Igor Sill v. William Deem et al

CIVIL LAW & MOTION CALENDAR – Hon. Cynthia P. Smith, Dept. A (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Igor Sill v. William Deem et al 24CV000698

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE ISSUE SANCTIONS AND EVIDENCE SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion for terminating sanctions and the alternate motion for evidence sanctions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The alternate motion for issue sanctions is GRANTED as against Defendants William Deem and Kimberton Wines, LLC. The Court will mark the appropriate portion of the Proposed Order and sign. The request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

A. PROCEDURAL MATTER

Plaintiff Igor Sill (“Plaintiff”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 and 2031.320,1 for an order for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, issue sanctions and evidence sanctions, against Defendants William Deem (“Deem”) and Kimberton Wines, LLC (“Kimberton”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (Notice of Motion, p. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court issue terminating sanctions in the form of either entry of default judgments against Defendants or a stay of the case until Defendants have fully complied with all discovery served on them. (Support Memo, p. 8.)

Alternatively, Plaintiff requests 1) issue sanctions designating as established that a unity of interest and ownership exists between Deem and Kimberton such that their separate personalities no longer exist, and 2) evidence sanctions prohibiting Kimberton and Deem from introducing evidence at trial to prove their affirmative defenses. (Proposed Order, p. 2.)

B. LEGAL STANDARD

Except for circumstances having no apparent relevance here, “if a party ... fails to obey an order compelling inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction.... In lieu of or in addition to that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction ....” (§ 2031.320, subd. (c).)

C. DISCUSSION

1. Plaintiff’s Contentions

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to comply with the Court’s March 24, 2026 Order compelling Kimberton to, by April 9, 2026, “provide further code-compliant responses to” Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 2-7, 11-12, and 17-19 and Demands for Identification and Production of Documents, Set One (“Demands”), Nos. 1, 3-6, and 11-18, and requiring both

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

Defendants to pay to Plaintiff sanctions in the amount of $4,685. (See 3/24/26 Minute Order; Notice of Entry of Order, filed 4/1/26.)

Plaintiff asserts that neither Defendant has paid the monetary sanctions. Plaintiff further argues that, while Kimberton did timely serve supplemental responses to the subject discovery, the supplemental responses to the Demands and most of the Special Interrogatories are not codecompliant, are incomplete, evasive, and lack credibility or are provably false. In support, Plaintiff submits a Separate Statement identifying the deficiencies with each response. (See Separate Statement [addressing Demand Nos. 1, 3-6, 11-18, Special Interrogatories Nos. 4-6, 11-12, 17- 19].)

Moreover, Plaintiff argues that Kimberton’s late document production omits “the vast majority” of documents covered by the March 24, 2026 Order, which were still not produced as of the date of signing the DeWitt Decl. (Declaration of Brian L. DeWitt, ¶¶ 8-9 (“DeWitt Decl.”).) Plaintiff contends that, because Deem is Kimberton’s sole manager, Kimberton’s failure to produce discovery and its misuse of the discovery process generally was Deem’s decision and no one else’s; thus, the sanctions should be imposed on Deem as well as Kimberton. (Id., pp. 10-11.)

The subject discovery requests were served on Kimberton on September 5, 2025. (DeWitt Decl., ¶ 2.) Prior to any motion practice, Kimberton was granted six weeks of extensions to respond and was provided multiple meet and confer communications placing it on notice of the issues. (Support Memo, pp. 5-6.) Over eight months later, and after a court order compelling compliance, Plaintiff contends it is still without code-complaint discovery responses or production of documents, which has caused severe prejudice to Plaintiff. (Id., p. 2.)

Namely, Plaintiff asserts that the deposition of Deem cannot proceed until documents are produced. (Ibid.) Moreover, the sought-after discovery is needed to prove the causes of action asserted against Defendants, as well as alter ego liability as to Deem. (Id., pp. 3, 5, 9-10.) Meanwhile, Plaintiff notes that trial is set for July 23, 2026, with the last day for discovery motions to be heard on July 8, 2026, leaving insufficient time for further motion practice if the Court declines to impose ultimate sanctions. (Id., p. 8.)

Plaintiff asserts that the discovery is reasonable in amount, and that Defendants have been represented by counsel so they are aware of their duty to furnish the requested information and documents. (Id., p. 5.) Plaintiff further argues that Kimberton’s delay has been intentional and that providing Kimberton more time is unlikely to lead to compliance. (Id., pp. 5, 7.) Although not a noticed basis for the Motion, Plaintiff points out that, on March 2, 2026, Plaintiff served new document demands on Defendants, Defendants did not respond to those discovery requests, and Plaintiff filed a motion to compel responses thereto which was heard on May 1, 2026. (Support Memo, pp. 3, 6.) The Court notes that that motion was granted. (See 5/1/26 Minute Order.)

