Amanda Perez, et al. v. Global Integrity Realty Corporation

Case No.: 25STCV00772 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 [TENTATIVE] order RE: plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication

BACKGROUND

On January 13, 2025, Plaintiffs Amanda Perez, Levi Cephas, Amber Thatcher, Christian Peel, Edward Revelez, and Alexa Moreno filed this action against Defendant Global Integrity Realty Corporation. The complaint asserts causes of action for (1) violation of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA), (2) failure to provide receipt for tenant screening, and (3) declaratory relief. The latter two causes of action were stricken on demurrer, leaving only the first cause of action for violation of ICRAA.

On February 20, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for summary adjudication. Defendant filed an opposition on April 28, 2026. Plaintiffs filed a reply on May 7, 2026.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and “all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

?[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1101.)

To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Defendant’s objection is overruled.

DISCUSSION

I. Preemption

a. Legal Standard

“Preemption analysis . . . generally begins with a presumption against preemption.” (Sanai v. Saltz (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 746, 772.) There is a “strong presumption against displacement of state law that applies in the preemption context.” (Kemp v. Superior Court (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 981, 1001.)

?[E]xpress preemption arises when Congress “define[s] explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law.”? (Id. at p. 997.) The Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) contains two express preemption provisions. First, FCRA provides that state laws are preempted “to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 1681 et seq.], and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.” (15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a).)

Second, FCRA prohibits states from imposing any “requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under’ specified FCRA sections. (15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1).) Two such sections are: “section 615(d) [15 USCS § 1681m(d)], relating to the duties of persons who use a consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance;” and “section 615(h) [15 USCS § 1681m(h)], relating to the duties of users of consumer reports to provide notice with respect to terms in certain credit transactions.” (Id., § 1681t(b)(1)(D), (I).)

?[T]he legislative history behind § 1681t(b) supports only “discrete’ and “sharply drawn’ areas of preemption.” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1069.)

Here, Defendant relies on both the general “inconsistency’ provision in section 1681t(a) and the specific provisions in section 1681t(b) to argue that the ICRAA claims are preempted. Defendant argues that because FCRA does not require the type of notice provided for in ICRAA, imposing strict liability for failure to provide such notice would be “inconsistent’ with the provisions of FCRA and be preempted as a “requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to [a] subject matter regulated under’ the sub-provisions of FCRA. (See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t.)

b. Inconsistency

Courts reject the notion that a state law is inconsistent with FCRA “simply because the [state law] regulate[s] a matter not addressed by the FCRA.” (Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group (8th Cir. 2004) 378 F.3d 839, 842.) “We decline to interpret Congress's silence with regard to any notice requirement to signify its intent to prohibit states from enacting their own regulations on the issue.” (Ibid.) FCRA “is not intended to occupy the entire regulatory field with regard to consumer reports.” (Ibid.)

As a result,”[s]tate law is pre-empted by the FCRA only when compliance with inconsistent State law would result in violation of the FCRA.” (Id. at p. 843.)

?[W]hen a state consumer protection law is merely broader than the federal law, the degree of inconsistency is zero.” (Aghaeepour v. N. Leasing Sys. (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 378 F. Supp. 3d 254, 263.) ICRAA is not inconsistent with FCRA merely because it imposes additional notice requirements not found in FCRA. It is possible to comply with both laws simultaneously. Defendant cites no authority finding the relevant provisions of ICRAA (Civ. Code, § 1786.16(a)(3), (b)) to be preempted by FCRA under 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a).

c. Section 1681m(d)

Section 1681m(d) pertains to the?[d]uties of users making written credit or insurance solicitations on basis of information contained in consumer files.” (15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d).) That sub-provision applies to?[a]ny person who uses a consumer report on any consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer, that is provided to that person under section 1681b(c)(1)(B) of this title.” (Id., § 1681m(d)(1).)

This case does not involve a solicitation, nor a credit or insurance transaction not initiated by the consumer. Thus, the ICRAA claim is not encroaching on “any subject matter regulated under’ section 1681m(d). (See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1).) Defendant cites no authority finding the relevant provisions of ICRAA (Civ. Code, § 1786.16(a)(3), (b)) to be preempted by FCRA under 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(D).

d. Section 1681m(h)

Section 1681m(h) pertains to the?[d]uties of users in certain credit transactions.” (15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h).) That sub-provision applies “if any person uses a consumer report in connection with an application for, or a grant, extension, or other provision of, credit on material terms that are materially less favorable than the most favorable terms available to a substantial proportion of consumers from or through that person, based in whole or in part on a consumer report.” (Id., § 1681m(h)(1).)

