) “‘The principle underlying the rule that a statute of limitations is suspended by the filing of the original complaint is that the plaintiff has thereby waived the claim and permitted the defendant to make all proper defenses to the cause of action pleaded.” (Trindade, supra, at 859-860.) “The statute is a bar to the defendant’s affirmative claim only if the period has already run when the complaint is filed. The filing of the complaint suspends the statute during the pendency of the action, and the defendant may set up his [cross] claim by appropriate pleading at any time.” (Trindade, supra, at 860.)

Although the foregoing legal authorities involve the filing of a complaint and a related cross-complaint, the circumstances presented here are sufficiently analogous to apply the rule and underlying principle. Rock Creek first became a party to this action when CEE filed a Cross-Complaint against it, akin to a defendant being brought into an action upon the filing of a complaint. Rock Creek was not a named plaintiff in the Complaint filed against CEE.

Thus, the question is whether CEE’s Cross-Complaint was filed within the 18 month statute of limitations for Rock Creek’s reimbursement claim, which accrues upon the completion or cessation of the PSA. The only dates proffered by CEE that could potentially bar the claims are that the construction was completed in May of 2018 (and that the plant was operational a few months later in August). (UMFs 8, 10.) The Court, however, has sustained Rock Creek’s hearsay objections as to these material facts in support because CEE’s evidence consists of written statements included in a PowerPoint presentation, which are being used to establish truth of the matter asserted – that construction was, in fact, completed in May of 2018.

Further, the author of the PowerPoint is entirely unclear. Based upon the parties’ objections to evidence and related discussion, the author may be Philip Bell, but there is no declaration from Mr. Bell indicating that he authored the statements, nor is there any evidence or material facts establishing Mr. Bell’s relationship to Rock Creek or that this was a statement made directly by Rock Creek such that it could be deemed a party admission. Therefore, this evidence has been excluded from consideration.

As the 2018 dates are the only dates presented by CEE that are more than 18 months prior to the filing of CEE’s Cross-Complaint, there is no evidence that CEE’s Cross-Complaint was not filed within the 18 month statute of limitations applicable to Rock Creek’s reimbursement claim and did not, therefore, toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of this action. Moreover, the Court notes CEE’s Cross-Complaint was filed on the same day that CEE claims construction ceased – July 31, 2020, which oddly post-dates the purported May 2018 date of completion as asserted by CEE.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

In sum, CEE presents no evidence that its Cross-Complaint did not toll the statute of limitations for Rock Creek’s cross claim, which arises out of the same transaction and matter, nor does CEE address this argument in its reply. Accordingly, the Court concludes CEE has failed to meet its initial burden on this argument and the Court need not delve into Rock Creek’s additional opposition arguments regarding the statute of limitations. CEE’s motion for summary adjudication on the ground of statute of limitations is DENIED.

CEE’s Status as a Contractor

Next, CEE seeks summary adjudication on the ground that section 7031 is not applicable because CEE, through its Cross-Complaint, seeks recovery of compensation for its performance as a purchaser and seller of natural gas, not as a contractor. CEE also argues that, even if the Court concludes the PSA is a construction contract, CEE is exempt and did not need a contractor’s license because it was merely a facilitator, did not perform construction services, and construction was performed incidental to the production of gas pursuant to Business & Professions Code section 7043.

Section 7043 states, that the contractor licensing laws do 'not apply to any construction, repair or operation incidental to the discovering or producing of petroleum or gas, or the drilling, testing, abandoning or other operation of any petroleum or gas well, when performed by an owner or lessee.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7043.) Incidental means “necessary to the main purpose.” (Currie v. Stolowitz (1959) 169 21 Cal.App.2d 810, 814.)

Courts have held that a contractor’s license is not required if a person or entity merely contracts to coordinate construction services performed by others. (The Fifth Day, LLC v. Bolotin (2009) 172 17 Cal.App.4th 939, 947-950 (“Fifth Day”).) In Fifth Day, the defendant, a construction manager, performed a variety of consulting functions, including coordinating with design professionals, advising on the budget, working on the schedule, coordinating with contractors, inspecting the site and reporting to the owner. (Fifth Day, supra, at 943-946). The Court found that such activities did not require a contractor’s license. (Fifth Day, supra, at 949.)

CEE presents UMFs 27 through 49 in support of this final issue, the majority of which concern the language of the PSA. Rock Creek does not dispute what is stated in the PSA, but as to some of the terms, claims they are irrelevant. However, CEE also asserts that it did not perform any construction, that it assigned its facilitation responsibilities to its affiliate CGG who contracted with licensed contractors to perform all construction, and that CEE advised on cost assessment, identified contractors, and coordinated with design and engineer professionals. (UMFs 33, 36, 43-45.) Assuming this is sufficient to meet its initial burden, the Court finds Rock Creek has presented

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Rock Creek maintains that there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether CEE acted as a “contractor” under the Code. Rock Creek presents evidence that CEE presented an estimate for construction of $3.43 million. (AUMF 2.) CEE then received payment for construction of the facilities. (AUMFs 5-9.) The PSA itself states CEE will “select construction contractor(s), and construct the PEP.” (UMF 30.) CEE’s Vice President of Operations testified he “oversaw” the entities constructing the facilities (AUMF 14), that CEE provided construction updates (AUMF 15), that CEE, by its own admission, was paid to select contractors and construct the PEP (UMF 30) and solicited costs for the construction (UMF 16).

CEE also charged a 10 percent overhead charge on the construction, oversaw the construction, and provided construction updates. (AUMFs 11, 21.) In fact, CEE’s own verified Cross-Complaint alleges, “In November 2017, CEE began construction of facilities for the Five Points PEP.” (Cross-Complaint ¶ 44; Ex. B to Rock Creek’s Compendium of Evidence.) CEE further alleges it “lost their original pipeline contractor due to permit and land delays[, but] CEE was able to secure a new contractor for $1,000,000 more than the original pipeline contractor.” (Cross-Complaint ¶ 45; Ex.

B to Rock Creek’s Compendium of Evidence.)

The definition of a “contractor” under Section 7026 is plainly “any person who undertakes to or offers to undertake to, or purports to have the capacity to undertake to, or submits a bid to, or does himself or herself or by or through others, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck or demolish any building ... project, development or improvement, or to do any part thereof...” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 7026 (emphasis added).) “Unlicensed persons may not finesse the statute by drafting contracts calling solely for unlicensed services where in reality other services requiring a license will be performed.” (Exec.

Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente County Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 496, 501.) CEE’s attempt to cast the PSA as only one for the sale of gas is simply not persuasive given the evidence presented by Rock Creek in opposition, which creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether CEE was acting as a “contractor” pursuant to the PSA. All of the foregoing creates a triable issue of material fact regarding whether or not licensure was required by CEE.

On reply, CEE asserts that the motion should be granted because Rock Creek did not address CEE’s argument that a license was not required under section 7043. However, even if Rock Creek did not specifically address this argument, Rock Creek has sufficiently created a triable issue as to the material facts CEE has presented in support of this final issue, which supports denial of the motion on this ground.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

CEE’s motion for summary adjudication on this ground is DENIED.

Conclusion

CEE’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278366-CU-BC-GDS: Temblor Petroleum Company, LLC a Delaware Limited Liability Company vs. California Energy Exchange Corporation 01/23/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication of Rock Oil Creek's Cause of Action for Reimbursement in Department 54

13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.