Defendants impliedly concede the foregoing by failing to file anything by way of an Opposition.

2.

Analysis

Failure to comply with a court order to provide discovery constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (§ 2023.010, subd. (g).) Faced with misuse of the discovery process, the Court may impose whatever sanctions are just, including issue sanctions, evidence sanctions, terminating sanctions, and monetary sanctions. (Id., § 2023.030.) Terminating sanctions include an order rendering a judgment by default against that party or staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. (Id., § 2023.030, subd. (d)(2), (4).)

Issue sanctions “order[] that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (b).) An evidence sanction “prohibit[s] any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (c).)

Two facts are generally prerequisite to the imposition of non-monetary sanctions: (1) there must be a failure to comply with a court order; and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Administrators, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102.) It is the moving party’s burden to demonstrate the responding party’s failure to obey the earlier discovery order. (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 201.) Then the burden of proof shifts to the party seeking to avoid sanctions to establish a suitable justification for its conduct. (Ibid.)

“If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 701-02 quoting Doppes v. Bentley (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) “[W]here a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” (Id., at 702.)

Here, Defendants have willfully not complied with the Court’s March 24, 2026 discovery and sanctions order, as they have not paid the sanctions to Plaintiff. Moreover, while Kimberton did provide supplemental responses following the March 24, 2026 order, Plaintiff has shown that the responses are not code-compliant. (See Separate Statement, filed 4/21/26.) Moreover, in the face of the March 24, 2026 order, Defendants failed to respond to additional discovery by a April 3, 2026 deadline resulting in a finding that they again failed to comply with their discovery obligations. (See Declaration of Brian L. DeWitt in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion, filed 4/7/26; see also 5/1/26 Minute Order.)

It is clear to the Court that lesser sanctions, such as monetary sanctions, would not be effective in compelling Defendants’ compliance with the Court’s order. These failures are to the detriment of Plaintiff’s right to receive a fair trial, which is right around the corner on July 23, 2026. Moreover, while Defendants have been represented by counsel at all relevant times, on April 29, 2026, Defendants’ counsel substituted out of the case, and Defendants are now representing themselves in propria persona.2 Furthermore, Defendants submitted no opposition to 2 The Court notes that Kimberton cannot act in propria persona.

the instant motion for terminating, issue, and evidence sanctions. This not only suggests that Defendants are not taking their discovery obligations seriously, but also establishes that Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show a suitable justification for their conduct. Simply put, there is nothing in the record to suggest that any lesser remedy short of issue, evidence, or terminating sanctions would change Defendants’ conduct. (See Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 789, 799-800 [holding that terminating sanctions were warranted when it became clear that the plaintiff had no intention of answering discovery or complying with court orders and had shown no interest in taking part in the case].)

That said, the Court is reluctant to issue terminating or evidence sanctions at this juncture given that “a more severe sanction is disfavored if a lesser sanction is available.” (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 63.) Here, issue sanctions are not only available, but have been shown by Plaintiff to be reasonably connected to Defendants’ precise misconduct. Indeed, Plaintiff has sufficiently shown how the subject discovery requests relate to Defendants’ unity of interest. (See Support Memo, pp. 9-10.)

Thus, a reasonable consequence of Defendants’ misuse of the discovery process as to the subject discovery is for Defendants’ unity of interest and ownership to be taken as an established fact. The Court is further hesitant about imposing evidence sanctions because Plaintiff has not shown a sufficient connection between the subject discovery requests and all 45 affirmative defenses asserted in Defendants’ Answer, filed July 1, 2025. (Ibid.) Without that showing, the Court is unable to conclude that Defendants’ misuse of the discovery process with respect to the subject discovery warrants an order prohibiting Defendants from introducing evidence as to all affirmative defenses.

In weighing the factors set out in Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court finds that the imposition of issue sanctions is an appropriate measure at this time. (See Support Memo, pp. 4-5.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for terminating and evidence sanctions is DENIED, and the alternate motion for issue sanctions is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED as that type of sanction was not included in the Notice of Motion. (See § 2023.040 [“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.”].)

John Doe A. R. et al v. Brad Rowell et al 25CV001606

DEFENDANT NAPA VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY BY PLAINTIFFS, JOE DOE A.R., JANE DOE J.M. AND JOHN DOE M.W., AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED as to Form Interrogatory Nos. 6.3-6.7, 8.2-8.8, and 17.1, Special Interrogatory Nos. 9-13, 46-48, 50, 58-61, and 64-67, and Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 1-37. Plaintiffs John Doe A.R, Jane Doe J.M. and John Doe M.W. are each ordered to serve amended code-compliant responses to the foregoing discovery and produce all nonprivileged, responsive documents no later than 10 calendar days from Notice of Entry of the present ruling. The Motion

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