Demurrer
question is resolved.” (Id. at Ex. B.)
Counsel even asked Plaintiffs whether they would waive their right to appeal, and also inquired of Judgment Debtor. (Ibid.)
Counsel also affirms that at the time of this email exchange, Counsel did not have the funds. (Obas Decl., ¶ 10.)
Rather, it was Plaintiff’s counsel who was not complying with the inquiry regarding Plaintiffs’ right to appeal; Plaintiff’s counsel threatened to sue Counsel’s client for breach of contract. (Id. at Ex. C.)
On January 23, 2026, Counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel that Judgment Debtor agreed to waive its right to an appeal, and asked Plaintiff’s counsel if they agreed as well, so that proposed settlement agreements could be sent. (Id. at Ex. D.)
Instead of declining to waive Plaintiffs’ right to an appeal, Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that he was filing the present motion. (Id. at Ex. E.)
Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence to support their claims that Counsel engaged in conduct that warrants him to be held in contempt.
The Court will not address the separate requests in the present motion because they depend on the fact that Counsel was in contempt.
Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to: (1) request that the Court to schedule an Order to Show Cause why Counsel should not be held in contempt; (2) request that the Court to schedule an Order to Show Cause why Counsel should not be jailed and sanctioned; (3) request for sanctions and attorney’s fees; and (4) for Counsel to be jailed for five days.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt (CCP 1209) is denied.
Department 516 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Case Name: Sanders v. Spiritual Pink, et al. Case No.: 24STCV12815 Matter: Demurrer Moving Party: Defendant Santee Maple Alley Association Responding Party: Plaintiff Johan Sanders Tentative Ruling: Santee Alley Maple Association’s demurrer is sustained.
Plaintiff Johan Sanders (“Sanders”) filed this action against Defendants Spiritual Pink, an unknown entity, Downtown Los Angeles Property Owners Association, a California corporation, Maple Avenue L.P., a California Limited Partnership, Sean Doe (“Doe”), an individual, and Does 1 to 100.
On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for the causes of action: (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligence; and (5) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.
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Plaintiff named Santee Maple Alley Association, a California nonprofit (“Santee Maple”), and Green Knight Security, Inc., a California stock corporation.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 8, 2022, Plaintiff was on the premises located at 1121 Maple Avenue, Los Angeles, CA, 90015 (“Subject Premises”), when Doe and other unidentified employees physically attacked and assaulted Plaintiff.
The FAC alleges that on August 9, 2022, Plaintiff returned to the Subject Premises and the events of June 8, 2022, occurred again.
On February 19, 2026, the Court sustained Santee Maple’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC with leave to amend.
On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) realleging the same five causes of action.
Santee Maple demurs to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for negligence and fifth cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.
Plaintiff opposes.
Legal Standard
A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)¿The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law.¿(Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.)¿?In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 452.)¿The court?? “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .”??¿ (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)¿In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.¿(Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)
Judicial Notice
Santee Maple requests the Court to take judicial notice of two legal documents and one fact.
The Court takes judicial notice of recorded documents, Exhibits B and C, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h).
Analysis
Meet and Confer
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, “a demurring party is required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or video conference with the party that filed the pleading. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).)
The parties did not fulfill their meet-and-confer obligations.
Santee Maple emailed Plaintiff on March 31, 2026, and called Plaintiff the next day on March 31, 2026, to attempt to meet and confer. (Daley Decl., ¶ 2.)
Santee Maple states that Plaintiff did not respond to its correspondence, and Plaintiff did not dispute the claim.
Thus, parties did not meet and confer.
In the interest of judicial efficiency, the Court has reviewed the merits of the moving papers despite the parties’ noncompliance with the meet-and-confer requirements.
Demurrer
Santee Maple demurs, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for negligence, and fifth cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention on the grounds of uncertainty, and for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
Uncertainty for the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), a demurrer must be sustained if a pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)
The term uncertain means “ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Ibid.)
However, demurrers for uncertainty will not be sustained unless??the pleading is so incomprehensi[ve] that a defendant could not reasonably respond.”? (A. J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695, quoting Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn.3 (A.J. Fistes Corp.).)
