defendants’ motions to strike (CRS# 1502, 4522)
v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motion to quash is GRANTED. The subpoena to The Walt Disney Company is quashed in its entirety. Sanctions are denied as the parties acted with substantial justification.
MARIA GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. 833 FEDORA RE LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 25STCV35131 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 [TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants’ motions to strike (CRS# 1502, 4522)
BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2025, various individual plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants 833 Fedora Re LLC and Weststar Property Management, Inc. for alleged habitability issues.
On March 25, 2026, Defendant 833 Fedora filed the instant motion (CRS# 1502) to strike punitive damages. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on April 7, 2026. Defendant filed a reply on May 11, 2026.
On April 10, 2026, Defendant Weststar filed a substantively identical motion (CRS# 4522) to strike punitive damages. CRS# 4522 was originally set for June 3, 2026. However, given the identical nature of the motions, CRS# 4522 is advanced and heard on this date.
LEGAL STANDARD
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).)
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.)
The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)
MEET AND CONFER
Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (
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The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See Zaks Decl.; Baldwin Decl.)
DISCUSSION
“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).)
??Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., § 3294(c)(1).)
??Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. § 3294(c)(2).)
Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., § 3294(c)(3).)
Here, the facts in the complaint demonstrate repeated pleas from tenants to abate unsafe and unsanitary conditions, plus repeated government notices. (Compl. ¶¶ 29-88.)
The complaint alleges that despite this, Defendants knowingly failed to address the defects. (Ibid.)
An intentional failure to abate known unsafe conditions may be considered malicious or oppressive for pleading purposes. Thus, the facts in the complaint support a plea for punitive damages.
Defendants do not dispute that the allegations sufficiently demonstrate malice or oppression. Instead, Defendants only attack the corporate ratification element. (See Civ. Code, § 3294(b).)
However, it may be reasonably inferred from the allegations that Defendants’ conduct was ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent. (See Compl. ¶¶ 95, 119.) Plaintiff is not required to identify a particular individual at the pleading stage.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motions to strike are DENIED. Home -->)" -->