This case does not involve material terms that are materially less favorable than the most favorable terms available to a substantial proportion of consumers. Thus, the ICRAA claim is not encroaching on “any subject matter regulated under’ section 1681m(h). (See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1).) Defendant cites no authority finding the relevant provisions of ICRAA (Civ. Code, § 1786.16(a)(3), (b)) to be preempted by FCRA under 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(I).

In sum, FCRA does not preempt the relevant provisions of ICRAA. As a result, preemption does not preclude Defendant from being held liable under ICRAA in this case. The remaining issue is whether the facts support Defendant’s liability under ICRAA as a matter of law.

II. Violation of ICRAA

a. The Undisputed Facts Demonstrate a Violation of ICRAA

ICRAA regulates the procurement of reports containing information on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living. ICRAA imposes certain requirements on those that request such information and the agencies that procure it for them. (Civ. Code, §§ 1786 et seq.)

The following two provisions are pertinent to this case: If an investigative consumer report is sought in connection with the hiring of a dwelling unit, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1940, the person procuring or causing the request to be made shall, not later than three days after the date on which the report was first requested, notify the consumer in writing that an investigative consumer report will be made regarding the consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living. The notification shall also include the name and address of the investigative consumer reporting agency that will prepare the report and a summary of the provisions of Section 1786.22. (Id., § 1786.16(a)(3).)

Any person described in subdivision (d) of Section 1786.12 [1] who requests an investigative consumer report, in accordance with subdivision (a) regarding that consumer, shall do the following: (1) Provide the consumer a means by which the consumer may indicate on a written form, by means of a box to check, that the consumer wishes to receive a copy of any report that is prepared. If the consumer wishes to receive a copy of the report, the recipient of the report shall send a copy of the report to the consumer within three business days of the date that the report is provided to the recipient, who may contract with any other entity to send a copy to the consumer.

The notice to request the report may be contained on either the disclosure form, as required by subdivision (a), or a separate consent form. The copy of the report shall contain the name, address, and telephone number of the person who issued the report and how to contact them. (Id., § 1786.16(b).)

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs applied for a dwelling unit as defined in Civil Code section 1940(c). (Plntf.”s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts (UF) 1-6.) Thus, the consumer reports obtained in relation to Plaintiffs’ housing applications fall under the purview of ICRAA. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1786.12(d), 1786.16(a), (b).)

It is undisputed that Defendant obtained consumer reports on Plaintiffs in relation to their rental applications. (UF 13-14.) It is further undisputed that Defendant did not provide a check box for Plaintiffs to indicate their desire to receive a copy of their consumer report. (UF 7-12.)

Lastly, it is undisputed that Defendants did not notify Plaintiffs in writing that an investigative consumer report will be made regarding their character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living; nor did Defendant provide the name and address of the agency preparing the report or provide a summary of the provisions of section 1786.22. (UF 17-19.) These facts establish, as a matter of law, that Defendant violated ICRAA. Therefore, summary adjudication is appropriate.

b. Defendant Fails to Raise a Material Dispute

1. Whether Plaintiffs Would Have Checked the Box

Defendant disputes the notion that Plaintiffs would have checked the box to obtain a copy of their report had such a box been provided. (Def.”s Resp. to UF 7-12.) Defendant claims it would have provided Plaintiffs with the report had Plaintiffs requested one. However, ICRAA does not require an affected consumer to prove that he or she actually wished to obtain a copy of their consumer report. Nor is a consumer required to prove that the defendant intended to conceal such a report. Therefore, this dispute is immaterial to the ICRAA claim.

2. General Reputation and Mode of Living

Defendant next argues that the reports it obtains include information about credit history, employment and income, criminal record, and lawsuits, but not about general reputation or mode of living. (Def.”s Resp. to UF 12-14.) However, credit history, employment, income, criminal record, and lawsuits do pertain to a consumer’s general reputation and mode of living. Moreover, Defendant does not dispute that its consumer reports at least pertain to character and personal characteristics. Thus, Defendant has not been absolved from the obligation to notify consumers in writing that a report will be procured regarding their “character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.” (See Civ. Code, § 1786.16(a)(3).) Lastly, this does not affect Defendant’s obligation to provide the check box required under section 1786.16(b).

