Genevieve Welsh v. Thomas Brown et al

appear and object to the petition orally or in writing at the hearing. (See Prob. Code § 1043.) If there are no objections, the Court is inclined to grant the Petition.

Conservatorship of Marvin M Braun 26PR000042

REVIEW HEARING – CONFIRM CONSERVATEE CONSENTS TO PREVIOUS ORDERS

APPEARANCE REQUIRED

Conservatorship of Merrily Wilkinson 26PR000046

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF PROBATE CONSERVATOR OF THE PERSON

APPEARANCE REQUIRED. By Minute Order of April 07, 2026, the matter was continued to allow Petitioner to file a Confidential Capacity Assessment and Declaration (Judicial Counsel form GC-335). There is still no GC-335. Counsel for Petitioner shall appear to inform the Court regarding the status of the GC-335.

Conservatorship of Earl Dean Pairett 26PR000070

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF PROBATE CONSERVATOR OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE

TENTATIVE RULING: The matter is CONTINUED to June 02, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. A to permit Petitioner to provide sufficient Notice of Hearing to Cindy Johnson Mederios. The proof of service on Ms. Johnson Mederios indicates insufficient notice pursuant to Probate Code section 1461.5.

The Order Appointing Temporary Conservator is hereby modified to expire on the continued hearing date.

CIVIL LAW & MOTION CALENDAR – Hon. Cynthia P. Smith, Dept. A (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Genevieve Welsh v. Thomas Brown et al 22CV000460

MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF PARTY

APPEARANCE REQUIRED: The motion is GRANTED. The Court is willing to add the matter to its trial calendar beginning any of the weeks of September 21, September 28, October 5, or October 12. Counsel are directed to meet and confer to select from these dates. The Court will reset the matter at the hearing. 3

The moving party failed to include in the notice of this motion proper notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 2.9. Moving party is directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the missing notice to opposing party/ies forthwith. The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

Genevieve Welsh v. Robert Fanucci, et al. 22CV001147

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO LIFT DISCOVERY STAY IMPOSED DECEMBER 2, 2024

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. The stay ordered by the Court on December 2, 2024, is hereby LIFTED. The matter is set for Case Management Conference on July 22, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. B. The parties should be prepared to set the matter for trial at the Case Management Conference.

Plaintiff Genevieve Welsh moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a): (1) for an order lifting the discovery stay in the matter; and (2) for scheduling of trial in the matter trailing that in Napa County Superior Court Case No. 22CV000460 captioned Genevieve Welsh v. Thomas Brown, et al. (Brown Action).

By Order After Hearing entered December 2, 2024 (12/2/24 OAH), the Court stayed the matter pending resolution of Genevieve Welsh v. Thomas Brown, et al., Case No. 22CV000460 in the Napa County Superior Court (Welsh v. Brown). As the Court noted at the time, “Defendants seek a stay pending full resolution of Welsh v. Brown. The Court acknowledges, however, the possibility that resolution of certain issues involved in that action may, prior to full resolution of the action, justify lifting the present stay. This ruling is therefore made without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to move the Court for an order lifting the stay.” (Id. at p. 3.)

Defendant contends that “[t]he factual and procedural landscape has materially changed in the sixteen months since the stay was imposed.” (Support Memorandum at 2:2-3.) The Court agrees, though not necessarily for the reasons urged by Defendant.

The Court concludes that the purpose of the stay has been accomplished by the passage of time and the progress towards trial in Welsh v. Brown. Nothing has changed the Court’s conclusion that “the claims for legal malpractice asserted here arise out of Defendant's transactional work for Plaintiff and the defendant in Welsh v. Brown, and . . . determinations regarding the effect, validity, and interpretation of the several transactional documents that were produced by that work are central to the Welsh v. Brown action . . . [and] . . . Plaintiff's damages claims, here, are, to a great degree, dependent on determinations regarding the effect, validity, and interpretation of the transactional documents that are at issue in Welsh v. Brown.” (12/2/24 OAH at p. 2.) For this reason, the Court finds good cause for ordering that any trial in this action will trail the trial in Welsh v. Brown.

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