Clare P.M. Sassoon, et al. v. Air Venezia, et al.

DISCUSSION: Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint I. Meet and Confer The Declaration of attorney Linda T. Hollenbeck reflects the meet and confer requirements were satisfied. II.

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)

In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Pro. § 430.30, subd. (a).)

A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)

Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.)

The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, at p. 747.)

“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.App.3d 584, 591.)

A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.) III.

Analysis

Defendants’ demurs to all causes of action in the SAC. A. First and Second Causes of Action for Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing To state a cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiffs must be able to establish?(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

“A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself and it has been held that bad faith implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken judgment.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394.)

“If the allegations do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated? [T]he only justification for asserting a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is to obtain a tort recovery.” (Id. at pp. 1394-1395.)

To recover in tort for breach of the implied covenant, the defendant must “have acted unreasonably or without proper cause.” (Id. at p. 1395, citations and italics omitted.)

Here, Defendants argue that it is unclear what breaches are alleged in the SAC (Mot. at p. 6.) The Court agrees.

While demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and should only be sustained where the complaint is so uncertain that the demurring defendant cannot reasonably respond thereto (see, e.g., Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616); here, Plaintiffs? SAC is so uncertain that Defendants cannot reasonably respond.

Plaintiffs? SAC is mostly a long history of the relationship between the parties. While there are scores of allegations of misconduct over the course of over twenty years, through many rounds of prior litigation, not once do Plaintiffs differentiate between the allegations of the prior rounds of litigation and the current action.

It is entirely unclear whether these allegations have already been adjudicated, or if Plaintiffs seek redress for the allegation in this action. Defendants are simply left guessing at what breach, if any, is alleged in this instant action versus what allegations are merely background information.

In opposition, Plaintiffs state “Defendants have wrongfully refused to accept Plaintiffs’ rent for nearly three years, subjected them to invasive surveillance and repeatedly threatened eviction based on a legal theory (illegal subletting) that was expressly invalidated by this Court’s June 2024 Judgment. Such conduct plainly deprives Plaintiffs of the quiet enjoyment and benefits of their leasehold, establishing robust claims for both breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Opp. at pp. 4:22-5:2.)

Plaintiffs do not cite any paragraphs of the SAC that frame such allegations. Further, these are not the only allegations in the SAC. As discussed above, the SAC contains one hundred and one paragraphs of general allegations that go well beyond the limited scope of issues Plaintiffs outlines in opposition.

By pleading every allegation over the last twenty years, Plaintiffs have essentially pled nothing the Court can reasonably identify as the allegations brought in this instant action.

Lastly, a “demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)

However, these ambiguities created by Plaintiffs overpleading are not salvageable through modern discovery procedures. While discovery may clarify certain issues, it does not narrow the scope of issues in the action. (See e.g. Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294, [Court must “identify the issues framed by the pleadings’ on a motion for summary judgment.])

Therefore, the Court finds the first and second causes of action uncertain. Accordingly, Defendants? Demurer to the first and second cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Generally, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) This will be decided at the hearing based upon a request for leave and a sufficient offer of proof supporting same.

B. Third Cause of Action for Tenant Harassment Los Angeles Municipal Code, sections 45.30, et seq. prohibit landlords from harassing tenants. “Tenant Harassment shall be defined as a landlord’s bad faith conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes the latter detriment or harm. “Bad faith’ refers to willful, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct.” (Los Angeles Mun. Code, § 45.30.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege: The acts of DEFENDANTS described above constitute violations of the Los Angeles City Tenant Harassment Ordinance as follows: Tenant Harassment shall be defined as a landlord’s knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific tenant that seriously alarms or annoys the tenant, and that serves no legitimate purpose, including, but not limited to: 6. Misrepresenting to a tenant that the tenant is required to vacate a rental unit or enticing a tenant to vacate a rental unit through an intentional misrepresentation or the concealment or omission of a material fact.

7. Threatening or taking action to terminate any tenancy including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice or bringing action to recover possession of a rental unit based on facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true. No landlord shall be liable under this subsection for bringing an action to recover possession of a rental unit unless and until the tenant has obtained a favorable termination of that action.

8. Threatening to or engaging in any act or omission which interferes with the tenant’s right to use and enjoy the rental unit or whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human habitation and occupancy. (L.A.M.C Article 5.3, section 45.33.) (SAC ¶120.)

However,”[w]e treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 591.) Since the allegations are merely the recitation of law without factual allegations, Plaintiff’s cause of action is deficient as a matter of law.

Further, as discussed above, the prior paragraphs do not sufficiently allege facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action. Accordingly, Defendants’ demurer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Generally, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) This will be decided at the hearing based upon a request for leave and a sufficient offer of proof supporting same.

C. Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with Contractual and/or Prospective Business Relationship and Negligent Interference with Contractual and/or Prospective Business Relationship The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are?(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (I-CA Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 257, 289.)

The elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage include?(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” (Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404, citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.)

Further, “the alleged interference must have been wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. For an act to be sufficiently independently wrongful, it must be unlawful, that is, it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” (Ibid., citation, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted.)

Here, in the fourth cause of action for intentional interference with contractual and/or prospective business relationship Plaintiffs allege: “There was a contract between PLAINTIFFS and Zeid Al Khawaja and PLAINTIFFS and Zeid Al Khawaja were in an economic relationship that would have resulted in economic benefit to PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANTS knew of the contract and knew of the economic relationship. DEFENDANTS engaged in wrongful conduct by threatening eviction without valid basis, relying on their unsupported interpretation of the TSA that PLAINTIFFS must make the UNIT their primary residence which (a) prevented performance of the contract or made performance more difficult or (b) disrupted the economic relationship. . . The economic relation between PLAINTIFFS and Zeid Al Khawaja was disrupted? (SAC ¶¶130-132, 133.)

Plaintiffs allege nearly identical allegations in the fifth cause of action for negligent interference with contractual and/or prospective business relationships. (SAC ¶¶138-140, 143.)

The factual allegations, if proven true, could sufficiently support each cause of action. Accordingly, Defendants? Demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action are OVERRULED.

D. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege: PLAINTIFFS repeat and reallege all the preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full below. As set forth above, the DEFENDANTS had a legal duty to PLAINTIFFs, DEFENDANTS breached that duty, and DEFENDANTS? Breach caused PLAINTIFFS to suffer damages. The PLAINTIFFS were harmed in an amount to be proven at trial. The DEFENDANTS’ negligence was a substantial factor in causing PLAINTIFFS’ harm. (SAC ¶¶145-147.)

However,”[w]e treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 591.) Since the allegations are merely the recitation of the elements of a cause of action for negligence without factual allegations, Plaintiff’s cause of action is deficient as a matter of law.

Further, as discussed above, the prior paragraphs do not sufficiently allege facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action. Accordingly, Defendants’ demurer to the sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Generally, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Because it appears there is a reasonable possibility of successfully amending this cause of action, thirty days leave to amend is given.

E. Seventh Cause of Action for violation of Business and Professions Code, section 17200 et. seq Business and Professions Code, section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see¿Clark v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 610.)¿A violation of other laws is¿deemed¿independently actionable under the UCL. (See¿Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Services¿(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 544, 554.)

“Virtually any law, federal, state or local, can serve as a predicate for a section 17200 action.” (Ibid. (quoting¿Troyk¿v. Farmers Group, Inc.¿(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1335).)¿To¿establish¿a fraudulent practice under the UCL, the plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived. (See¿West v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 806.)

“A business practice is unfair within the meaning of the UCL if it violates established public policy or if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.”¿(McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1473.)¿Further, statutory claims must be pled with particularity. (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC¿(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 410.)¿A cause of action for unfair competition “is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.¿(2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.)¿

Here, Plaintiffs allege “DEFENDANTS, and each of them, engaged in conduct that constituted unlawful, unfair and/or fraudulent business practices, including their ongoing refusal to accept rent, and refuse to clarify their terms regarding what actions Plaintiffs must take to comply with the Notice (for example, did they believe PLAINTIFFS need to reside at the UNIT full-time, did it need to be PLAINTIFFS exclusive residence, and many other examples of dirty tricks, harassment, threats and intimidation).” (SAC ¶149.)

These allegations are deficient. First, Plaintiffs do not assert any specific statutory violation. (See Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 410.) Second, all violations are merely restatements of prior tort and contract causes of action. Plaintiffs are attempting to use this cause of action as a “all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action’ instead of alleging an independent cause of action. (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 173.)¿Therefore, the SAC does not allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code, section 17200.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurer to the seventh cause of action is SUSTAINED. Generally, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) This will be decided at the hearing based upon a request for leave and a sufficient offer of proof supporting same.

F. Eighth Cause of Action for violation of the Bane Act The elements of a claim for violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act are: (1) the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights by threatening or committing violent acts; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed that if he or she exercised his or her constitutional rights the defendant would commit violence against him or her or his or her property, or the defendant injured the plaintiff or his or her property to prevent him or her from exercising his or her constitutional rights or retaliated against the plaintiff for having exercised his or her constitutional rights; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (Civ.

Code, § 52.1; Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 882.)

A Bane Act violation requires that the defendant have a specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights. (Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 801-802.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege “Pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 DEFENDANTS wrongfully engaged in the following conduct: using threats, harassment, and intimidation to interfere with PLAINTIFFS right of quite enjoyment of their leasehold interest.” (SAC ¶154.)