3. Acknowledgement

Defendant further contends that Plaintiffs signed acknowledgments that a “screening report’ would be prepared about them. (Def.”s Resp. to UF 17-18, 21.) However, this does not absolve Defendant from providing the specific notices required by ICRAA. Defendant does not contend that the acknowledgments constituted notice “in writing that an investigative consumer report will be made regarding the consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living.” (See Civ. Code, § 1786.16(a)(3).)

Nor is there any evidence that the acknowledgments included the name and address of the agency preparing the report or provided a summary of the provisions of section 1786.22. (Ibid.) And the acknowledgments did not contain a check box for Plaintiffs to request a copy of their consumer reports. (Id., § 1786.16(b).) Therefore, the acknowledgments do not raise a factual dispute in relation to the ICRAA claim.

4. Damages

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not suffered any harm because their rental applications were approved. But the analysis does not end there. Rather, ICRAA was enacted to address “grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” (Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 399, 414.) To that end, “plaintiffs whose ICRAA rights are violated have standing to sue and recover a statutory penalty even if they have not suffered an actual injury.” (Yeh v. Barrington Pacific, LLC (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1303, 1320?1321.) Therefore, the absence of damages does not result in a triable issue.

c. Good Faith and Substantial Compliance are Not Exceptions to the Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to statutory damages because Defendant held a good faith belief that it had complied with ICRAA and substantially complied with ICRAA. Nothing in the statute implies that either good faith or substantial compliance is an exception to the penalties provided therein.

ICRAA simply provides that?[a]n investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with any requirement under this title with respect to an investigative consumer report is liable to the consumer who is the subject of the report in an amount equal to the sum of all the following: . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 1786.50(a).) Willfulness is only pertinent to a potential award of punitive damages. (See id., § 1786.50(b).)

Defendant acknowledges that “California courts have yet to explicitly address whether substantial compliance or a good faith belief of compliance with the ICRAA is sufficient to avoid its statutory damages.” (Opp. 14:15-16.) In other words, there is no binding authority creating a good faith or substantial compliance exception to ICRAA.

Defendant proceeds to analyze cases arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and wage statement law, pointing out that those statutes require a showing of willfulness or bad faith as a condition to imposing their respective penalties. (Opp. 14:25-17:9.) However, those other statutes have express provisions either requiring “a knowing and intentional failure’ or absolving liability based upon a showing of “bona fide error.” (See Lab. Code, § 226(a); Civ. Code, § 1788.62(e).)

By contrast, ICRAA contains no such provisions, and the Court will not create an exception that does not otherwise arise from the statutory text. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [“In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted”]; Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 636 [courts “will not create an exception the Legislature did not enact”].)

Defendant’s reliance on Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976 is unhelpful. The court in Lusardi held that “in a proper case equitable considerations may preclude the imposition of statutory penalties against a public work contractor for failing to pay the prevailing wage.” (Id. at p. 996.) The court found statutory penalties to be unwarranted under the particular circumstances of that case: “Here, Lusardi acted in good faith in entering into the contract on the basis of the District's representations, assertedly on the advice of its attorneys, that the project was not subject to the prevailing wage law. Under the circumstances of this case it would be inequitable for Lusardi to be held liable for penalties for failure to pay the prevailing wage.” (Ibid.)

By contrast, the instant case involves a different statute and different facts. Defendant’s evidence of its purported good faith is not analogous to the circumstances in Lusardi. (See Alkobi Decl. ¶ 4 [averring that Defendant relied on third-party entities to create legally compliant application forms].)

ICRAA was enacted to address “grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” (Parsonage, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.) ICRAA fulfills its purpose by “strictly limiting’ when an investigative report may be furnished. (Id. at p. 415.) There is no indication that a good faith or substantial compliance exception would be aligned with the text and purpose of ICRAA, and Defendant cites no authority supporting such an exception under ICRAA.

In sum, the undisputed facts establish that Defendant violated ICRAA as a matter of law. Defendant has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, summary adjudication is warranted.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED.

[1] This includes a person who?[i]ntends to use the information in connection with the hiring of a dwelling unit, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1940.” (Civ. Code, § 1786.12(d)(5).)

Case Number: 25STCV32864 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 32 TIMOTHY SEAN GRIZZLE, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants.