Jose Sanchez Beltran v. General Motors, LLC, et al.

CASE NUMBER: 23STCV00451 OPPOSED ___________________________________________________________________ Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Beltran’s Motion for Attorney Fees ___________________________________________________________________ Facts: This is a lemon law action. The Complaint alleges as follows. Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Beltran (“Plaintiff”) purchased a 2022 Chevrolet Suburban on July 18, 2022, with an express written warranty. (Complaint ¶¶ 2?3.) During the warranty period the vehicle contained or developed defects that the manufacturer was unable to fix. (Complaint ¶¶ 3?5.)

Procedural History: Plaintiff filed the Complaint on January 10, 2023, alleging one cause of action under the Song Beverly Act. Defendant General Motors, LLC filed an answer on February 9, 2023. Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement on October 7, 2025. Plaintiff filed the present motion for attorney fees on April 22, 2026. Defendant filed an opposition on May 4, 2026. Plaintiff filed a reply on May 11, 2026.

Analysis

I. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES Parties to litigation must generally bear their own attorney’s fees, unless they otherwise agree. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.) However, the Song-Beverly Act provides for the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs as follows:

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment. (See id.)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. “Fundamental to its determination . . . [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).) A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney. (Id. at p. 49.)?

Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV).) The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys’ fees are recoverable. (See id. at p. 624.)

Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Beltran (“Plaintiff”), following the settlement of his Song Beverly claim, seeks $55,971.88 in attorney fees as a prevailing party, representing a lodestar of $44,777.50 plus a 1.25x multiplier of $11,194.38, and fees and expenses in the amount of $1,883.18. (Motion at p. 6.) The lodestar amount of $44,777.50 represents 104 hours of work by eight timekeepers’ three attorneys and five paralegals, with paralegal rates ranging from $150 to $200, and attorney rates ranging from $600 to $750 per hour, with a mean hourly rate across timekeepers of $430.55. (Inscore Decl. Exh. 1.)

As an initial matter, no lodestar multiplier is appropriate in this case. “Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative “multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank., N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.) The court’s file and the billings submitted in support of the motion demonstrate that this lemon law case, which did not proceed to trial, was not particularly novel or complex.

Secondly, Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) does not challenge the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff’s counsel, which are in the main well-supported by relevant surveys and prior awards in other cases in which similar rates were awarded. (Inscore Decl. ¶¶ 13?15, Exhs. 2?5.)) But the evidence does not necessarily reflect that all hourly rates sought are reasonable. The “reasonable hourly rate [used to calculate the lodestar] is the product of a multiplicity of factors ... the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney's reputation, and the undesirability of the case.” (Ketchum v.

Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139.) Here, Plaintiffs present prior cases in which the rates sought were awarded, yet no case reflects the desired $650 rate for Drew Burford, $600 rate for Daniel Inscore, or $200 rate for Amr Ulloa. (Inscore Decl. Exh. 1.) The nearest decision presented by Plaintiff as of April 20, 2026, shows that Burford was awarded fees at $600 per hour, Inscore at $575, and Ulloa at $175. (Inscore Decl. ¶ 14a.) Applying these modest reductions to these three timekeepers yields a lodestar reduction of $1,207.50.

Defendant argues that this matter was overstaffed. (Opposition at pp. 12?13.) it is true that unreasonable multiplicity of attorneys performing duplicative work may furnish a basis to substantially reduce a cost award. In Morris v. Hyundai Motors America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5 th 24, the trial court substantially reduced a requested attorney fees award involving 11 attorneys and two firms in a lemon law action. (Id. at p. 32.) “Out of a total of 283.3 hours of billed work, the court did not award any fees for 83.5 hours of work billed by six associates.” (Ibid.)

The appellate court affirmed: “Plainly, it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Id. at p. 39.) The appellate court determined that the trial court’s remedy of cutting out several attorneys’ billings was permissible because it “was designed to yield a revised lodestar figure that reflected a total amount of fees that were reasonably incurred.” (Id. at p. 40.)

