Torres vs. Northgate Gonzalez Markets, Inc

Moving parties, however, do not show Lynch’s ability to comply with the court’s 2/20/26 sanctions order. In fact, Lynch shows he is unable to pay the sanctions order. (See Lynch Decl. ¶¶ 3-11, Exh. 3 [re inability to work and income insufficient to cover monthly costs].) As such, moving parties have not shown willful disobedience, a prerequisite for a contempt order.

Moreover, a sanctions order is enforceable in the same was as a “money judgment”. As such, contempt does not appear to be appropriate here.

In sum, the motion is DENIED.

Moving parties to give notice.

10 Torres vs. Motion for Spoliation Sanctions Northgate Gonzalez Markets, The court DENIES Plaintiff JAVIER NAVARRO TORRES’s Inc Motion for Spoilation Sanctions against Defendant NORTHGATE GONZALEZ, LLC.

Sanctions for Spoilation of Evidence

The court may impose sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) Sanctionable discovery abuses include, among other things, spoliation of evidence. (Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 191, disapproved of on other ground by Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493.) Spoliation of evidence “is defined as the destruction or alteration of relevant evidence or the failure to preserve evidence for another party’s use in pending or future litigation.” (Victor Valley Union High School District v.

Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1139 [citing other cases].) “[T]he party moving for discovery sanctions based on the spoliation of evidence must make an initial prima facie showing that the responding party in fact destroyed evidence that had a substantial probability of damaging the moving party’s ability to establish an essential element of his claim or

defense.” (Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227 [citing National Council Against Health Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1346-1347 and cases cited therein].)

Importantly, the court must tailor the sanction for such conduct to “fit the crime.” (Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1293.) The court cannot impose sanctions as punishment; the choice of sanctions should not give the moving party more than it would have gotten had the discovery been responded to. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992; Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 300, 303.)

Monetary sanctions or evidentiary sanctions may be imposed for misuse of the discovery process. (See, e.g., Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Henning (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 57, 76 [regarding monetary sanctions in the form of attorneys fees based on a party and the party’s counsel’s egregious litigation conduct, including destroying and hiding evidence after communication to “get rid of certain” evidence]; Victor Valley Union High School Dist. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1139.)

Terminating sanctions are also available but only where a party engages in egregious and deliberate misconduct. (Dept. of Forestry, 18 Cal.App.5th at 191-198 [finding the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions where substantial evidence supported the department’s willful, repeated and egregious misuses of the discovery process, including presenting false, misleading, or evasive discovery responses, presenting false and evasive deposition testimony, engaging in spoliation of field notes despite probable litigation], disapproved of on other ground by Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493.)

In Williams v. Russ, the plaintiff sued his former attorney for legal malpractice. (Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1218.) While the action was pending, the plaintiff obtained his entire client file in the underlying litigation. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s current attorney reviewed the

file, warned the defendant that evidence in the file supported new claims, and thereafter, amended the complaint accordingly. (Id. at 1224.) Over the next few months, the plaintiff fell into a pattern of either late or partial payments for storage facility where he kept the client file. (Ibid.) Several months later, the boxes containing his client file were destroyed. (Id. at 1218.) The plaintiff did not immediately disclose this fact until over three years later, after defendant made a discovery request for the entire client file. (Ibid.)

The Russ court concluded the plaintiff’s conduct “at least raises an inference that, after cherry-picking favorable new information from the file, [the plaintiff] chose to stand by and allow the rest of the files to be destroyed” and “that at least one reason for having done so would be to prevent [the former attorney] from obtaining other documents from the file that were unfavorable to [the plaintiff].” (Id. at 1224.) The Russ court noted several evidentiary conflicts supporting the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had acted intentionally, including no evidence to support the plaintiff’s claimed financial difficulties or medical condition excusing his conduct. (See id. at 1224-1225.) The Russ court ultimately affirmed the termination of the plaintiff’s complaint, finding no abuse of discretion. (Id. at 1224- 1228.)

Spoliation

Here, it is undisputed Defendant failed to preserve a 90- minute video file while litigation was reasonably foreseeable, in violation of Defendant’s duty to preserve relevant evidence.

Plaintiff requests the following sanctions:

(1) Issue sanctions deeming liability-related facts established. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that that the court issue an order establishing that (a) the floor was hazardous at the time of Plaintiff’s fall; (b) Defendant failed to inspect or maintain the area; and (c) the missing video would have been unfavorable to Defendant.

(2) Evidentiary sanctions preventing Defendant from contradicting those facts.

(3) Monetary sanctions for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion.

(4) Terminating sanctions if the court finds willfulness or bad faith.

First, terminating sanctions is inappropriate here. Plaintiff does not show the spoliation was willful. After its duty preserve arose, Defendant transferred the video to its network-attached system to prevent the video file from being overwritten as part of the routine operation of the electronic surveillance system and system server. (Ocegueda Decl. ¶ 6.) While in storage, the video file became corrupted. (See id. at ¶¶ 7-8.)

Plaintiff notes that Defendant chose a storage system with no backup, but Plaintiff cites no authority requiring a Defendant to maintain an extra copy of preserved evidence, and this court is aware of none.

Nor does Plaintiff show any intentional conduct causing the corruption. Rather, while the 90-minute video is apparently corrupted, Plaintiff was able to produce an incident clip and a still image, which supports a finding that the corruption was not intentional.

This case is distinguishable from the situation in Williams v. Russ, where the offending party’s actions directly led to the destruction of the relevant client file. Here, the only evidence of possible wrongdoing is the corrupted video file itself and the fact Defendant had access to the video file. Without more, the facts are insufficient support a reasonable inference that Defendant intentionally, recklessly, or willfully corrupted or otherwise destroyed the file.

The requested issue and evidentiary sanctions also appear to be inappropriate here. First, the court record includes only hearsay evidence that the video file is beyond full or even partial restoration. (See Ocegueda Decl. ¶ 9.) There is

no evidence that Plaintiff requested repair logs, error logs, or emails documenting the corruption event and no evidence proffered that Defendant failed to provide such. There is also no evidence a forensic expert reviewed the relevant system(s) and documentation and concluded the file is unrestorable. The court notes that whether and to the extent the video file can be restored affects the level of prejudice Plaintiff may suffer.

Further, assuming the video file is corrupted, Plaintiff fails to show that the corrupted evidence had a substantial probability of damaging Plaintiff’s ability to establish an essential element of his claim. (Williams v. Russ, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1227.) No evidence is presented suggesting the video would have shown a failure to inspect or maintain the area or would have contained other unfavorable evidence. Again, the court cannot impose sanctions as punishment and Plaintiff cannot obtain more than he would have gotten had the evidence been produced in a non-corrupted form. (See e.g, Doppes, 174 Cal.App.4th at 992.)

As for the request for monetary sanctions for attorney fees and costs in bringing this motion, Plaintiff does not request or support any particular amount of monetary sanctions. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040 requires any request for sanction be “accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.” Due process also requires notice of the amount being requested.

In sum, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

Defendant to give notice.

11 Vo vs. Mercedes- Motion to Compel Arbitration Benz USA, LLC The court GRANTS Defendant MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC’s (“Moving Defendant”) motion to compel Plaintiff PHAT TAN VO to arbitrate his claims against Defendant Mercedes-Benz and staying this action pending completion of arbitration.

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