However, these allegations are deficient. Plaintiffs do not assert any specific constitutional rights Plaintiffs interfered with. Instead, it appears from the allegation, that Plaintiffs are alleging violations of a contract or of local ordinances. Therefore, the SAC does not allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED. Generally, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) This will be decided at the hearing based upon a request for leave and a sufficient offer of proof supporting same.

G. Ninth Cause of Action for violation of Cal. Civil Code § 1940.2 “Civil Code section 1940.2 makes it unlawful for a landlord to commit certain specified acts “for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling.”? (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1301., quoting Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a).)

It is unlawful for a landlord to?[u]se, or threaten to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the tenants’ quiet enjoyment of the premises in violation of Section 1927 that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person.” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Plaintiffs allege “DEFENDANTS wrongfully engaged in the following conduct: using threats, harassment, and intimidation for the purpose of influencing PLAINTIFFS to vacate their dwelling.” (SAC ¶160.)

However,?[w]e treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 591.) Since the allegations are merely the recitation of the elements of a cause of action for without factual allegations, Plaintiff’s cause of action is deficient as a matter of law.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurer to the ninth causes of action is SUSTAINED. Generally, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) This will be decided at the hearing based upon a request for leave and a sufficient offer of proof supporting same.

Motion to Strike I.

Legal Standard

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (Code Civ. Pro § 436.) II.

Analysis

Moving Defendants move to strike the prayer for punitive damages from portions of the SAC as well as irrelevant portions therein. As the Court SUSTAINED the demurrer to causes of actions one through three and six through nine, the motions to strike portions from those causes of actions is MOOT.

As an initial note, Defendants seek to strike what Defendants argue is irrelevant information from the SAC in paragraphs 28-35, 67, and 70-74. As noted in the ruling on the concurrent demurrer, it is ambiguous whether such allegations are relevant to this action. As Plaintiffs have been given leave to amend this ambiguity, the motion to strike is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

A. Punitive Damages Civil Code, section 3294 provides that?[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

To survive a motion to strike, the compliant must contain “specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)

Furthermore, corporate liability for punitive damages requires proof that an officer, director, or managing agent authorized, ratified, or personally engaged in malicious conduct. (Civ. Code § 3294 subd. (b).)

In support of the fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs state: DEFENDANTS are guilty of malice as defined in Cal. Civil Code § 3294(c)(1) regarding their conduct related to this cause of action. Specifically, DEFENDANTS’ conduct was intended “to cause injury to the PLAINTIFF[S]? for the purpose of causing PLAINTIFFS to terminate their tenancy. Further, DEFENDANTS’ conduct was “carried on by the DEFENDANT[S] with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Cal. Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).) PLAINTIFFS’ rights and such acts were oppressive, fraudulent and despicable. Accordingly, PLAINTIFFS are entitled to punitive damages, according to proof. (SAC ¶136.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege broad conclusive statements rather than “specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious? (Today's IV, Inc., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages from the fourth cause of action in the complaint.

Generally, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) This will be decided at the hearing based upon a request for leave and a sufficient offer of proof supporting same.

Concluding Observations re: Over-Pleading Last, but not least, this Court is continuingly frustrated by the constant over-pleading of lawsuits by plaintiffs’ attorneys in essentially what is a habitability cases.

Why assert nine (9) causes of action in this particular case, when two or three will suffice? The causes of action for the habitability claim may be understandable. Why then add separate causes of action for basically the same underlying allegations, such as breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; tenant harassment; intentional interference with contractual relationship; negligent interference with contractual relationship; negligence, etc.” The Bane Act?!”

Are you concerned that you will not be able to simply prove that there was a breach of habitability? Indeed. And of course, let us not forget every plaintiff’s favorite’ unfair business practices! What is the “restitution’ you will be requesting? What is the restraining order you will be seeking? “Don’t rent an inhibitable premises?? [FN 1]

A lawsuit’s complaint should not become a law school or bar examination in which one attempts to identify every possible claim in a blue book. Suffice it to state, many of the causes of actions pled in this case are either duplicative and/or already covered by the initial causes of action.

In this case, Plaintiffs’ counsel may perhaps score an “A’ in a law school examination, but they get an “F’ in practical civil litigation practice. Food for thought.

Dated: May 18, 2026 ___________________________________ Randolph M. Hammock Judge of the Superior Court

FN 1 - Indeed, one should be careful for what they ask. This Court could unilaterally bifurcate the unlawful business practices cause of action, and hear it immediately, given that this is equitable in nature, and there is no right to a jury. In such an event, any rulings and or findings of fact in such a bifurcated trial could have implications to the remaining causes of action.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at [email protected] by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By