The present motion presents eight timekeepers on Plaintiff’s case. But a large number of timekeepers is not on its own reason to reduce a fee award, and the cases cited above upheld lodestar reductions based on the “duplicative’ and “inefficient’ billings that resulted from the number of attorneys employed. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5 th at p. 255; Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5 th at p. 40.) Here the number of timekeepers employed does not indicate a systemic inefficiency of litigation in this matter; it rather appears from the billing records produced that different timekeepers were employed to address different tasks or aspects of the case. Where duplication of work appears in the billings, it is more properly addressed by deducting the duplicative billings as they arise.

Defendant next argues that various charges for which Plaintiff here seeks compensation are excessive in relation to the simplicity and largely template-based nature of this litigation. (Opposition at pp. 9?12.) According to Defendant, these overcharged areas consist of virtually all aspects of the case, including pre-lawsuit investigation, complaint preparation, discovery and service of subpoenas, motions in limine, post-settlement negotiations concerning delivery of the vehicle and payment, and the present motion. (Opposition at pp. 9?12.)

Much of Defendant’s argument on this point is unpersuasive. The hours billed for drafting Plaintiff’s complaint, preparing, responding to, and reviewing discovery, and drafting and reviewing motions in limine indeed involved work largely templated from prior cases, as demonstrated by the declaration of Defendant’s counsel. (Bowton Decl. Exhs. A?H.) But the time charged for such work already reflects the availability of templates to Plaintiff’s counsel, and no reduction is required beyond that already reflected in the billings. (Inscore Decl. Exh. 1.)

However, some reduction is appropriate. The billings indeed reflect, not merely substantial pre-litigation investigation of Plaintiff’s claims, but two separate instances in which an attorney engaged in “lengthy’ conferences with the client, including two separate test-drives of the vehicle. (Inscore Decl. Exh. 1, 12/15/22, 5/16/23.) These charges are unusual and unreasonable, in light of the already-substantial time expended on investigation, and together amount to a charge of $3,525.00. This is properly reduced from the lodestar.

Additionally, the time incurred in preparing the present fees motion was excessive. In addition to being largely a product of templates, the charges reflect successive hours of finalization and review by three different timekeepers, in addition to the time spent drafting the motion and auditing the associated records. (Inscore Decl. Exh. 1, 4/17?22/26.) These charges are excessive. The six hours in finalization charges’ amounting to $3,000.00 at the reduced hourly rates set forth above’ are properly deducted in their entirety from the lodestar.

Likewise, the seven hours and three timekeepers anticipated to prepare, revise, and finalize a reply are also excessive, and the 2.5 hours charged by Susan Yeck at $750 per hour for this task are redundant of work already charged at lesser rates. Thus an additional $1,875.o0 is properly reduced from the lodestar. Accordingly, the fee lodestar is properly reduced from $44,777.50 to $35,170.00.

Defendant also objects to the costs sought as follows: $22.89 for filing fees associated with the reply for the present motion; $865 for deposition subpoenas; and $150 for courtesy copies. (Opposition at pp. 13?14.) The costs associated with the filing of the reply and with the service of deposition subpoenas are not properly deducted, as they were reasonably necessary to the advancement of this litigation. The charges for courtesy copies are associated with the present motion and reply papers, and are likewise compensable as “expenses’ under the Civil Code § 1794, subd. (d). (See Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 138 disapproved on other grounds by Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189.) Thus the motion is GRANTED for fees in the amount of $35,170.00 and costs in the amount of $1,883.18.

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Department 732 Jose sanchez beltraN, Plaintiff v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No.:

Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Beltran’s Motion for Attorney Fees Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Beltran’s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED for fees in the amount of $35,170.00 and costs in the amount of $1,883.18. Plaintiffs to give notice. Dated: May 18, 2026 __________________________________________ Hon. Richard S. Kemalyan Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 24STCV19576 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 732 Blue Oceanside Holdings, LLC v. Raul Hinojosa, et al. Monday, May 18, 2026