Young vs. Young

inequitable result will follow. (Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A. De C.V. v. Resnick (1957) 47 Cal.2d 792, 796; Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 415.)

Defendants argue, but do not show, that the alter-ego allegations are merely conclusory or otherwise subject to being stricken under Code of Civil Procedure section 436. Attachment 9a alleges that Defendants disregarded business formalities, commingled personal and SeaCats funds, used SeaCats’ assets to pay personal expenses, inadequately capitalized and depleted SeaCats, and operated it as a shell or conduit for their personal affairs. (FAC, Attachment 9a, ¶ 1.) It further alleges that respecting SeaCats’ separate existence would sanction fraud or produce an inequitable result. (Ibid.) These allegations track recognized alter-ego factors and sufficiently plead both unity of interest and an inequitable result.

Accordingly, the motion to strike the alter-ego allegations is DENIED.

Defendants (ANDRES A. MUNT-LOVELL and NICHOLAS P. MUNT-LOVELL) SHALL answer the First Amended Complaint within 30 days.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

15 Young vs. Young Demurrer (re First Amended Complaint) Motion to Strike

1. Demurrer

The court OVERRULES Defendant BARBARA YOUNG’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (FAC) filed by Plaintiff BRIAN YOUNG.

RJN - GRANTED: As requested by Defendant, the court takes judicial notice of (1) the original Complaint, (2) the notice of ruling on Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint and motion to strike, and (3) the First Amended Complaint. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).)

The FAC asserts the following four causes of action against Defendant: (1) breach of contract, (2) conversion, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and (4) promissory estoppel. The FAC was filed after Defendant successfully demurrer to the original Complaint.

1ST C/A (breach of contract)

Barbara argues the first cause of action in the FAC for breach of contract fails because: (1) Brian lacks standing as the alleged funds were intended for Brian’s sons and Brian had no authority to contract over the father’s Ally Bank account; (2) the FAC fails to plead consideration and instead alleges, at most, an unenforceable promise to make a gift; (3) the claim is time-barred; and (4) it is uncertain.

Standing: According to the FAC, which must be read in a light favorable to Plaintiff, Barbara’s promise was made to Brian, that Barbara agreed to transfer the funds to Brian, and that Brian’s intent was to use those funds for his sons’ benefit. (FAC ¶¶ 18–19, 34.) Thus, the sons’ benefit was derivative of Brian’s rights under the agreement. Although their father owned the Ally Bank account during his lifetime, the FAC alleges that he knew of and agreed to the beneficiary arrangement, and the alleged contract concerned what Barbara would do with the funds after their father’s death. (FAC ¶¶ 20–21, 34.)

Consideration: The FAC also now adequately alleges consideration in the form of both a benefit conferred on Barbara and a legal detriment suffered by Brian. (FAC ¶ 36.) Consideration may be by act, forbearance to act, promise, or change in legal status. (Civ. Code, §§ 1605- 1615.) Whether that consideration is adequate or factually supported is not properly resolved on demurrer.

SOL: Further, the FAC is not time-barred on the face of the FAC. Defendant points to both Section 366.3 and 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 366.3 provides a one-year limitations period, running from the date of the decedent’s death, for claims

arising from a promise to make a distribution from an estate or trust after death. Because Brian seeks to enforce Barbara’s alleged promise, not a promise by their father, section 366.3 appears inapplicable.

Section 339 provides for a two-year limitations period for a cause of action based upon a breach of an oral contact and a four-year limitations period for a cause of action based upon breach of a written contract. Here, the FAC does not specifically allege whether the cause of action is based upon an oral or written agreement. Rather, the FAC alleges an agreement generally with written and oral acknowledgements, assurances and/or confirmations. (See FAC, ¶¶ 2, 22, 63.)

Notably, despite quoting the demurrer statute, Defendant did not demur on the ground that “it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(g). See also, Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p. 5, line 24-p.6, line 1 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10].)

If based on an oral contract, the claim may be time-barred. The FAC alleges that Defendant “unequivocally promised that, upon their father’s death, she would immediately transfer to Brian the funds she received so he could use them for his sons’ benefit.” (FAC, ¶ 1, emphasis supplied.) The FAC alleges that their father died on or about 4/4/23. (FAC, ¶ 23.) Plaintiff did not file this action until 8/8/25 – over 2 years after their father’s death. Notably, however, an acknowledgement may toll the limitations period. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 360. See also, Dawadi v. Adhikari (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 558, 562 [discussing distinction between acknowledgements made before and after the statute of limitations has run].)

Here, the FAC does not establish on its face that the claim is time-barred as argued by Defendant.

Uncertainty: Finally, Defendant fails to show how the first cause of action is uncertain. A party attacking a pleading on “uncertainty” grounds must specify how and why the pleading is uncertain, and where that uncertainty can be found in the challenged pleading. (Fenton v. Groveland

Community Services Dept. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809 (disapproved on other grounds in Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300).) Here, the demur merely concludes, without showing, that the first cause of action is uncertain.

The demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of contract is therefore OVERRULED.

2nd C/A (conversion)

Defendant argues that insufficient facts are alleged in the FAC to support the second cause of action for conversion and that the claim is also uncertain.

Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another. (Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403-1404; Los Angeles Fed. Credit Union v. Madatyan (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1387 [wrongful interference with insurance proceeds].) The elements for a claim of conversion are: “(1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property right; and (3) damages.” (IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 650.)

The FAC sufficiently alleges each element of conversion. It alleges Brian owned, possessed, or had the immediate and exclusive right to possess the personal property located at the Property, including Father’s diaries, Mother’s Japanese cookware, a Tiffany lamp, Dansk bowls and dishes, Asian rugs, silverware, and other household items. (FAC ¶ 40.) It further alleges Barbara expressly told Brian that she did not want any of the personal property and that Brian could have all of it, and that Brian accepted that offer. (FAC ¶ 41.)

The FAC alleges Barbara thereafter intentionally and without Brian’s consent took possession of, removed, and/or destroyed the property, thereby exercising dominion and control over it in a manner inconsistent with Brian’s rights. (FAC ¶¶ 42–45.) Finally, the FAC alleges Brian suffered damages, including the fair market value of the converted property and consequential damages. (FAC ¶ 46.)

While Defendant complains that the terms of a family trust are not set forth in the FAC and that a copy is not attached to the FAC, Defendant fails to show that such is required to overcome the demurrer.

Nor is the claim uncertain. A demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading, but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made. (People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal. 2d 872, 883.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action for conversion is OVERRULED.

3rd C/A (IIED)

Defendant argues that insufficient facts are alleged in the FAC to support the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion distress and that the claim is also uncertain. More specifically, Defendant argues that the FAC fails to include allegations that the alleged “extreme and outrageous conduct” occurred in Plaintiff’s presence. According to the FAC, Defendant intentionally “destroyed, discarded, or otherwise permanently disposed of his Father’s personal diaries and his Mother’s Japanese cookware” after being told of their ownership and special significance to Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 51.)

To prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, plaintiff must prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 [internal quotes omitted].) The conduct must be so extreme as to be beyond all bounds of decency tolerated by society. (Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th at 1050-1051.) Mere

indignities, insults, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions and the like are not enough. (Id. at p. 1051.) The test is whether a reasonable community member, hearing what defendant did, would feel resentment and exclaim “Outrageous!” (Rest.2d Torts § 46, comm. d; see Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.)

Behavior may be considered “outrageous” if defendant knows plaintiff is vulnerable to injuries through mental distress; or abuses a relation or position that gives defendant power to damage plaintiff's interest; or acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. (See McDaniel v. Gile (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 363, 372-373.)

The FAC adequately alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. It alleges the intentional destruction of specifically identified, irreplaceable family heirlooms after Defendant was told they belonged to Plaintiff and held profound sentimental value to him. (FAC ¶¶ 49–52.) The FAC also adequately alleges that the conduct was directed at Plaintiff because Defendant knew the items belonged to Plaintiff, knew their special emotional significance to him, and allegedly destroyed them for that reason. (FAC ¶¶ 50– 53.)

Physical presence is not required where the alleged conduct was directed at the plaintiff. (See Christensen v. Superior Court (Pasadena Crematorium of Altadena) (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903-906 [IIED conduct “must be directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware”].) Further, the FAC alleges targeted emotional harm from the intentional destruction of irreplaceable heirlooms, not merely economic loss from damaged property.

The court finds that sufficient allegations are pled to overcome the demurrer and therefore OVERRULES the demurrer to the third cause of action.

4th C/A (promissory estoppel)

Defendant first argues that the fourth cause of action for promissory estoppel is inconsistent with the first cause of

action for breach of contract. A plaintiff however may plead alternative and inconsistent theories. (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402.)

Without much analysis, Defendant also argues that “the same standing and statute of limitations issues” raised with the breach of contract claim apply. The argument fails for the reasons discussed above.

As such, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action for promissory estoppel.

Plaintiff to give notice.

2. Motion to Strike

The court DENIES Defendant BARBARA YOUNG’s motion to strike the following portions of the First Amended Complaint (FAC) filed by Plaintiff BRIAN YOUNG concerning punitive damages: ¶ 47 and Prayer ¶ 3.

Punitive damages are available where plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294(a); Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 137, 148.) Malice, oppression and fraud are defined as follows: (1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ.

Code, § 3294(c).)

The complaint must allege specific factual allegations to support a request for punitive damages. (See, e.g., Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [allegations that defendant’s conduct

was intentional, willful, malicious, performed with ill will, and in conscious disregard of plaintiffs’ rights does not satisfy the specific pleading requirement].) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim . . . .” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Here, the FAC alleges specific facts sufficient to overcome the motion to strike. For example, the FAC alleges Defendant told Plaintiff he could have all of the personal property, that Plaintiff accepted ownership, and that Defendant was instructed through counsel not to sell, remove, or dispose of any items without Defendant’s consent. (FAC ¶¶ 30, 31, 40–42.) Despite that notice, Defendant allegedly intentionally removed or destroyed the property, including their Father’s diaries and Mother’s Japanese cookware, knowing the items belonged to Defendant and had unique and irreplaceable sentimental value. (FAC ¶¶ 43–47, 49–52.) These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to meet the requirements of Civil Code section 3294.

Accordingly, the motion to strike the punitive damages allegation is DENIED.

Defendant SHALL answer the FAC within 30 days.

Plaintiff to give notice.

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