Catherine D Holmes et al v. FCA US LLC et al

B. LEGAL BACKGROUND

“Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer, the same rules apply.” (Hightower v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (1995)

38 Cal.App.4th 853, 858.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore treated as “admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court must “construe the allegations of a complaint liberally in favor of the pleader.” (Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 438.) Court must also accept as true facts that may be inferred from those expressly alleged. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405.)

The Court may also consider as grounds for granting the motion any matter that is judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) Because the motion tests “only the legal sufficiency of the pleading...the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove the[] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-14.)

C. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1. The Complaint Fails to Allege that the Subject Vehicle is Defective

FCA first argues that “Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim fails to allege with sufficient particularity the defect FCA allegedly concealed. The Complaint merely describes a list of ways in which the Jeep Wrangler’s engine may be defective that could result in a variety of problems and hazardous driving conditions due to the purported ‘Engine Defect’. [Citation.] None of these allegations identify the defect, let alone the defect in the subject vehicle at issue in this case.” (Support Memo at 5:18-22.) The Court agrees.

California’s fraudulent concealment statute provides that “[o]ne who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” (Civil Code § 1709.) For purposes of that section, a “deceit” includes, “[t]he suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact.” (Civil Code § 1710, subd. (3).)

Plaintiffs allege that “FCA committed fraud by allowing the Subject Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiffs without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle equipped with the 2.0L engine was defective . . ..” (Complaint at ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs do not, however, so far as the Court can find, allege that the specific vehicle that Plaintiffs allegedly purchased (Subject Vehicle) is defective. Rather, Plaintiffs allege, in the abstract, that “Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and thereon alleges [sic] that FCA knew since prior to Plaintiffs purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2021 Jeep Wrangler vehicles equipped with the 2.0L engine have one or more defects that can result loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the ‘Engine Defect’).” (Complaint at ¶ 16.)

The Court can find no allegation that the Subject Vehicle suffers from one or more of these “Engine Defects.”

Plaintiffs appear to concede the foregoing by failing to file any opposition to the instant motion.

In the absence of allegations that the Subject Vehicle suffers from any specific defect, the Complaint fails to state a claim for fraudulent concealment of defects.

2. The Complaint Alleges Facts that Disclose that the Fraudulent Concealment Claim is Time-Barred

A general demurrer, and by extension a motion for judgment on the pleadings, will lie “where the complaint has included allegations that clearly disclose some defense or bar to recovery.” (Cryolife, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152.) Where a plaintiff has pled facts that appear to demonstrate an affirmative defense to the claims, they must then “plead around” the defense by alleging facts sufficient to avoid the apparent defense. (See Gentry v. eBay Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 825.)

However, “‘[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar ... to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.)

The statute of limitations on a fraud claim is three years. (See § 338, subd. (d).)

“Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ [Citation.]” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) California’s fraudulent concealment statute provides that “[o]ne who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” (Civil Code § 1709.) “[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Jones v.

ConocoPhillips Co., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1198.)

Through the Complaint, filed June 17, 2025, Plaintiffs allege that, “[o]n or about September 28, 2021, Plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2021 Jeep Wrangler . . . (hereafter ‘Subject Vehicle’), which was manufactured and or distributed by Defendant FCA.” (Complaint at ¶ 7.) The Concealment Claim is based on allegations that Defendant failed to disclose one or more defects relating to the engine of the vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that, “Plaintiffs were harmed by purchasing vehicle that Plaintiffs would not have leased and/or purchased had Plaintiffs known the true facts about the Engine Defect.” (Id. at ¶ 71.)

Taking, for purposes of the instant motion, these allegations as true, the Court finds that the cause of action was complete with all of its elements when Plaintiffs altered their (collective) position on September 28, 2021; more than three years before filing the Complaint.

Plaintiffs appear to concede the foregoing by failing to file anything in opposition to the instant motion.

Finally, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs have pled around the statute of limitations defense. “In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ [Citation.] In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff to ‘show diligence’; ‘conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.’ [Citation.]” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 808.)

The Complaint contains a section titled “Tolling of Statutes of Limitations.” (See id. at 5:21, et seq.) Paragraph 37 contains exclusively legal argument. Paragraph 39 asserts a revocation of acceptance of the subject vehicle. Paragraph 38 alleges only that “Plaintiffs discovered Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following FCA’s unsuccessful attempts to repair them.” The Court finds these allegations wholly insufficient to invoke the delayed discovery rule pursuant to the holding in Fox.

3. Leave to Amend

Generally, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that a plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) However, the pleading party bears the burden of showing such reasonable possibility. (Ibid.) Here, the burden is on Plaintiffs to show in what manner they can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Ibid.; Medina v. Safe Guard Products (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 105, 112 n.8; see also Heritage Pac. Fin’l, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 994 [court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to amend where, despite ample opportunity, plaintiff failed to demonstrate it could cure defect].)

As noted, Plaintiffs failed to file anything in opposition to the instant motion and failed to request leave to amend the Complaint to state a good Concealment Claim. The motion is, therefore, GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

PROBATE CALENDAR – Hon. Joseph J. Solga, Dept. B (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Conservatorship of Arturo Manuel Cruz 25PR000053

REVIEW – 1ST YEAR

TENTATIVE RULING: The matter is CONTINUED to June 03, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. B to allow the Conservators to file: (1) Notice of Conservatee’s Rights (Judicial Council form GC-341) mailed to relatives of the proposed Conservatee within the second degree; and (2) Care Plan (Judicial Council form GC-355/356). The Clerk is directed to send notice to the parties.

Conservators are encouraged to contact the Court's Self-Help Center, located on the lower level of the Historic Courthouse at 825 Brown Street, for assistance.

Estate of Mark Wayne Miller 25PR000059

STATUS HEARING RE: FINAL DISTRIBUTION

TENTATIVE RULING: A status report is on file. Based on the Court’s review of the status report, the Court determines that continuation of administration is in the best interests of the estate and/or of interested persons. Thus, the Court orders that administration of the estate continue. (Prob. Code, § 12201, subd. (c)(2).) The matter is CONTINUED to April 06, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. B. The Status Hearing may be vacated if, prior thereto, the personal representative files a petition for an order for final distribution. The personal representative shall file a status report 10 days prior to the next hearing. The Clerk is directed to provide notice to the parties.

In The Matter of George J Manyik 26PR000065 and Antoinette J Manyik Family Trust

PETITION TO MODIFY TRUST RE: SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES

APPEARANCE REQUIRED. Petitioner does not, through the instant Petition, seek to resign, and does not seek an order naming Tammy L. Duda as Successor Trustee. Rather, Petitioner seeks to modify the Trust itself to provide for Tammy L. Duda as Successor Trustee, and further to permit Petitioner to resign upon 30 days’ notice in the future.

The Court is concerned, however, that the prayed for approach would, upon any such resignation, effect a violation of Probate Code section 15602, subdivision (a)(3). That statute provides that a trustee is required to give a bond when “an individual who is not named as a trustee in the trust instrument is appointed as a trustee by the court.” Section 15602, subdivision (b), states: “The court may not . . . excuse the requirement of a bond for the individual described in [(a)(3)], except under compelling circumstances. For the purposes of this section, a request by all adult beneficiaries of a trust that bond be waived for an individual described in [(a)(3)] is deemed to constitute a compelling circumstance.”

The Court would like counsel to appear to discuss the foregoing.

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