Santee Maple’s notice of demurrer states that Plaintiff’s complaint is uncertain.
However, looking at the SAC as a whole, it is not incomprehensible.
The SAC alleges sufficient facts for Santee Maple to respond.
Thus, the Court overrules Santee Maple’s demurrer on the fourth and fifth causes of action for uncertainty.
Failure to State a Cause of Action
Fourth Cause of Action?Negligence
“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the “defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.”? (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213.)
“A duty exists only if??the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.”?? (Ibid.)
Moreover, a “special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one that “gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that “entails an ability to control [the third party's] conduct.” [Citation.]
Relationships between parents and children, colleges and students, employers and employees, common carriers and passengers, and innkeepers and guests, are all examples of special relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to protect. [Citation.]
The existence of such a special relationship puts the defendant in a unique position to protect the plaintiff from injury.
The law requires the defendant to use this position accordingly. [Citation.]? (Id. at p. 215-16.)
??Courts have found such a special relationship in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.”? (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 535 (Melton).)
Santee Maple argues that it did not owe Plaintiff a duty because it is not the owner of the premises.
However, ownership is not the only way to have a duty of care in premises liability.
Santee Maple cites to Melton, where the court recognized that special relationships can exist between??business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.”? (Melton, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.)
Similarly, a defendant’s “lack of ownership or right to maintain the property was important but not conclusive.
Where a business expressly or impliedly adopts the property of another and invites others to use it, that business “owes to such invitee a duty to exercise reasonable care to see that the property is safe.”? (Hassaine v. Club Demonstration Services, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 843, 855.)
Plaintiff argues that because he was on the premises, in a vulnerable situation, and Santee Maple employed Doe and the other aggressors, Santee Maple owed him a duty.
The Court previously addressed the defects in the SAC, particularly in that Plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory. (February 19, 2026, Minute Order.)
The SAC, however, does not cure this defect.
The SAC does not allege sufficient facts to allege that Santee Maple owed a duty to Plaintiff.
The SAC changed three paragraphs in the SAC to attempt to allege duty. (See SAC, ¶ 35.)
Plaintiff argues that Santee Maple and its co-defendants undertook providing security of the premises.
However, the SAC?s allegations are conclusory.
While Plaintiff is correct that, at this point in the proceedings, he is not required to prove his allegations, he must allege facts sufficient to state a viable cause of action. (See C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
In reviewing the Complaint as a whole and accepting all allegations as true, the SAC still lacks allegations that Santee Maple owed Plaintiff a duty.
Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for the element of duty in Plaintiff’s claims for negligence.
Therefore, the Court sustains Santee Maples’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence.
Fifth Cause of Action?Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention
“Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.)?[L]iability for negligence can be imposed only when the employer knows, or should know, that the employee, because of past behavior or other factors, is unfit for the specific tasks to be performed.” (Federico v. Superior Court (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1215.)
“An employer is not charged with guaranteeing the safety of anyone his employee might incidentally meet while on the job against injuries inflicted independent of the performance of work-related functions.” (Ibid.)
The fifth cause of action remains substantially unchanged from the allegations in the FAC. (See SAC, ¶ 42; FAC ¶ 42.)
The SAC alleges that Santee Maple, “knew or should have known that Defendant SEAN DOE and other security personnel were unfit and posed a risk of harm to patrons because they lacked proper training, supervision, and temperament for interacting with the public.” (SAC, ¶ 42.)
Further, Plaintiff does not allege that Santee Maple hired Doe and the other employees.
Plaintiff attempts to cure this evidence by filing outside evidence with the opposition, which is not procedurally proper on demurrer. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)
Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.
The Court sustains Santee Maple’s demurrer as to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action.
Leave to Amend
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”].)
The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that the pleading can be successfully amended. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend his SAC.
Thus, the Court grants leave to amend to address the defects in his pleading.
Conclusion
The Court sustains Maple Alley Association’s demurrer.
Plaintiff shall have leave to amend and must file an amended Complaint by June 17, 2026.
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